On Point

State v. Steven P. Muckerheide, 2007 WI 5, affirming unpublished opinion
For Muckerheide: Mark S. Rosen

Issue/Holding:

¶38      We agree with the State’s assertion that cases from other jurisdictions are not binding on Wisconsin courts. State ex rel. E.R. v. Flynn, 88 Wis. 2d 37, 46, 276 N.W.2d 313 (Ct. App. 1979). We recognize that such case law is oftentimes helpful,

Oneida Co. DSS v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, affirming unpublished decision

Issue: Whether partial summary judgment against Nicole was properly granted under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10) (prior involuntary TPR within 3 years) when the prior termination order was based on her default for failing to personally appear at the fact-finding hearing.

Holding:

¶27 We agree with the court of appeals that to require more evidence than a prior involuntary termination order to satisfy Wis.

Oneida Co. DSS v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, affirming unpublished decision

Issue: Whether partial summary judgment against Nicole was properly granted under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10) (prior involuntary TPR within 3 years) when the prior termination order did not state the explicit § 48.415 ground relied on.

Holding:

¶2 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10)(b) does not require proof of which § 48.415 ground was relied upon for a prior termination of parental rights because the phrase,

Dane co. DHS v. Dyanne M., 2007 WI App 129, District 4 court of appeals, 3/29/07 (published)

Issue/Holding:

¶19 Dyanne acknowledges that the CHIPS order makes reference to “warnings” and contains the statutory language defining the possible grounds for termination. She also does not dispute that the order contains the conditions that were necessary for Artavia’s return. Dyanne’s argument is limited to an assertion that the order fails to sufficiently connect the warning language to the statutory language.

Dane Co. DHS v. Dyanne M., 2007 WI App 129, District 4, 3/29/07 (published)

Competency of TPR Court – Statutory Time Limits, Generally

Issue/Holding:1: Generally, compliance with a statutory TPR time limit is mandatory, such that non-compliance results in lost circuit court competency absent an applicable exception, ¶5, citing Dane Co. DHS v. Susan P.S., 2006 WI App 100, ¶63.

Issue/Holding:2: The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of lost judicial competency for lapse of a time limit without obtaining a proper extension under § 48.315,

State v. Bobby G., 2007 WI 77, reversing a summary order remanding the case to the court of appeals.

Issue/Holding:

¶5 For the reasons set forth, we hold that in determining whether a party seeking termination of parental rights has proven by clear and convincing evidence that a biological father has failed to assume parental responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), a circuit court must consider the biological father’s efforts undertaken after he discovers that he is the father but before the circuit court adjudicates the grounds of the termination proceeding.

Waukesha Co. DHHS v. Teodoro E., 2008 WI App 16, District 2 (published)

Issue/Holding: The trial court properly exercised discretion in terminating rights:

¶25 Teodoro finally argues that at the dispositional stage, the trial court erroneously determined that termination of his parental rights would be in the best interests of the children. This determination is committed to the circuit court’s discretion, and will not be overturned unless that discretion is erroneously exercised.

Waukesha Co. DHHS v. Teodoro E., 2008 WI App 16, District 2 (published)

Issue/Holding: Conditions imposed for non-termination of a deported parent’s children weren’t impossible, notwithstanding parent’s inability to return to country:

¶23 But as the circuit court noted, “Mexico is not prison” and Teodoro remained free to work on and meet many of the conditions of return. As an example, the first condition,

Allen A. Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir 2005)

Issue/Holding: AEDPA requirement of state court adjudication on merits requires neither “well-articulated or even correct decision”; state court need not offer any reasons, so that summary disposition would satisfy requirement. In short: it “is perhaps best understood by stating what it is not: it is not the resolution of a claim on procedural grounds.”

Followed: Joseph M.

State v. Thomas S. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, affirming unpublished opinion
For Mayo: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶46      We agree with Mayo’s position, and the State’s concession at oral argument, that the prosecutor’s remarks on Mayo’s pre-Miranda silence, and the testimony she elicited in that regard, during the State’s opening statement and case-in-chief, violated Mayo’s right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,