On Point blog, page 176 of 485
Openly carrying firearms didn’t violate loitering ordinance
Village of Somerset v. Mark J. Hoffman, 2015AP140, District 3, 5/17/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Viewed through the interpretive prism mandated by § 66.0409(6), a local ordinance prohibiting “wander[ing] or stroll[ing] in an aimless manner” that is “not usual for law abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons” isn’t violated by a person walking around with a loaded semi-automatic rifle slung over his shoulder and a loaded handgun in a holster on his hip.
Child welfare agency can file TPR petition on any ground
Rock County HSD v. W.J., 2015AP2469, District 4, 5/12/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The county department had authority under § 48.42(1) to file a TPR petition alleging any ground for termination.
Privilege re: desire to shoot victim waived by statement of desire to shoot self
State v. Daniel L. Schmidt, 2016 WI App 45; case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals rejects three challenges to Schmidt’s jury-trial conviction of two homicides.
Traffic stop unreasonable; officer had no reason to conclude driver violated parking statute
State v. Justin Carl Herman Hembel, 2015AP1220-CR, 5/10/16, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Police lacked probable cause to believe Hembel violated § 346.54, governing “How to park and stop on streets,” so the stop of Hembel was unlawful.
Evidence supported extension of involuntary commitment
Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2016AP46-FT, 5/4/16 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication),petition for review granted 9/13/16, affirmed, 2017 WI 57; case activity
To commit a person involuntarily, the county must show that the person is mentally ill and dangerous. To extend the commitment, the county may prove “dangerousness” by showing that “there is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual’s treatment record, he would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.” §51.20(1)(am).
On reconsideration, court of appeals finds PC for PBT
State v. Zachary W. Swan, 2015AP1718-CR, 5/5/16, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity, including briefs
Swan was convicted of OWI 2nd with a prohibited alcohol content. On appeal he argued that the circuit court should have suppressed the results of a preliminary breath test and other evidence due to the absence of probable cause. The court of appeals initially rejected Swan’s argument on the ground of issue preclusion, but on reconsideration agreed with Swan that issue preclusion “could not apply as a matter of law.” (¶2, ¶13). It now rejects Swan’s argument on the merits and affirms.
Evidence sufficient; judge’s ex parte communication harmless
State v. Jeffrey S. Decker, 2015AP1997-CR, District 2, 5/4/2016 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Jeffrey Decker had been banned from the UW-Oshkosh, and was arrested when he arrived at a grand opening event. The arrest was not without incident and he was charged with obstructing an officer and convicted after a jury trial.
Ensuring automatic admissibility justified warrantless blood draw
State v. Melvin P. Vongvay, 2015AP1827-CR, District 2, 5/4/2016 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Wisconsin Stat. § 885.235(1g) makes a blood alcohol test automatically admissible in a drunk driving prosecution if the blood is drawn within three hours of the alleged driving. The court here holds that an officer who was running up against the end of that three-hour window was justified in drawing blood without seeking a warrant.
As-applied constitutional challenges to TPR rejected
State v. G.H., 2015AP1606, District 1, 4/28/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
G.H.’s parental rights to M.R.H. were terminated on the grounds that M.R.H. remained in need of protection or services under § 48.415(2) and that G.H. had failed to assume parental responsibility under § 48.415(6). The court of appeals rejects his claims that these statutes are unconstitutional as applied to him.
Court of Appeals asks SCOW to decide how to raise claims that counsel at revocation hearing was ineffective
State ex rel. Antjuan Redmond v. Brian Foster, 2014AP2637, District 2, 4/27/16, certification granted 6/15/16, certification vacated and case returned to the court of appeals 9/15/16; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Whether an offender whose parole and extended supervision was revoked after a revocation hearing has an adequate remedy other than a writ of habeas corpus to pursue a claim that the attorney who represented him during the hearing rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance? Specifically, must the offender raise a claim of ineffective assistance of revocation counsel in a motion to the division of hearings and appeals (DHA) in the department of administration?