On Point

State v. Cherise A. Raflick, 2001 WI 129
For Raflik: Michael J. Fitzgerald, Dean A. Strang

Issue/Holding:

¶1. This case requires us to decide whether suppression is the proper remedy when a telephonic application for a search warrant is not recorded in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3)(d)1, and when the factual basis for the warrant is reconstructed in an ex parte hearing after the warrant has been executed.

State v. Larry J. Sprosty, 2001 WI App 231, PFR filed
For Sprosty: Jack E. Schairer, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the trial court erroneously exercised discretion in granting the state’s motion to vacate an SVP order for supervised release entered, but not implemented, almost four years earlier.

Holding: Under § 806.07(1)(h), there is no deadline for relieving a party from a judgment or order, so long as “extraordinary circumstances”

State v. John Casteel, 2001 WI App 188, PFR filed

Issue: Whether the appeal is sufficiently frivolous to warrant sanctions.

Holding:

¶19. On five previous occasions, Casteel’s appeals have been dismissed based on Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) and Escalona-Naranjo. This case is dismissed on the same basis. Because we conclude that Casteel knows or should know that this, his eighth postconviction order appeal, is without any reasonable basis in law or equity and is not supported by a good faith argument for an extension,

State v. Paul L. Wolfe, 2001 WI App 66, 242 Wis. 2d 426, 625 N.W.2d 655
For Wolfe: Gary Seeling

Issue: “The basic question before us is whether a court, in a multiple count conviction where one sentence is imposed and another stayed, must apply sentence credit to the conviction of the first imposed sentence,” ¶1.

Holding:

¶1. … We hold that it must under the rule of State v.

State v. Gabriel L. Ortiz, 2001 WI App 215
For Ortiz: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Failure to object to restitution until postconviction motion would not incur waiver bar for several reasons: particular claim is of statewide interest; the state never argued waiver in the trial court; the issue is one purely of law. ¶¶11-13.

State v. James A. Torpen, 2001 WI App 273, PFR filed 11/13/01
For Torpen: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether a court has authority to order, as restitutive conditions of probation, payment of obligations from prior, unrelated criminal cases.

Holding:

¶14. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.20, a circuit court may order the payment of restitution to victims of crimes for which the defendant is being sentenced,

State v. Chad J. Knoll, 2000 WI App 135, 237 Wis.2d 384, 614 N.W.2d 20
For Knoll: Ralph Kalal

Issue: Whether passenger Foust, injured in the crash of a car whose driver (Knoll) was drunk, was party to the crime of drunk driving and therefore not a “victim” for purposes of restitution.

Holding:

¶11           Because Knoll has not established either that Foust undertook conduct to aid Knoll in operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated or that Foust intended his conduct to help Knoll drive while impaired,

State v. Troy B. Baker, 2001 WI App 100, 243 Wis. 2d 77, 626 N.W.2d 862

Issue: Whether the trial court had authority to order that restitution be withheld from prison wages.

Holding: Because a restitution order contained in a judgment of conviction is an “obligation reduced to judgment,” a trial court has authority under § 303.01(8)(b) to order disbursement of restitution from prison wages. ¶17.

State v. Garren G. Gribble, 2001 WI App 227, PFR filed
For Gribble: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether, on a conviction for homicide of a child, the child’s mother and aunt could be considered victims within the meaning of § 973.20(1r) so as to support restitution for their counseling costs.

Holding: “Victim” in § 973.20(1r) is assigned the meaning of “victim”

State v. Troy B. Baker, 2001 WI App 100, 243 Wis. 2d 77, 626 N.W.2d 862
For Baker: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the county DHS, which paid out testing expenses for a sexual assault victim, may be considered for restitution purposes an “insurer, surety or other person who has compensated [the] victim.”

Holding: Because § 973.20(5)(d) permits restitution to a third party,