On Point: 1. Original commitment

Milwaukee County v. I.K., 2017AP1425, District 1, 5/8/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The County proved I.K. was dangerous under both § 51.20(1)(a)2.d., by showing there was a substantial probability I.K. would suffer physical harm resulting from his inability to satisfy basic needs due to mental illness, and § 51.20(1)(a)2.e., by showing that, after being advised of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting treatment, I.K. was unable to understand and make an informed choice regarding treatment and that a lack of treatment will result in further disability or deterioration.

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2018AP145-FT, 5/1/18, District 3 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication), petition for review granted, 7/10/19, reversed, 2020 WI 41; case activity

This decision makes you wonder whether §51.20(1)(am), Wisconsin’s recommitment statute, is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to D.J.W.

Chippewa County v. M.M., 2017AP1325, 5/1/18, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

You don’t see this very often. A jury found M.M. mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous under §51.20(1)(a)2.c based on testimony by not 1, not 2, but 3 doctors–all of whom said that M.M.’s paranoia and conduct would cause others to feel fearful and threatened and possibly assault him in an effort to protect themselves. This idea that M.M. was “indirectly” dangerous to himself did not wash with the court of appeals. It reversed and also rejected the County’s claim that M.M.’s appeal from this 6-month commitment was moot.

Outagamie County v. C.A., 2017AP450, District 3, 1/23/18 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The records for Chapter 51 cases are confidential, so we have not seen the briefs for this case. But, judging from this court of appeals opinion, it doesn’t take much beyond a mental illness diagnosis to get yourself committed under §51.20(1)(a)2e, Wisconsin’s 5th standard of dangerousness. A little unsubstantiated hearsay about your frustration with the justice system just might do the trick.

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2017AP1313-FT, District 3, 11/7/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was sufficient evidence at D.J.W.’s commitment trial to establish he met the standard for dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.

Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, 6/8/2017, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 370 Wis. 2d 262, 881 N.W.2d 359; case activity

In Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., which involved a woman with Alzheimer’s disease, SCOW held that a person is a “proper subject for treatment” under §51.20(1) if she can be “rehabilitated.” It then set forth a test for determining whether a mentally ill person has “rehabilitative potential.” In this case, J.W.J. argued that Helen E.F.’s framework should be modified because it does not account for the characteristics of mental illnesses other than Alzheimer’s, such as the one he has–paranoid schizophrenia.

Marathon County v. R.O., 2016AP1898-FT, 2/27/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In 2016 R.O. was detained under § 51.15 after she was evicted and went to a local shelter but wasn’t able to do the paperwork to stay at the shelter. According to the two doctors who examined her while she was under emergency detention, R.O. was angry, defiant, irritable, displayed some paranoia, refused to cooperate with certain parts of the exams, and ‘lacked insight” into her illness. (¶¶2-6). These observations, in conjunction with information in her records describing past episodes that ended in hospitalization, were sufficient to justify the circuit court’s finding she was dangerous to herself.

Dodge County v. J.T., 2016AP613, District 4, 2/9/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The threats J.T. made in a letter provided sufficient evidence to find him dangerous to others under § 51.30(1)(a)2.b.

Iowa County v. J.L.R., 2016AP1459, 1/12/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

J.L.R. challenges her ch. 51 commitment on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that she was dangerous to herself or others. The court of appeals finds sufficient evidence as to danger to others, and so affirms.

Review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179 held that an individual is capable of rehabilitation, and thus a proper subject for treatment under Chapter 51, when treatment would control the symptoms of the individual’s disorder.  If, on the other hand, treatment would control only the individual’s activity or behavior, then he is not a proper subject for treatment under Chapter 51. The question is: how are courts to determine whether treatment is controlling symptoms of disorder–especially when medical experts, when describing the effects of treatment, blur the line between symptoms and behavior?