On Point: G. Sec. 971.17, NGI

Graham L. Stowe v. Gregory Van Rybroek, No. 23-3345, 8/21/24

This habeas appeal is limited to a facial challenge to the NGI conditional release statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d). The Seventh Circuit rejects Stowe’s argument, concluding that he cannot show that there are no circumstances under which the law’s application would be valid.

Graham L. Stowe v. Gregory Van Rybroek, 18-CV-400-wmc (W.D. Wis. 11/6/23).

Having recently prevailed on a judicial bias claim in state court, Stowe makes a return appearance to the blog on his 2018 federal habeas petition. Unfortunately, the Western District of Wisconsin denied the petition, which had been pending for close 5 years. The petition sought relief from the Wisconsin courts’ denial of his 2016  petition for conditional release under Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d). In a novel reading of a nearly three-decades old Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995) (“Randall I”), the federal court concludes that “one can reasonably read Randall I to require a showing of both mental illness and dangerousness.”

Milwaukee County v. D.H., 2022AP1402, 3/7/23, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

To obtain an involuntary medication order, a county must satisfy the multi-step test for incompetency to make medication decisions in §51.61(1)(g)4. The first step requires the county to prove that the person received a “reasonable explanation” of the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication. The examiner can’t just testify that she complied with the statute. She must tell the court what she told the person about the medication. In “Dan’s” case, the court of appeals reversed the involuntary medication order because the county failed this step.

State v. Graham L. Stowe, 2021AP431-CR, District 3, 02/17/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Graham Stowe was found NGI in 2005 and committed to the Department of Health and Family Services for 39 years and 6 months. Between 2007 and 2019, Stowe filed 10 petitions for conditional release. The same circuit court judge who committed Stowe in 2005 has presided over every subsequent proceeding. After five prior appeals, the court of appeals now agrees with Stowe that the circuit court was objectively biased at his 2019 conditional release hearing based on a totality of comments that demonstrate a “serious risk of actual bias.” As a result, the court reverses the circuit court and remands the case for a new conditional release hearing before a different judge. (Opinion, ¶2).

State v. Christopher W. Yakich, 2022 WI 8, 2/16/22, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

When a defendant is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI) for more than one offense, the commitments for the offenses may be ordered to run consecutively.

State v. Christopher W. Yakich, 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR, petition for review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals granted 6/16/21; case activity (including briefs)

Issue Presented (from the PFR):

When a defendant has been found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect in two separate cases and is subject to two separate commitment orders, does the circuit court have authority to run the terms of commitment consecutive to one another?

State v. Christopher W. Yakich, 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR, District 4, 1/14/21 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted, 6/16/21; affirmed, 2022 WI 8; case activity (including briefs)

A defendant who is found not guilty by reasons of mental disease or defect (NGI) of a crime may be committed under § 971.17 for the maximum term of confinement (for felonies under Truth-in-Sentencing II, § 971.17(1)(b)) or two-thirds the maximum term of imprisonment (for misdemeanors or pre-TIS II felonies, § 971.17(1)(a) and (d)). The court of appeals holds that if a defendant is found NGI for more than one offense, the maximum term of commitment is determined by adding together the maximum terms on each offense, as if they were consecutive.

State v. Larry W. Olson, 2019 WI App 61; case activity (including briefs)

Olson and the state resolved some felony counts with an agreement that he’d plead not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The court found him NGI and committed him for 19 years, placing him on conditional release immediately. A few weeks later, Olson admitted violating his release conditions by smoking methamphetamine. DHS, which supervises NGI committees, immediately took him into custody. For reasons unknown, it held him for eight days before filing a petition to revoke his supervised release. This, everyone agrees, violated Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(e), which says such a petition “shall” be filed within 72 hours of detention (excluding weekends and holidays). The dispute on appeal is what that violation means: the state says there’s no consequence at all; Olson says a late petition is no good and must be dismissed. In legalese, the question is whether the word “shall” is mandatory or directory.

Kahler v. Kansas, USSC No. 18-6135, certiorari granted 3/18/19

Question presented:

Do the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense?

State v. Justice G. Armstead, 2017AP1586-CR, 5/30/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Armstead pled NGI to 2 misdemeanors, pursuant to §971.16. The court ordered his conditional release into the community for 6 months, along with involuntary medications. Five months into the order, Armstead filed a motion for postdisposition relief  arguing that both the examining physician and the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard for ordering involuntary medications. The circuit court denied the motion. The conditional release order expired a week later but Armstead appealed anyway. The court of appeals dismissed his appeal as moot. In doing so, it made a significant error of law.