On Point blog, page 106 of 263
Evidence defendant shot a gun at prior incident was admissible
State v. Terrell Dawon Essex, 2017AP1509-CR, District 1, 5/15/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Essex was on trial for being a felon in possession of a firearm and first degree reckless homicide of a man named Dotson by use of a dangerous weapon. The circuit court allowed the state to present evidence that on a prior occasion Essex used the same firearm involved in Dotson’s shooting. The court of appeals holds the evidence was admissible.
Must other states’ court orders mean what they say?
State v. Benjamin R. Tibbs, 2017AP2408-CR, District 4, 5/10/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Why, no; no, they don’t.
Defense win: Officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop car that turned around in wayside
Fond du Lac County v. Isaac Anthony Dahlke, 2017AP1417, District 2, 5/9/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The stop of Dahlke’s car was unlawful because the officer didn’t have an objectively reasonable belief that Dahlke entered a wayside in violation of an ordinance prescribing hours when the wayside is closed.
Challenge to collection of old fine fails
State v. Eric W. Poirier, 2017AP931-CR, District 3, 5/8/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Back in 2003, Poirier was fined $1,184 for an OWI conviction. He didn’t pay, so a judgment was entered against him. In 2017 the circuit court entered an order assigning income from his prison account to pay the judgment. He objects to the assignment order, but to no avail, due in large part to missteps common to pro se litigants.
Evidence was sufficient to prove dangerousness under ch. 51
Milwaukee County v. I.K., 2017AP1425, District 1, 5/8/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The County proved I.K. was dangerous under both § 51.20(1)(a)2.d., by showing there was a substantial probability I.K. would suffer physical harm resulting from his inability to satisfy basic needs due to mental illness, and § 51.20(1)(a)2.e., by showing that, after being advised of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting treatment, I.K. was unable to understand and make an informed choice regarding treatment and that a lack of treatment will result in further disability or deterioration.
It’s like déjà vu all over again: Challenges to TPR rejected
State v. A.E., 2017AP1773 & 2017AP1774, District 1, 5/8/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
This is the third TPR opinion in a week addressing challenges to the denial of a postjudgment fact-finding hearing under § 809.107(6)(am) and a constitutional challenge to the application of the failure to assume parental responsibility standard to a parent whose children have been removed from the home under a CHIPS order. As with the other two cases, the court of appeals rejects the challenges.
Challenges to TPR order rejected
State v. L.J., 2017AP1225, 2017AP1226, & 2017AP1227, District 1, 5/1/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
L.J. challenges her no-contest plea to there being grounds to terminate her parental rights to three of her seven children. She argues the plea wasn’t knowing and voluntary and that § 48.415(6), the statute regarding failure to assume parental responsibility, is unconstitutional as applied to her. She also argues there was improper testimony at the disposition hearing. The court of appeals rejects each claim.
Court of appeals upholds questionable recommitment; query whether sec. 51.20(1)(am) is unconstitutional?
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2018AP145-FT, 5/1/18, District 3 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication), petition for review granted, 7/10/19, reversed, 2020 WI 41; case activity
This decision makes you wonder whether §51.20(1)(am), Wisconsin’s recommitment statute, is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to D.J.W.
Court of appeals affirms TPR, rejects novel challenges to statute and request for ceritfication to SCOW
State v. C.W., 2017AP1228-1230, 5/1/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
Among several interesting challenges to the termination of his parental rights, C.W. argues that he was statutorily entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his “no contest” plea was not knowing and intelligent and that SCOW should withdraw language from State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475.
Violation of Uniform Law on Close Pursuit doesn’t merit suppression
State v. Anthony H. Garbacz, Jr., 2017AP1419, 5/3/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A Prairie du Chien police officer saw Garbacz driving erratically and tried to stop him. Garbacz didn’t stop, instead heading over the bridge to Iowa with the officer in pursuit. Some Iowa squads joined the chase and eventually Garbacz was arrested. He was not, however, taken before a judge in Iowa to determine the legality of the arrest–he was taken back to Wisconsin and charged with OWI. That’s a violation of Iowa’s Uniform Law on Close Pursuit, and Garbacz argues evidence derived from his arrest must thus be suppressed.