On Point: 5. Confessions

State v. Randy L. Martin, 2010AP505-CR, District 1, 5/3/11

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication), reversed, 2012 WI 96; for Martin: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Although Martin was in custody and had not received Miranda warnings, his statement wasn’t the result of “interrogation” and therefore wasn’t suppressible. When it appeared that Martin’s uncle was going to be arrested for possessing a gun found in their car,

State v. Brad E. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, reversing 2010 WI App  11; for Forbush: Craig A. Mastantuono, Rebecca M. Coffee; amicus: Colleen D. Ball, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Forbush’s 6th amendment right to counsel had already attached – because a criminal complaint had been filed – and he had retained counsel before officers began interrogating him on that charge in the absence of his attorney.

State v. Darron D. Jackson, 2011 WI App 63 (recommended for publication); for Jackson: Rebecca Lawnicki; case activity

Waiver – Lesser Offense Instruction

The jury convicted Jackson of recklessly endangering safety while armed, which was submitted as a lesser offense of the charged offense, attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Although Jackson did object to the endangering instruction on the ground that it wasn’t supported by the facts,

State v. Quentin J. Louis, 2009AP2502-CR, District 3, 3/15/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Louis: Edward J. Hunt; amicus, Wis. Innocence Project: Keith A. Findley, Peter Shawn Moreno; case activity

Trial court grant of new trial in interest of justice upheld as proper exercise of discretion:  the issue in controversy wasn’t fully and fairly tried, given failure to adduce at trial medical testimony that the deceased baby’s injuries didn’t result from shaken baby syndrome.

on certification; for Spaeth: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Issue (formulated by On Point):

Whether a statement made to law enforcement following a probationer’s honest accounting to his probation agent may derive from a “legitimate source wholly independent of compelled testimony” and therefore admissible in a criminal case, notwithstanding the promise of immunity for such statements when made to probation agents.

See prior post for further discussion.

Docket

Decision below (617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir 2010))

Question Presented (by Scotusblog):

Whether this Court’s clearly established precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 holds that a prisoner is always “in custody” for purposes of Miranda any time that prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct occurring outside the prison regardless of the surrounding circumstances.

Cert petition

Brief in opposition

Petitioner’s reply

Scotusblog page

The grant appears to raise the recurrent problem of whether Miranda warnings are always and necessarily required when someone already incarcerated is interrogated by the police on a different offense.

certification; for Spaeth: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; Spaeth BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Review granted 2/8/11

ISSUE

In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453, 460 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that the government may compel incriminating testimony so long as it comes with a grant of use and derivative use immunity—that is to say,

State v. Marlon M. Anderson, 2010AP742-CR, District 1/4, 12/9/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Anderson: Angela Conrad Kachelski; Anderson BiC; State Resp.

A defendant’s statement made voluntarily but in violation of Miranda isn’t admissible in the State’s case-in-chief, but is admissible if the defendant testifies and the statement is inconsistent with his testimony. The question raised here relates to how such inconsistency is measured: whether outright contradictions are necessary,

State v. Patrick E. Hampton, 2010 WI App 169 (recommended for publication); for Hampton: Michael S. Holzman; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Custodial Interrogation – Request for Counsel

To invoke the 5th amendment right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the suspect must assert the right unambiguously, something Hampton did not do.

¶30      Hampton alleges that detectives ignored him and continued to inappropriately question him five minutes into the July 20 interview,

Docket

Decision below (N.C. supreme court)

Question Presented:

Whether, in the context of interrogating a juvenile in a school setting, “custody” for purposes of triggering Miranda warnings is determined by a purely objective test; or includes subjective considerations such as the subject’s age and status as a special education student.

Scotusblog page

The nub of the lower court holding:

 …