On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Keith J. Eggum, 2016AP2036-CR, District 2, 11/8/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

And that factual finding dooms Eggum’s claim that his “noticeably disheveled” appearance made his trial unfair. Eggum’s complaint about the presence of extra officers for courtroom security fares no better. And topping it all off, Eggum’s First Amendment defense to the disorderly conduct charge makes no headway, either.

State v. Jamie M. Srb, 2017AP307-CR, 11/9/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Srb objected to the admissibility of his BAC results at his OWI trial in part because the State submitted a summary of expert testimony that failed to indicate that its expert would testify about retrograde extrapolation. See §971.23(1)(e). The court of appeals agreed that the State’s summary contained no information regarding retrograde extrapolation, but held that this level of specificity was not required.

State v. David L. Miller, 2017AP685-CR, 11/9/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Miller moved to suppress evidence of OWI on the grounds that the deputy who stopped him lacked reasonable suspicion. The suppression hearing involved two types of evidence: (1) the deputy’s testimony, and (2) the squad video. Miller asked the court of appeals to review the squad video de novo and to publish a decision saying that it is appropriate for appellate courts to do so. The court of appeals saw no need for publication. It found that the trial court denied suppression based on the deputy’s testimony and only used the video to assess his credibility.

State v. Matthew P. Elliott, 2016AP2363, 11/8/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A police officer in his squad followed a vehicle from a bar for a short time before the vehicle turned into the parking lot of a closed restaurant. A couple minutes later, the officer returned and parked behind the still-running car, the driver of which appeared to be unconscious. The officer did not have his emergency lights or his spotlight on. The driver got out of the car and approached the squad and the officer too got out. The officer asked for identification, and shortly thereafter noted sings of intoxication ultimately leading to arrest.

State v. Bryan J. Landwehr, 2016AP2536-CR, 11/7/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals holds that officers lacked a valid community caretaker basis to seize Landwehr from his garage based on speculation that he might engage in a domestic dispute in the future.

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2017AP1313-FT, District 3, 11/7/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was sufficient evidence at D.J.W.’s commitment trial to establish he met the standard for dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.

State v. Shawn T. Wiskerchen, 2016AP1541-CR, 11/1/17, District 2 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 3/14/18; affirmed 1/4/19; case activity (including briefs)

“If you start off on the wrong foot, the footer you go, the wronger it gets.” So said Hank the Cowdog and so, essentially, argues the dissenting opinion in this case.  Section 973.20(1r) allows a sentencing court to order a defendant to make full or partial restitution to any victim of a “crime considered at sentencing,” which means “any crime for which the defendant was convicted and any read-in crime.” §973.20(1g)(a). Before ordering restitution, the court must first find a “causal nexus” between the “crime considered at sentencing” and the victim’s alleged damages. Here, the court of appeals finds a “causal nexus” between the lone burglary considered at sentencing and possible losses caused by possible, uncharged prior burglaries that were never considered or read in at sentencing. It does so based upon a series of restitution decisions that have incrementally produced a result the dissent finds absurd.

State v. Micah Nathaniel Reno, 2016AP1371-CR, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Reno’s trial lawyer wanted to call A.A. as a witness at trial. But A.A. had a pending case and A.A.’s lawyer told Reno’s lawyer not to talk to her. Thinking he was barred by the ethics rules from talking to a represented person, Reno’s lawyer didn’t attempt to talk to A.A. or call her as a witness. Trial counsel was ineffective because he was not attempting to talk to A.A. about the subject matter of her case, but only about the subject matter of Reno’s case, and therefore counsel wasn’t barred under the rules of ethics from trying to talk to or call A.A. as a witness.

State v. Gary Lee Wayerski, 2015AP1083-CR, District 3, 10/31/17 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 3/13/18, and modified, and afford as modified, 2019 WI 11; case activity (including briefs)

Rejecting Wayerski’s argument to the contrary, the court of appeals holds that a police officer alleged to have sexually assaulted two teenage boys could be convicted under § 948.095(3)(a), which prohibits a person over age 21 “who engages in an occupation or participates in a volunteer position that requires him or her to work or interact directly with children” from having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a child “whom the person works or interacts through that occupation or volunteer position.” The court also rejects the challenges Wayerski makes to the conduct of his trial.

State v. Eric L. Moore, 2016AP1292-CR, District 1, 10/31/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Moore’s right to confrontation wasn’t violated by the admission of the recording of a 911 call about an incident in which Moore was alleged to have committed battery against A.J. Nor was Moore’s lawyer ineffective for deciding not to elicit information that A.J. later recanted that allegation of battery.