On Point blog, page 179 of 484
Stop of SUV reasonable due to malfunctioning stop lamp
State v. James A. Webb, 2015AP1613-CR, 3/22/16, District 1 (-1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals here reverses a suppression order and holds that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Webb’s SUV because its high-mount stop light was not working while the driver was braking. During the stop, officers discovered that Webb was carrying a concealed weapon without a permit.
No need to warn defendant his actions might result in forfeiture of counsel
State v. Jack M. Suriano, 2015AP959-CR, 3/15/16, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 9/13/16, affirmed, 2017 WI 42; case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court never warned Suriano that forfeiture of his right to counsel was a possibility and did not engage Suriano in a colloquy about the difficulties and dangers of self-representation. Nonetheless, its finding that Suriano forfeited his right to appointed counsel is affirmed because the warning and colloquy are only “recommended,” and not required, procedures.
CHIPS order didn’t violate right to substantive due process
State v. J.S., 2015AP707, District 1, 3/15/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Applying the failure to assume parental responsibility statute, § 48.415(6), to J.S. did not violate his right to substantive due process because J.S.’s own behavior, not the CHIPS order removing his daughter S.L. from her parental home, was what prevented him from taking part in S.L.’s daily supervision and care.
Weaving within lane, other circumstances supported traffic stop
Columbia County v. Stephen M. Kokesh, 2015AP1650, District 4, 3/10/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The totality of the circumstances—the driving observed by the officer and the time of the driving—provided reasonable suspicion stop Kobkesh’s car, despite Kokesh’s creative attempt to show otherwise.
Object found during frisk could be removed from pocket
State v. Steve C. Deterding, 2015AP195-CR, 3/10/16, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A police officer lawfully removed the object he felt in Deterring’s pants pocket during a lawful pat-down for weapons.
Counsel not ineffective for not striking juror
State v. Todd Brian Tobatto, 2016 WI App 28; case activity (including briefs)
The news, in this otherwise run-of-the-mill case, is the standard of review.
Any error in excusing juror or allowing notes during closing harmless
State v. Jesus C. Gonzalez, 2015AP784-CR, 3/8/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Gonzalez raises two challenges to his conviction, at jury trial, of reckless homicide and reckless endangerment. The court of appeals finds any error harmless.
Audiovisual recording of child victim’s forensic interview was properly admitted
State v. Beverly Reshall Holt, 2013AP2738-CR, 3/8/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The trial court did not err in admitting the audiovisual recording of the forensic interview of Caleb, one of the child victims, at Holt’s trial for child sexual assault.
Accident reporting statute covers injury regardless of monetary cost
City of Rhinelander v. Thomas V. Wakely, 2015Ap302, 3/8/16, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
While the accident reporting requirement under § 346.70(1) requires that property damage reach a certain minimum “apparent [monetary] extent” before the accident is reportable, it does not require a minimum monetary extent for personal injuries before the accident is reportable.
Court of appeals sees no problem with initiation or duration of traffic stop
State v. John D. Arthur Griffin, 2015AP1271-CR, 3/3/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals finds that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the car Griffin was driving and, even though that suspicion dissipated during the encounter, that the continued detention of Griffin was reasonable.