On Point blog, page 101 of 261
Defendant not entitled to sentence credit for charges dismissed but not read in
State v. Demario D. Fleming, 2017AP1851-CR, District 1, 7/17/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Applying its recent decision in State v. Piggue, 2016 WI App 13, 366 Wis. 2d 605, 875 N.W.2d 663, the court of appeals rejects Fleming’s request for sentence credit for time he spent in custody on charges that were dismissed, but not read in, as part of a plea agreement.
Deputy had reasonable suspicion to extend stop based on driver’s odor of alcohol and glassy eyes
State v. Misty Dawn Donough, 2017AP2000-CR, 7/10/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication), case activity (including briefs)
Deputy Moldenhauer saw Donough’s car disabled on an interstate and stopped to help. Moldenhauer repeatedly interacted with Donough, told her to get into the car, put it in neutral, and steer as the car was pushed on to a side street. Then she approached Donough for her license and insurance and saw her glassy eyes and detected the odor of alcohol.
TPR based on continuing denial of visitation or placement upheld
Monroe County DHS v. A.D., 2018AP825, District 4, 7/5/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
A.D. argues the circuit court shouldn’t have granted summary judgment as to the grounds of the petition to terminate her parental rights, which alleged continuing denial of periods of physical placement or visitation under § 48.415(4). She also challenges the constitutionality of § 48.415(4), both on its face and as applied to her. The court of appeals rejects both arguments.
Circuit court can’t hold defendant in contempt for refusing to sign bond
In re the Finding of Contempt in: State v. Shafia M. Jones, 2107AP2359, District 2, 5/9/18 (UNCITABLE SUMMARY DISPOSITION); case activity (including appellant’s brief)
This is a summary order, the holding of which may be of interest to trial lawyers. Because it is a summary order, it may NOT be cited “in any court of this state as precedent or authority,” § 809.23(3)(a). But the reasoning the court of appeals gives for its holding cites to and relies on published decisions. So if a circuit judge orders your client to sign his or her bond and threatens your client with contempt for refusing to do so, you should fight back using the same authority cited by the court of appeals in this summary order.
Jury learning PBT was requested not grounds for mistrial
State v. Dale R. Delvoye, 2017AP833, 7/3/18, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
At Delvoye’s OWI trial, an officer testified that as part of the stop he asked Delvoye to take a preliminary breath test. Counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the mistrial, and the court of appeals affirms.
COA: Pharmacologist properly barred from testifying about stomach condition
State v. Paul E. Ayala, 2017AP1510, 7/3/18, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Ayala was charged with OWI. A blood test showed a high level of Ambien in his system. He sought to defend on the ground of involuntary intoxication by presenting a pharmacologist’s testimony that he had a stomach condition that caused the drug to build up in his system.
Parents’ no-contest pleas to TPR grounds were valid
State v. M.A.H., 2017AP1785 & 2017AP1786, District 1, 7/3/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
State v. K.C.H., 2017AP1787 & 2017AP1788, District 1, 7/3/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
M.A.H. and K.C.H. entered no-contest pleas to the continuing CHIPS grounds alleged in the petitions to terminate the parental rights to their children. They later challenged those pleas, arguing they weren’t voluntary because they were induced by a promise to allow additional visitation of the children, who were in foster care, pending a disposition hearing if they entered the pleas. Their challenge fails because there was no such promise.
COA says trial court didn’t sentence on improper factors
State v. Dion Lashay Byrd, 2017AP1968, 6/26/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Byrd was convicted of making a bomb threat to the Fox 6 TV station in Milwaukee. He claims the sentencing court relied on two improper factors in imposing the maximum sentence for this Class I felony. First, he says the court coerced him into making self-incriminating statements during his sentencing allocution–statements that could not be used against him at sentencing under the Fifth Amendment. Second, he contends the court should not have based its sentencing decision on its stated dissatisfaction with the statutory maximum.
COA finds hearsay and right to presence claims forfeited and harmless
State v. Delano Maurice Wade, 2017AP1021, 6/26/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Wade appeals his jury-trial conviction of sexual assault and false imprisonment. He argues that certain of his accuser’s statements, related by police officers on the stand, were hearsay, and that the court erred in addressing a jury question when he was absent.
Court of appeals erases line between civil commitments and protective placements
Marathon County v. P.X., 2017AP1497, 6/26/18, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
P.X. is autistic, non-verbal, intellectually and developmentally disabled and has obsessive compulsive disorder and pica. The question is whether he is capable of “rehabilitation,” which would make him a proper subject for treatment on Chapter 51. If not, then he should be placed under Chapter 55. The court of appeals held that even though P.X.’s disabilities cannot be cured and he can never function in society, his OCD and pica could be controlled with medication, so Chapter 51 applies. Under Chapter 51, a person can be committed to a mental institution for years, but Chapter 55 bars protective placement in a unit for the acutely mentally ill. See §55.12(2). This decision seems to let the county accomplish through Chapter 51 what it cannot do through Chapter 55. Let’s hope P.X. petitions SCOW for review.