On Point: A. Certification requests

State v. Heather Jan VanBeek, 2019AP447, 8/12/20, District 2; certification granted 9/16/2020; case activity (including briefs)

VanBeek was sitting with a companion in her parked truck when an officer approached. There’d been a tip that people were sitting in the truck for an hour and that someone had come to the truck with a backpack, then departed. The officer asked a few questions, got satisfactory answers, and then asked for ID, purportedly for his report of the contact. The truck’s occupants were reluctant to hand over their licenses, but the officer insisted, and they did. He held onto them for more than five minutes and summoned a drug dog, who eventually alerted. At some point in this time frame, reasonable suspicion developed, but it wasn’t present when the officer took the IDs. So, was the encounter, at that point, “consensual” (as the state argues) or were the truck’s occupants seized–which, without reasonable suspicion, would be unconstitutional?

State v. Courtney C. Brown, 2017AP774-CR, District 2, 11/21/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

[A]fter a ticket has been written but before delivery [of the ticket to the motorist], and in the absence of reasonable suspicion, does asking a lawfully stopped motorist to exit the car, whether he or she possesses anything of concern, and to consent to a search unlawfully extend a traffic stop?

State v. Joseph B. Reinwand, 2017AP850-CR, District 4, 7/26/18, certification granted 9/4/2018, affirmed 2019 WI 25; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

We certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide a question involving the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” doctrine. Under this doctrine, testimonial statements, which would otherwise be barred under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment if the declarant does not appear at trial, may be admitted nonetheless if the reason the declarant does not appear is the result of wrongdoing by the defendant. In the typical case, this doctrine is applied when a defendant prevents a witness from testifying at the proceeding at which the State seeks to admit the out-of-court statement. ….

The question we certify today is whether the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” doctrine applies at a homicide trial where the declarant is the homicide victim, but where the defendant killed the declarant to prevent him or her from testifying at a separate proceeding. ….

An additional and closely related question we certify is whether preventing the declarant from testifying must be the defendant’s primary purpose for the wrongful act that prevented the declarant from testifying in that separate proceeding.

State v. Curtis L. Walker & State v. Omer Ninham, 2016AP1058 & 2016AP2098, Districts I & III, 3/6/18; case activity (including briefs): Walker; Ninham

Issue:

We certify these appeals to determine whether Wisconsin case law regarding life sentences without parole for juvenile murderers comports with recent pronouncements from the United States Supreme Court, and whether the sentencing courts in these cases adequately considered the mitigating effect of the defendants’ youth in accord with those Supreme Court pronouncements.

State v. Arthur Allen Freiboth, 2015AP2535-CR, District IV, 2/26/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

…[W]e certify the present appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide whether a defendant who was not advised at the time of the plea that he or she faced multiple mandatory DNA surcharges has grounds for plea withdrawal.

State v. Michael L. Cox, 2016AP1745-CR, District 2, 8/29/17, certification granted 10/17/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 67; case activity (including briefs)

Issue certified

This case raises a single question: whether a sentencing court retains any discretion under Wis. Stat. § 973.046 (2015-16), to waive DNA surcharges for crimes committed after January 1, 2014.

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR; District 2, 6/28/17, certification granted 9/12/17, appeal voluntarily dismissed 2/22/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

In determining whether the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitutes “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) so that a court must advise a defendant about the surcharges before a valid plea may be taken, is the “intent-effects” test, as applied in State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, and State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786, to ex post facto claims, the same analysis that was applied in State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, to a plea withdrawal claim?

If the analysis is the same, should Radaj be overruled in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs?

We note that we previously certified the issue of whether multiple DNA surcharges constituted “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a), such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The supreme court declined to accept certification.

We certify again because, as explained below, the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs now suggests that the ex post facto analysis of Radaj, holding that multiple DNR surcharges are “punishment,” was incorrect.

State v. Gerald P. Mitchell, 2015AP304-CR; District 2, 5/17/17, certification granted 9/11/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:  Whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law, where no exigent circumstances exist or have been argued, violates the Fourth Amendment.

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR; District 2, 11/9/16; certification refused 1/9/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Does the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitute “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent?

State v. Katherine J. Downer Jossi, 2016AP618-CR, 8/24/16, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This court of appeals decision acknowledges what On Point predicted here when SCOTUS issued Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). That is, Rodriguez, which held that prolonging a traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity  beyond the traffic infraction, effectively overruled State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶32, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748, which allowed for a reasonable delay based on the totality of the circumstances (a.k.a. the “incremental intrusion” test).