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On Point is a judicial analysis blog written by members of the Wisconsin State Public Defenders. It includes cases from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and the Supreme Court of the United States.
Particular Examples of Misconduct, § 904.04(2) – “Context”
State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg
Issue/Holding:
¶58. First, the circuit court could reasonably have concluded, as it did, that the other-acts evidence was admissible for the purpose of establishing context. Other-acts evidence is permissible to show the context of the crime and to provide a complete explanation of the case.
Particular Examples of Misconduct, § 904.04(2) – “Victim’s State of Mind”
State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg
Issue/Holding:
¶59. The other-acts evidence was permissible to show the victims’ state of mind, to corroborate information provided to the police, and to establish the credibility of victims and witnesses in light of their recantations. Such purposes have been held to be permissible purposes in Wisconsin.
Particular Examples of Misconduct, § 904.04(2) – “Opportunity and Motive”
State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg
Issue/Holding:
¶60. Next, the circuit court could reasonably have concluded that the other-acts evidence was admissible for the purpose of establishing opportunity and motive. When a defendant’s motive for an alleged sexual assault is an element of the charged crime, we have held that other crimes evidence may be offered for the purpose of establishing opportunity and motive.
Particular Examples of Misconduct, § 904.04(2) — (Non-)Consent & State v. Alsteen
State v. Timothy M. Ziebart, 2003 WI App 258
For Ziebart: Robert R. Henak
Issue: Whether the holding of State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982) (re sexual assault where the defendant admits the act but claims consent: prior sexual misconduct has no probative value) imposes an absolute bar against admissibility of prior other-acts to prove the contested issue of consent.
Plea Bargains – Breach: By Prosecutor — Less Than Neutral Recitation of Recommendation
State v. Rodney K. Stenseth, 2003 WI App 198, PFR filed 9/2/03
For Stenseth: Robert A. Ferg
Issue/Holding: The state did not violate the plea bargain, which limited its recommended disposition to two years’ confinement plus extended supervision, by expressing agreement with some portions of the PSI (which recommended 8 years’ confinement plus supervision):
¶12. Here, the State’s reference to the plea agreement was not less than neutral.
Particular Examples of Misconduct, § 904.04(2) – “Reverse” Misconduct – Inability of Witness to Identify Defendant of Similar Uncharged Crime
State v. Robert Jamont Wright, 2003 WI App 252
For Wright: Ann Auberry
Issue/Holding:
¶44. Alternatively, Wright argues that Lomack’s testimony was admissible as other acts evidence of a third-party perpetrator pursuant to Scheidell. Scheidell involved the admissibility of other acts evidence committed by an unknown third party, which was proffered by the accused on the issue of identity.
Particular Examples of Misconduct, § 904.04(2) — Prior Sexual Assaults
State v. William A. Silva, 2003 WI App 191, PFR filed 9/4/03
For Silva: Martin E. Kohler, Brian Kinstler, Donald E. Chewning
Issue/Holding: Prior sexual assaults were admissible at Silva’s trial for 1st-degree sexual assault of his 6-year old niece: Silva’s 13-year old niece; Silva’s girlfriend’s 13-year old daughter; and Silva’s 9-year old daughter. ¶¶27-28.
Spousal Privilege, § 905.05(3) – 3rd-Party Exception
State v. Richard G.B., 2003 WI App 13, PFR filed 1/13/03
For Richard G.B.: Bridget E. Boyle
Issue: Whether the “third-party exception” to spousal privilege — which overrides the privilege for crimes committed “against” the spouse, § 905.05(3) — is triggered by sexual assault of a non-spouse, on the theory that such an act amounts to adultery, § 944.16(1), hence a crime against the spouse.
Holding:
¶15.
Privileges – Confidential Informant, § 905.10(3)(b) – Procedure for Disclosing
State v. Phonesavanh Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 41, reversing, 2001 WI App 299
For Vanmanivong: John J. Grau
Issue/Holding:
¶33. With the benefit of these above-stated standards, we now move to the second issue: the application of the procedures in this case. The parties here agree, as do we, that it was error for the circuit court to rely upon an unsworn memo in determining whether the identities of the confidential informants should be disclosed.
Privilege – Confidential Informant, § 905.10(3)(b) – Test for Disclosure
State v. Phonesavanh Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 41, reversing, 2001 WI App 299
For Vanmanivong: John J. Grau
Issue/Holding: The test for disclosing an informant’s identity under § 905.10(3)(b) is found in the concurrence to State v. Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d 112, 321 N.W.2d 145 (1982):
¶24. We now reaffirm our holding in Dowe that the concurrence in Outlaw states the test to be applied in determining whether an informant’s identity must be disclosed.
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