On Point

State v. John Doe, 2005 WI App 68
For John Doe: Amelia L. Bizzaro (the court file has been ordered sealed, and the caption amended “to shield the defendant’s identity”)

Issue/Holding: “(A) defendant’s substantial and important assistance to law enforcement after sentencing may constitute a new factor that the trial court can take into consideration when deciding whether modification of a sentence is warranted,” ¶1.

¶8.

State v. Robert M. Fowler, 2005 WI App 41, PFR filed 3/9/05For Fowler: Randall E. Paulson, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶30 Dr. Harasymiw’s report concludes that Fowler still is a sexually violent person. This was sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that it was substantially probable that Fowler would engage in acts of sexual violence. …¶31 … Although Dr. Maskel disagreed with certain conclusions,

State v. Frederick W. Prager, 2005 WI App 95
For Prager: Daniel P. Fay

Issue: Whether, six days after original sentencing and imposition of probation, the State’s proffered new factor (that defendant had quitclaimed the jointly owned farm to his wife) supported a modification to an active prison term.

Holding: Although the term of probation was premised in part on the economic hardship that defendant’s wife would suffer if he were sentenced to prison (¶¶4,

State v. John Doe, 2005 WI App 68
For John Doe: Amelia L. Bizzaro (the court file has been ordered sealed, and the caption amended “to shield the defendant’s identity”)

Issue/Holding:

¶6. Thus, sentence modification on the basis of a new factor is a two-step process. Id. First, the defendant must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a new factor justifying a motion for sentence modification. 

State v. James L. Montroy, 2005  WI App 230
For Montroy: Jay E. Heit; Stephanie L. Finn

Issue/Holding: Wisconsin discretionary guideline regime is not governed by the holdings of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), ¶¶20-24.

State v. James L. Montroy, 2005  WI App 230
For Montroy: Jay E. Heit; Stephanie L. Finn

Issue/Holding1: Though information before the sentencing court was indisputably inaccurate, the court took remedial action by ordering that this information be stricken, and thus Montroy can’t satisfy his burden of showing actual reliance on inaccurate information. ¶¶9-11. (State v. Anderson, 222 Wis. 2d 403,

State v. Ryan E. Baker, 2005 WI App 45, PFR filed 3/17/05
For Baker: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The plain text of § 969.02(6) mandates that bail money be used to satisfy court costs, with no room for discretionary return to the depositor rather than payment of costs, ¶¶7-9.

This is a misdemeanor, but the relevant felony statute, § 969.03(4),

State v. Harry L. Seymer, 2005 WI App 93
For Seymer: Andrea T. Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: Where the (pro se) sexual assault defendant’s attempt to cross-examine the complainant and principal witness was abruptly terminated by the trial court, purportedly because of the defendant’s “mocking tone” and “derisive behavior”; but where the record did not in any respect support these “subjective impressions,” “the underpinnings of the trial court’s decision to terminate cross-examination [are] unavailing,

State v. Glenn H. Hale, 2005 WI 7, affirming, as modified, 2003 WI App 238
For Hale: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶53. A threshold question for applying the Crawford framework is whether the State is proffering “testimonial” hearsay evidence. …¶54. Because Sullivan’s hearsay evidence was “testimonial” in nature, we turn next to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by Crawford: (1) unavailability of the declarant and (2) a prior opportunity for cross-examination.

State v. Paul J. Stuart, 2005 WI 47, reversing unpublished COA opinion; and overruling State v. Paul J. Stuart, 2003 WI 73
For Stuart: Christopher W. Rose

Issue: Whether the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness (“John”) – unavailable at trial after refusing to testify at that stage – was admissible under the confrontation clause,