On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

Brown County DHS v. H.P., 2019AP1324 & 2019AP1325, District 3, 5/13/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

This case involves another challenge to the application of the new version of § 48.415(2)(a)3. in cases where the CHIPS order was entered before the effective date of the amendments. As in Dane County DHS v. J.R., 2020 WI App 5, and Eau Claire County DHS v. S.E., 2019AP894, slip op. recommended for publication (WI App May 13, 2020), the court of appeals rejects the challenges.

State v. D.R.C., 2019AP1155, District 2, 5/13/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police detained, initially handcuffed, patted down, and then questioned D.R.C. about his involvement in a car crash from which he had fled. The court of appeals holds the officers’ actions were part of an investigatory Terry stop and didn’t amount to custody requiring that D.R.C. be given Miranda warnings before being questioned.

State v. Kieuta Z, Perry, 2019AP270-CR, 5/12/20, District 1, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The State charged Perry with armed robbery and 1st degree recklessly endangering safety with use of a dangerous weapon both as a party to a crime, along with possession of a firearm by a felon. During cross-exam a witness blurted out “Didn’t [Perry] shoot somebody in the head before he shot me? That’s what I heard.” Defense counsel moved to strike and then later for a mistrial.

State v. Jeffrey I. Quitko, 2019AP200-CR, District 3, 5/12/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Quitko’s motion to suppress evidence obtained following his traffic stop for speeding violation should have been granted because law enforcement lacked probable cause to request that he submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT).

State v. Tavodess Matthews, 2020 WI App 33; case activity (including briefs).

Section 801.58(1) states that if a party to a civil action files a judicial substitution request “preceding the hearing of any preliminary contested matter” and not later than 60 days after service of the summons and complaint then the request must be granted.  A “preliminary contested matter” refers to a “substantive issue” going to”the merits of the case.” The court of appeals holds that a motion to adjourn a probable cause hearing  in a Chapter 980 case fits that bill.

State v. Gary R. Schumacher, 2019AP1261-CR, District 4, 5/7/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Schumacher was convicted of OWI with a prohibited alcohol content in connection with an accident at 8:45 p.m. His blood was drawn at 10:56 p.m., and tests showed a BAC of .171, well above his legal limit of 0.08. The sole issue on appeal was whether Schumacher’s trial counsel had adequately cross-examined Kristin Drewieck, a chemist with the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene about her estimates of Schumacher’s BAC at 8:45 p.m.

Town of Waterford v. Christopher Pye, 2019AP737, 5/6/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals rejects the municipality’s argument that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to the two-year statute of limitation for bringing a forfeiture action.

State v. David William Krumm, 2019AP243-CR, District 3, 5/5/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Under § 343.303 and County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999), there was probable cause to believe Krumm was operating while intoxicated, so police could request he submit to a preliminary breath test.

State v. Ronald Eugene Provost, 2020 WI App 21; case activity (including briefs)

It’s unclear why this opinion is recommended for publication. Best guess is that is provides a (rather thin) gloss on the “systemic breakdown” exception to the rule that delays attributable to defense counsel don’t weigh in favor of a speedy trial violation. The court cites and adopts a statement from a New Mexico court that defense counsel’s delays represent a “systemic breakdown” only when they are caused by “problems that are both institutional in origin and debilitating in scope.” (¶40). Sounds like a slightly longer way of saying “systemic breakdown,” no?

State v. Phyllis M. Schwersenska, 2018AP1619-CR, District 4, 4/30/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Schwersenska was convicted of embezzling money from a joint bank account she held with her daughter, H.R. The court of appeals holds trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to raise the defense that, as joint owner of the account, none of the money in the account belonged solely to H.R. and so she can’t be guilty of theft from H.R.