On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. Russell C. Troka, 2016 WI App 35; case activity (including briefs)

Because the record does not reflect an adequate basis for a finding of manifest necessity warranting a mistrial over Troka’s objection, retrying Troka would violate his right against double jeopardy.

State v. Miguel Angel Langarica, 2015AP1546, 4/21/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Langarica’s misunderstanding about whether the conviction would require him to register as a sex offender under Illinois law doesn’t entitle him to withdraw his plea because he didn’t prove the misunderstanding was based on incorrect information from his trial lawyer.

State v. Donald Weso, 2015AP1004-Cr, 4/19/16, District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This unpublished opinion appears to decide an issue of first impression for Wisconsin. Section 973.055(1) requires a court to impose a $100 surcharge if it finds that an adult convicted of domestic abuse committed the act “against an adult with whom [he] resides. ” The novel question is: what does “resides” mean? The answer is only a little more involved than the title to this post suggests.

State v. T.D.M., 2015AP2289, 4/20/16, District 2, (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

T.D.M. was charged with burglary and theft, as party to a crime, and obstructing an officer. The circuit court waived him into to adult court mostly because his “pattern of living” was more like an adult’s than a juvenile’s. That is, he was not reliant upon his mother for large periods of time. His whereabouts were unknown for at least 3 months in 2014. He allegedly had fathered a child. He did not attend school or avail himself of services. And he repeatedly violated curfew and came and went as he pleased. See ¶14.

Waukesha County DH&HS v. K.R.G., 2016AP222, 4/20/16, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals here holds that a mom’s failure to follow court orders and failure to make court appearances were egregious enough to justify a default finding of grounds for terminating her parental rights even though she asserted a “desire” and “determination” to participate in the proceeding.

State v. M.K., 2015AP2098, District 1, 4/19/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

While the second (and final) extension of M.K.’s original CHIPS dispositional order listed only one of the three conditions M.K. had to meet for return of her son, the original order and first extension listed all three, and that’s good enough in the eyes of the court of appeals to satisfy the requirements of § 48.356(2).

State v. Gary F. Lemberger, 2015AP1452-CR, 4/14/2016, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 10/11/2016, affirmed, 2017 WI 39; case activity (including briefs)

A breathalyzer test is a Fourth Amendment search, and state case law holds that the state may not invite a jury to view a defendant’s refusal to consent to a search as evidence of guilt. So, can a prosecutor argue that a defendant’s refusal to take a breathalyzer shows his guilt? Don’t look to this case for an answer.

Jefferson County Department of Human Services v. J.V., 2015AP2622, 2623, & 2624, 4/14/2016, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

J.V. appeals the termination of her parental rights to her three younger children, arguing the circuit court erred in excluding evidence that she had succeeded in having her eldest child returned to her.

State v. Andrew G. Chitwood, 2016 WI App 36; case activity (including briefs)

In theory, Wisconsin’s new test for the admissibility of expert testimony “is flexible but has teeth.” State v. Giese, ¶19. In practice, it’s flexible and has dentures. Literally every Daubert challenge litigated on appeal since Wis. Stat. §907.02 became effective has failed. The court of appeals has held that expert testimony regarding the retrograde extrapolation of a person’s blood alcohol concentration passes Daubert (See Giese). So does a doctor’s testimony based solely on his personal experience with prenatal and delivery case (see Seifert). So does a social worker’s testimony based solely on her observations of behavior in child abuse victims (see Smith). And now with Chitwood so does expert testimony by a drug recognition evaluator.

State v. C.R.R./State v. M.R., 2015AP1771 & 2015AP1772, District 3, 4/13/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals rejects various challenges to orders terminating the parental rights C.R.R. and M.R., the mother and father, respectively, of A.M.R.