On Point blog, page 125 of 484
Court of appeals affirms orders for commitment and involuntary medication under the 5th standard
Rock County v. B.A.G., 2018AP782, 7/26/18, District 4, (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity
B.A.G. challenged a court order to commit and medicate him under §51.20(1)(a)2e (the 5th standard). His main objection appears to be that being undressed outside in cold weather was insufficient evidence to commit him. The court of appeals does not articulate the challenge he lodged against the medication order. Regardless, he lost on both issues. However, the court of appeals opinion on the medication order suggests a possible defect in the statute.
Court of Appeals asks SCOW to address forfeiture of right of confrontation by wrongdoing
State v. Joseph B. Reinwand, 2017AP850-CR, District 4, 7/26/18, certification granted 9/4/2018, affirmed 2019 WI 25; case activity (including briefs)
Issues:
We certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide a question involving the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” doctrine. Under this doctrine, testimonial statements, which would otherwise be barred under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment if the declarant does not appear at trial, may be admitted nonetheless if the reason the declarant does not appear is the result of wrongdoing by the defendant. In the typical case, this doctrine is applied when a defendant prevents a witness from testifying at the proceeding at which the State seeks to admit the out-of-court statement. ….
The question we certify today is whether the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” doctrine applies at a homicide trial where the declarant is the homicide victim, but where the defendant killed the declarant to prevent him or her from testifying at a separate proceeding. ….
An additional and closely related question we certify is whether preventing the declarant from testifying must be the defendant’s primary purpose for the wrongful act that prevented the declarant from testifying in that separate proceeding.
July 2018 publication list
On July 25, 2018, the court of appeals ordered the publication of the following criminal law related decisions:
State v. Theoris Raphel Stewart, 2018 WI App 41 (identity theft statute, § 943.203, applied to defendant’s forgery of documents he submitted at sentencing hearing)
Drazen Markovic v. Jon E. Litscher, 2018 WI App 44 (DOC may collect restitution from an inmate even after expiration of sentence to which restitution order was connected)
State’s failure to file a brief leads to (partial) defense win
State v. Aman D. Singh, 2017AP1609, 7/26/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
We last saw Singh attempting, and failing, to get his long-ago second-offense OWI dismissed by a writ of coram nobis. After that, he went back to court arguing that the count should be dismissed because of Wis. Stat. § 345.52 (which says that a judgment in a traffic ordinance action bars state proceedings for the same violation) and Wis. Stat. § 973.17 (which says excessive sentences are void).
Plea hearing courts don’t have to inform defendants about the mandatory DNA surcharge
State v. Arthur Allen Freiboth, 2018 WI App 46; case activity (including briefs)
In light of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s May 2018 decisions in State v. Muldrow, 2018 WI 52, 381 Wis. 2d 492, 912 N.W.2d 74, and State v. Williams, 2018 WI 59, 381 Wis. 2d 661, 912 N.W.2d 373, the court of appeals now holds:
“Let me represent myself” is not a clear and unequivocal request to represent yourself
State v. Terrance Lavone Egerson, 2018 WI App 49; case activity (including briefs)
Egerson told the trial court that his lawyer was “totally deficient” and declared a “total breakdown in communication.” The trial court agreed to let Egerson have a new lawyer, but as the parties and the court discussed logistics, he said: “let me represent myself and have co-counsel.” When that was ignored, Egerson said: “let me represent myself and have no counsel.” The court of appeals holds that this was not clear and unequivocal request to go pro se. Thus, the trial court had no duty to conduct the colloquy required by State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997). If Egerson’s words don’t satisfy the test, what words would? Perhaps SCOW will tell us.
Defendant not entitled to sentence credit for charges dismissed but not read in
State v. Demario D. Fleming, 2017AP1851-CR, District 1, 7/17/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Applying its recent decision in State v. Piggue, 2016 WI App 13, 366 Wis. 2d 605, 875 N.W.2d 663, the court of appeals rejects Fleming’s request for sentence credit for time he spent in custody on charges that were dismissed, but not read in, as part of a plea agreement.
Deputy had reasonable suspicion to extend stop based on driver’s odor of alcohol and glassy eyes
State v. Misty Dawn Donough, 2017AP2000-CR, 7/10/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication), case activity (including briefs)
Deputy Moldenhauer saw Donough’s car disabled on an interstate and stopped to help. Moldenhauer repeatedly interacted with Donough, told her to get into the car, put it in neutral, and steer as the car was pushed on to a side street. Then she approached Donough for her license and insurance and saw her glassy eyes and detected the odor of alcohol.
“Email volunteer system” for assigning substitute judge isn’t unlawful
Petitioner v. Robert D. Evans, 2018 WI App 53; case activity (including briefs)
Evans, the respondent in a domestic abuse injunction proceeding, filed a substitution request on the day of the injunction hearing. To find a substitute judge in cases where substitution is requested so close to the hearing, the clerk uses an “email volunteer system”: An email is sent out to all the other judges to see if anyone is available to take over the case, and the first judge who is gets the case. (¶¶2-4). The court of appeals finds nothing prohibiting this method of assigning a substitute judge.
TPR based on continuing denial of visitation or placement upheld
Monroe County DHS v. A.D., 2018AP825, District 4, 7/5/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
A.D. argues the circuit court shouldn’t have granted summary judgment as to the grounds of the petition to terminate her parental rights, which alleged continuing denial of periods of physical placement or visitation under § 48.415(4). She also challenges the constitutionality of § 48.415(4), both on its face and as applied to her. The court of appeals rejects both arguments.