On Point

State v. Forest S. Shomberg, 2006 WI 9, affirming unpublished decision
For Shomberg: Charles W. Giesen; Morris D. Berman

Issue/Holding: Trial court’s refusal to admit expert testimony on factors influencing witness’s ability to identify a stranger during a lineup procedure, in particular the distorting effect of a simultaneous as opposed to sequential procedure, was not an erroneous exercise of discretion:

¶15     In 2002,

State v. Jeffrey Lorenzo Searcy, 2006 WI App 8
For Searcy: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue/Holding:

¶48 Here, Adams’ statements were properly admitted under the excited utterance hearsay exception. Adams spontaneously made the statements, without police prompting, under the stress of watching her cousin being taken into custody at gunpoint. It was only one to two minutes after Searcy’s arrest that Adams emerged from the crowd that had gathered to witness the arrest and yelled,

State v. Reinier A. Ravesteijn, 2006 WI App 250
For Ravesteijn: Rudolph L. Oldeschulte

Issue/Holding: Although kidnapping for ransom, § 940.31(2)(a), is susceptible to possible mitigation of penalty from 60 to 40 years if the victim is released without permanent physical injury, testimony from counsel at a postconviction hearing that the defendant was well aware of this possibility when he pleaded guilty dooms his claim that he was unaware of the potential penalty when he entered his guilty plea,

State v. Roberto Vargas Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, PFR filed 8/28/06
For Rodriguez: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Where the defendant’s brother testified that the non-testifying complainant had recanted, the prosecution could impeach the brother with the possibility that the complainant was motivated by fear due to the brother’s gang affiliation, ¶31: “A witness’s motive (whether testifying ‘live’ or by admission of his or her out-of-court assertions) is never collateral, 

State v. Justin Yang, 2006 WI App 48
For Olson: John J. Grau

Issue/Holding:

¶11      Inquiry into a witness’s bias is always material and relevant. State v. Williamson, 84 Wis. 2d 370, 383, 267 N.W.2d 337, 343 (1978) (bias and improper motive of witness are never collateral). John Henry Wigmore has characterized cross-examination as “beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” 5 Wigmore,

State v. Nicole Schutte, 2006 WI App 135, PFR filed 7/21/06
For Schutte: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding1: Evidence of the driver’s marijuana use just before the accident resulting in the charged homicide by negligent use of vehicle was relevant and admissible:

¶48      Although the toxicology expert could not tie the level of THC detected in Schutte’s blood to a specific level of impairment,

State v. Forest S. Shomberg, 2006 WI 9, affirming unpublished decision
For Shomberg: Charles W. Giesen; Morris D. Berman

Issue/Holding:

¶39 Finally, we determine that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in refusing to admit testimony regarding Shomberg’s offer to take a polygraph examination. … However, such an offer is only “relevant to the state of mind of a person making the offer as ‘long as the person making the offer believes that the test or analysis is possible,

State v. Rachel W. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, reversing unpublished decision
For Kelty: Michael J. Fairchild

Issue/Holding: The defendant’s striking the victim “twice with two separate objects, each time committing herself to strike the baby, each blow separate, distinct, not identical in fact,” supports two separate charges of first-degree reckless injury, § 940.23(1)(a), ¶¶49-50.

State v. Keith S. Krause, 2006 WI App 43
For Krause: Roger G. Merry

Issue/Holding: Because collateral attack on a prior conviction used as a sentencing enhancer is limited to denial of counsel, and because the right to counsel does not attach to a civil proceeding, a refusal revocation is not subject to collateral attack on its use as an OWI enhancer:

¶12      In an enhanced-penalty situation,

State v. John W. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, on certification
For Campbell: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether a § 948.31 defendant is entitled to raise a common-law privilege defense against the element of “legal custody” by collaterally attacking the court’s custody order as having been procured by fraud.

Holding:

¶56      There are good reasons not to recognize a common law affirmative defense of fraud to interference with child custody.¶57      One species of affirmative defense——exemplified by self-defense and the now-abrogated privilege to resist unlawful arrest——that courts recognize arises where a person is faced with the difficult decision whether to commit a crime or suffer an injury not otherwise susceptible to effective redress.