On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. Jeremy D. Russ, 2006 WI App 9
For Russ: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: A deaf defendant who had been shackled when he entered a guilty plea and was sentenced must show actual inability to communicate effectively in order to meet his burden of showing a violation of rights. Thus, even though the defendant adduced expert proof at the postconviction hearing “that communication would be limited and difficult if a deaf person who used sign language were handcuffed,” he did not meet his burden of proof:

¶10      As the trial court observed,

State v. Steven A. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26
For Harvey: Christopher William Rose

Issue/Holding: Defendant’s recalculation of his chance’s at trial after pleading guilty in an effort to maximize chances of avoiding or reducing prison term, uncoupled to any claim of confusion about the nature of the offense, was not a fair and just reason for pre-sentencing plea withdrawal, ¶¶24-29.

State v. Timothy J. Goyette, 2006 WI App 178
For Goyette: E.J. Hunt, Kathleen M. Quinn

Issue/Holding:

¶17 The purpose of filing a Bangert plea withdrawal motion is to obtain an evidentiary hearing at which the State bears the burden of producing evidence showing that, despite a defective plea colloquy, the defendant’s plea was nonetheless knowing and voluntary. State v.

State v. Donnell Basley, 2006 WI App 253
For Basley: Randall E. Paulson, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding1: The postconviction court erroneously denied without evidentiary hearing Basley’s motion for plea-withdrawal (on Nelson/Bentley rather than Bangert grounds):

¶8        Accompanying Basley’s motion is an affidavit from his postconviction counsel averring that the motion “summarizes … Basley’s expected testimony.” Counsel also acknowledges in the affidavit that Basley’s trial counsel will likely dispute that he threatened to withdraw unless Basley accepted the proffered plea bargain.

State v. Mark E. Nelson, 2006 WI App 124, PFR filed 6/22/06
For Nelson: Robert R. Henak; Amelia L. Bizzaro

Issue: Whether the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” in § 942.09 is unconstitutionally vague, where the conduct involved videotaping women in a second-floor bathroom in their own house.

Holding:

¶39      However, this court and the supreme court have already concluded in several different contexts that the term “reasonable” does not render a statute unconstitutionally vague.

State v. Mark E. Nelson, 2006 WI App 124, PFR filed 6/22/06
For Nelson: Robert R. Henak; Amelia L. Bizzaro

Issue/Holding:

¶19      The phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” is not defined in Wis. Stat. § 942.09, nor are the individual words. However, the words “expectation of privacy” have a common meaning that can be ascertained with reference to a standard dictionary.

…¶

21      If we apply the common meanings of “expectation” and “privacy” and the well-established meaning of the term “reasonable,” Wis.

State v. Mark E. Nelson, 2006 WI App 124, PFR filed 6/22/06
For Nelson: Robert R. Henak; Amelia L. Bizzaro

Issue/Holding: The evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction under § 942.09 for videotaping into a bathroom notwithstanding that the window was open, under the following circumstances:

¶53      Applying this standard, we conclude the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Nelson guilty of violating Wis.

State v. Timothy J. Goyette, 2006 WI App 178
For Goyette: E.J. Hunt, Kathleen M. Quinn

Issue: Whether Goyette was coerced into pleading guilty under a “package” agreement (one “contingent on two or more codefendants all entering pleas according to the terms of the agreement”), given the seriousness of the charges and the youthfulness (age 16) of the defendant.

Holding: In the absence of any evidence that Goyette was too young to understand the implications or that he was pressured by his attorney or unable to meet alone with him,

State v. Jeffrey Townsend, 2006 WI App 177, PFR filed 8/18/06
For Townsend: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: Because the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, § 976.05, doesn’t prescribe dismissal as a sanction for a state’s failure to notify a prisoner of a lodged detainer, dismissal as a remedy for such a violation is not supported:

¶17 Any IAD violation was the fault of Illinois,

State ex rel. Kenneth Onapolis  v. State, 2006 WI App 84, PFR filed 5/25/06
Pro se

Issue/Holding: Extradition from Australia to Wisconsin to face bank fraud and federal tax charges did not preclude, under the Rule of Specialty, Onapolis’s return on an outstanding parole violation warrant, at least where the parole violations included the fraud and tax offenses. (“The Rule of Specialty generally requires that an extradited defendant be tried for the crimes on which extradition has been granted,