On Point blog, page 105 of 263
COA: There was reasonable suspicion for stop, man on ground with deputy’s knee on his back being handcuffed wasn’t arrested
Dane County v. Damian A. Bethke, 2017AP1284, 5/31/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Bethke was acquitted of his OWI charge, so this is an appeal only of his refusal, and his claim is that the officer who detained him violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Wrong return address on notice of intent to revoke license doesn’t undo refusal revocation
County of Door v. Donald L. McPhail, 2017AP1079, 5/30/18, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
When McPhail was arrested for first-offense OWI, he refused a blood test. The arresting officer gave him the notice of intent to withdraw his operating privilege, which told McPhail he had 10 days to request a hearing, and that he should send his request to 1201 S. Duluth Ave in Sturgeon Bay. But that’s the Sheriff’s department, not the clerk of courts, which is at 1205 (though the two are part of the same complex).
Order revoking operating privileges for unlawful refusal of blood test upheld
State v. Jeffrey A. Jacobi, 2017AP1816, 5/30/18, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Based on facts specific to this case, the court of appeals held that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe Jacobi was intoxicated when he bumped into a car while driving his motorcycle. It also wagged its finger at appellate counsel for carelessness in compiling the record and for misrepresenting the record. It also noted his failure to file a reply brief.
TPR court appropriately considered whether, after termination, children would continue to have contact with biological family
State v. P.J., 2018AP376-2018AP381, 5/30/18, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
P.J. challenged the termination of her parental rights to her 6 children on the grounds that the circuit court failed to appropriately consider the substantial bond that she had with her children and improperly relied on testimony by the various foster parents that the children would continue to have contact with each other. The court of appeals affirmed.
Defense win! Extension of Ch. 51 involuntary medication order vacated for failure to explain ads, disads, and alternatives
Waukesha County v. M.J.S., 2017AP1843, 5/30/18, District 2, (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity
Section 51.61(1)(g)4 and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607 establish that a person subject to a possible involuntary medication order is entitled to receive a reasonable explanation of the proposed medication, why it is being prescribed, its advantages and disadvantages (include side effects), and alternatives to it. If the person is incapable of expressing an understanding of these matters or incapable of applying the information to his situation in order to make an informed decision, then he is incompetent to refuse them. In this case, M.J.S. failed to show for the examination where a doctor would have attempted the statutorily-required explanation. The circuit court ordered involuntary meds; the court of appeals reversed.
Seemingly unaware of multiple statutes, court of appeals declares appeal from NGI conditional release plan moot
State v. Justice G. Armstead, 2017AP1586-CR, 5/30/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Armstead pled NGI to 2 misdemeanors, pursuant to §971.16. The court ordered his conditional release into the community for 6 months, along with involuntary medications. Five months into the order, Armstead filed a motion for postdisposition relief arguing that both the examining physician and the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard for ordering involuntary medications. The circuit court denied the motion. The conditional release order expired a week later but Armstead appealed anyway. The court of appeals dismissed his appeal as moot. In doing so, it made a significant error of law.
Court of appeals upholds extension of traffic stop based on strong odor of perfume and cigarettes
State v. Jasetta Smith, 2017AP1807-CR, 5/23/18, District 2, (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Better go easy on the perfume or cologne. An officer ran the license plates on the car Smith was driving at 1:08 a.m. one night. He saw that the registered owner’s license was suspended, stopped the car, learned that Smith was not the owner, and smelled the overpowering odor of perfume and cigarettes.
Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to challenge officer’s credibility at suppression hearing
State v. Royce O. Bernard, 2017AP2162-CR, District 1, 5/22/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
After being charged with carrying a concealed weapon, Bernard challenged the Terry stop that led to the charge. His suppression motion was denied. Postconviction he argued trial counsel was ineffective because he failed in various ways to undermine the credibility of the officer who stopped Bernard. The court of appeals holds Bernard’s postconviction motion failed to allege sufficient facts to get a Machner hearing.
Court of appeals construes owner’s defense to hit and run liability under § 346.675(4)(b)2.
City of Eau Claire v. Debora Ann West, 2017AP1527, District 3, 5/22/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Section 346.675 provides that the owner of a vehicle is liable for a hit-and-run violation that his or her vehicle is involved in, regardless of whether the owner is operating the vehicle at the time of the violation, but also subject to certain defenses. One of the defenses, § 346.675(4)(b)2., allows the owner to avoid liability by providing the name and address of the person operating the vehicle at the time of the violation along with other information sufficient to provide probable cause that the owner wasn’t operating at the time of the violation. Contrary to the circuit court’s conclusion, the evidence in this case wasn’t sufficient to conclude that West established that defense.
Warrantless, forced blood draw was reasonable
State v. Keith A. Wall, 2017AP2367-CR, District 4, 5/17/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Wall sought the suppression of the results of the test of his blood, which showed he had a BAC of 0.178 after his arrest for OWI. He argues the blood was seized unlawfully because police didn’t have a warrant and they used excessive force to draw the blood. The court of appeals rejects both claims.