On Point: A. Ch. 51, Mental health

Fond Du Lac County v. R.O.V., 2019AP1228, 2020AP853, 12/16/20, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In these consolidated cases, the court of appeals reviewed both Ray’s initial commitment and his 2nd recommitment (not his 1st recommitment), which has not yet ended. Although the initial commitment order expired long ago, the court held that it was not moot due to a recurring, “sufficiency of the evidence” regarding dangerousness that might affect the outcome of his appeal from the 2nd recommitment.

The doctors who examined Ray for his initial commitment and for his 2nd recommitment agreed that he is mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment. They diagnosed him with either bipolar disorder with psychotic features, schizoaffective disorder bipolar type, or schizophrenia.  The main dispute was over his alleged dangerousness.

Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., 2019AP2073, petition for review granted 11/19/20; case activity

Issues presented:

1. Did the circuit court lack competency to adjudicate this Chapter 51 commitment proceeding due to the county’s violation of the rule requiring it to file psychiatric reports 48 hours before the final hearing?

2. If the circuit court retained competency, did it err in admitting a tardy report and the testimony of the report’s author?

Vilas County DHS v. N.J.P., 2019AP1567, 12/15/20, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In this appeal from an initial commitment, the county conceded that it had not offered clear and convincing evidence to mee the 4th standard of dangerousness. It asked the court of appeals to affirm the commitment based on the 5th standard of dangerousness.  The court of appeals rejected the county’s concession and affirmed on the 4th standard because N.J.P., who is mentally ill, had been expelled from a homeless shelter and was found dressed in tattered clothes on a bitterly cold day. 

State v. Daniel J. Van Linn, 2019AP1317, 11/17/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 4/27/21, affirmed, 3/22/22; case activity (including briefs)

Police found Van Linn injured and intoxicated near the scene of an accident, and an ambulance took him to the hospital for treatment. At the hospital Van Linn refused an officer’s request that consent to a blood draw; the officer, claiming exigency, ordered blood taken anyway. Van Linn moved to suppress and the court held there was no exigency, and accordingly suppressed the BAC results. Shortly thereafter, the district attorney asked the court to approve a subpoena of Van Linn’s treatment records from the hospital; the court issued the subpoena and the hospital turned over the records, which included the results of the hospital’s own blood test. Van Linn asked the court to suppress those as well, but it declined. He was convicted and appealed.

Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2020AP370, 11/4/20, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 2/26/21; case activity

Section 51.20(11)(a) provides that an individual or his counsel must demand a jury trial at least 48 hours before the time set for his final commitment hearing. At the start of his hearing, E.J.W requested a substitution of trial counsel and a jury trial. The court granted the substitution of counsel and postponed the trial 7 days, but it would not reset the clock for demanding a jury. The court of appeal affirmed.

Waukesha County v. L.J.M., 2020AP820, 11/4/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

L.J.M. (“Lisa”) appeals the extension of her commitment under ch. 51. In a thorough opinion, the court of appeals affirms, though not without pointing out deficiencies in the county’s case and the circuit court’s decision.

Waukesha County v. I.R.T., 2020AP996, 11/4/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity

The county sought to extend I.R.T.’s commitment but could not be located for a time. Eventually the court issued a capias and I.R.T. was arrested. At the extension hearing, there was testimony that after his parole in a criminal matter ended I.R.T. had become homeless and had not taken medications or communicated with the county or his “outpatient prescribers.” (¶14). A psychologist opined that I.R.T. would be dangerous if treatment were withdrawn due to his history of noncompliance with treatment and his “history of psychotic symptoms, and threatening behaviors toward others” and referred to information received from “staff” at an unnamed facility and I.R.T.’s parents. (¶16).

Jackson County v. W.G., 2020AP961, District 4, 11/5/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence presented at a ch. 51 extension hearing is found wanting because it doesn’t establish dangerousness as required by Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.

Portage County v. L.E., 2020Ap1239-FT, District 4, 10/29/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence presented at L.E.’s ch. 51 extenstion hearing was sufficient to prove she was dangerous and was not competent to refuse medication.

Columbia County v. J.M.C., Jr., 2020AP1001, District 4, 10/22/20 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

J.M.C. was taken to jail on possible criminal charges. Two days later, the County filed a Chapter 51 petition for his commitment.  Section 51.20(7) provides that the circuit court must hold a probable cause hearing within 72 hours of taking a person into custody under §51.20.  The circuit court dismissed the petition for violation of the 72-hour rule, and the County appealed arguing that the circuit court erred in determining what triggered 72-hour clock triggered.