On Point

State v. Kent Kleven, 2005 WI App 66
For Kleven: Roberta A. Heckes

Issue/Holding: Where sentencing includes multiple enhancers, the court may identify the amount of confinement attributable to each enhancer, without violating the rule that an enhancer doesn’t support a separate sentence. ¶¶16-18. (The court adds, however, ¶18 n. 4, that the “better practice” is to avoid “allocating any portions of the confinement imposed among the base offense and enhancers.”)

Issue/Holding: Maximum confinement for TIS-I attempt to commit a classified felony is one-half the maximum confinement for the completed crime,

State v. Jeremy P., 2005 WI App 13
For Jeremy P.: Adam B. Stephens

Issue/Holding: Because mandatory sex offender registration for certain juvenile offenders, §§ 938.34(15m)(bm) and 301.45(1m), is not punishment it does not violate procedural due process, ¶¶8-15. The court’s retention of discretion in administering registration defeats a substantive due process claim, ¶22. An equal protection argument, based on claim of children-as-supsect-class, is also rejected, ¶¶23-29.

State v. Kent Kleven, 2005 WI App 66
For Kleven: Roberta A. Heckes

Issue/Holding:

¶14. We conclude that, provided the sentence imposed exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment established for the base offense, a court’s remarks attributing a portion of the sentence to an applicable enhancer does not constitute grounds to vacate that portion of the sentence. As the supreme court explained in State v.

State v. Brandon J. Matke, 2005 WI App 4, PFR filed 1/6/05
For Matke: James B. Connell

Issue/Holding:

¶16. Matke also contends that the trial court’s interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2), which is now ours as well, violates due process because it permits the court to sentence him for a sixth OMVWI without requiring the State to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that he had five prior OMVWI convictions.

State v. Ryan E. Baker, 2005 WI App 45, PFR filed 3/17/05
For Baker: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The plain text of § 969.02(6) mandates that bail money be used to satisfy court costs, with no room for discretionary return to the depositor rather than payment of costs. ¶¶7-9.

This is a misdemeanor, but the relevant felony statute, § 969.03(4),

State v. Martin D. Triplett, 2005 WI App 255
For Triplett: Syovata Edari, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate / Milwaukee Trial

Issue: Whether the officer’s inability to perform an “effective” patdown permitted a further intrusion that led to the discovery of contraband.

Holding:

¶12      Our supreme court has not, however, addressed the scope of a permissibleTerry search where an effective patdown is impossible.

State v. James L. Montroy, 2005  WI App 230
For Montroy: Jay E. Heit; Stephanie L. Finn

Issue/Holding: The sentencing court properly exercised discretion in denying eligibility for Earned Release, § 302.05(3), despite misperceiving at one point that defendant was statutorily ineligible:

¶17 … [A]t the December 6, 2004, [postconviction] hearing … [t]he court stated:

Well, of course, the Court is very familiar with Mr. 

State v. Bill P. Marquardt, 2005 WI 157, on certification; prior history: 2001 WI App 219
For Marquardt: John Brinckman; Patricia A. Fitzgerald

Issue/Holding: The “significant investigation” requirement of State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98 is satisfied:

¶52      Investigator Price estimated that over the course of March 13 and 14, a total of 20 law enforcement officers had become involved in the investigation of the homicide.

State v. Sheldon C. Stank, 2005 WI App 236
For Stank: Dennis P. Coffey

Issue: Whether Stank was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, relative to the credibility of the informant, in support of his attack on probable cause for the search warrant.

Holding:

¶30      We hold that Stank was not entitled to such a hearing. In Morales v. State, 44 Wis.

State v. Sheldon C. Stank, 2005 WI App 236
For Stank: Dennis P. Coffey

Issue: Whether a time lag of two months between the informant’s observations and the application for the search warrant rendered the warrant stale.

Holding: Passage of time dose not alone render probable cause stale; the warrant-issuing court may consider various factors, ¶33 (citing State v. Multaler,