On Point

State v. Brian D. Robins, 2002 WI 65, on bypass
For Robins: Craig W. Albee

Issue/Holding:

¶37. The crime of attempt is complete when the intent to commit the underlying crime is coupled with sufficient acts to demonstrate the improbability of free will desistance; the actual intervention of an extraneous factor is not a “third element” of the crime of attempt, although it is often part of the proof. 

State v. Brian D. Robins, 2002 WI 65, on bypass
For Robins: Craig W. Albee

Issue: Whether attempted child enticement is a prosecutable offense, where the “child victim” was in fact a government agent posing as a child as part of a government sting operation.

Holding: That the “victim” was fictitious is the extraneous factor intervening to make the crime attempted rather than completed enticement. 

State v. Thomas W. Grimm, 2002 WI App 242
For Grimm: Daniel W. Hildebrand

Issue/Holding: State v. Robins, 2002 WI 65, 253 Wis. 2d 298, 646 N.W.2d 287, and State v. Koenck, 2001 WI App 93, 242 Wis. 2d 693, 626 N.W.2d 359, which permit enticement charges where a fictitious online “victim” is thought by the defendant to be a child,

State v. Thomas W. Grimm, 2002 WI App 242
For Grimm: Daniel W. Hildebrand

Issue/Holding: The rationale of State v. Robins, 2002 WI 65, 253 Wis. 2d 298, 646 N.W.2d 287, and State v. Koenck, 2001 WI App 93, 242 Wis. 2d 693, 626 N.W.2d 359, which permit enticement charges where a fictitious online “victim” is thought by the defendant to be a child,

State v. Arden C. Hirsch, 2002 WI App 8For Hirsch: Paul G. LaZotte, UW Law School, LAIP

Issue: Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for second-degree murder, § 940.02 (1969).

Holding: Discrepancies between the parent’s version of what happened to the child and medical expert testimony as to what could not have, or what must have, happened to produce the injuries is crucial. ¶7. Persuasive medical evidence that the child died as result of sever injury,

State v. Jon P. Barreau, 2002 WI App 198, PFR filed 8/12/02
For Barreau: Glenn C. Reynolds

Issue: Whether the first-degree intentional homicide defendant was entitled to an instruction on the lesser offense of first-degree reckless homicide.

Holding: Barreau must show a reasonable basis for negating intent to kill. The victim was killed by multiple blows to the head with a baseball bat.

State v. Debra Ann Head, 2002 WI 99, reversing 2000 WI App 275, 240 Wis. 2d 162, 622 N.W.2d 9
For Head: John D. Hyland, Marcus J. Berghan
Issue/Holding:

¶103. Based on the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 940.05(2), supported by the legislative history and articulated public policy behind the statute, we conclude that when imperfect self-defense is placed in issue by the trial evidence,

State v. Charles J. Burroughs, 2002 WI App 18
For Burroughs: William F. Mross

Issue/Holding: The term “confine” has been defined under § 940.30 (false imprisonment), to mean compelled deprivation of free movement. ¶18. Therefore, the definition of “confine” in Wis JI-Criminal No. 1275 applies to kidnapping. ¶19. Applying that definition: physical force isn’t essential; nor is the victim required to undertake the risk presented by an opportunity to escape.

State v. Russell L. Dibble, 2002 WI App 219, PFR filed 8/14/02
For Dibble: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: First-degree recklessly endangering safety, § 941.30(1), is not a lesser included offense of aggravated battery, § 940.19(5), under the “elements-only” test. Aggravated battery requires intent (to cause great bodily harm); endangering safety requires recklessness (while showing utter disregard for human life). It is this last —

State v. Alan C. Campbell, 2002 WI App 20, PFR filed 1/16/02
For Campbell: Alexander D. Cossi

Issue: Whether Campbell’s conviction for forgery in another state is regarded as a felony for purposes of felon in possession, § 941.29.

Holding:

¶6. We agree with Campbell that the Ohio forgery statute is broader than Wisconsin’s, and that looking solely at the language of the Ohio statute would be insufficient to prove that Campbell was guilty of possessing a firearm as a felon.