On Point blog, page 115 of 265
Probation extension passes due process muster
State v. Daniel E. Olsen, 2017AP918-CR, District 4, 1/25/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including respondent’s brief)
At the request of DOC, the circuit court extended Olsen’s probation by one year and increased his monthly restitution payment. His challenges to the court’s orders fail.
An unconstitutional application of the 5th standard of dangerousness?
Outagamie County v. C.A., 2017AP450, District 3, 1/23/18 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The records for Chapter 51 cases are confidential, so we have not seen the briefs for this case. But, judging from this court of appeals opinion, it doesn’t take much beyond a mental illness diagnosis to get yourself committed under §51.20(1)(a)2e, Wisconsin’s 5th standard of dangerousness. A little unsubstantiated hearsay about your frustration with the justice system just might do the trick.
There was reasonable suspicion to administer field sobriety tests after “fender bender”
Milwaukee County v. Nicholas O. Moran, 2017AP1047 & 2017AP1048, District 1, 1/23/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The totality of the circumstances provided reasonable suspicion to believe Moran was operating while intoxicated, so police were justified in continuing to detain Moran to conduct field sobriety tests.
No erroneous exercise of discretion in TPR
State v. M.D.W., 2017AP1945 & 1946, 1/23/18, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
M.D.W. appeals only the disposition in the TPR of her two children. She argues that the court erred in its consideration of the statutory factors. The court of appeals disagrees.
Officer had reasonable suspicion to extend traffic stop
Dane County v. Brenna N. Weber, 2017AP1024, District 4, 1/11/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Weber was legitimately stopped for speeding, but argues there was insufficient basis for the officer to extend the traffic stop to conduct field sobriety tests. The court of appeals holds the totality of the circumstances justified the continued detention.
Once again, FTA leads to TPR
State v. A.S., 2017AP1349, District 1, 1/9/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to adjourn the disposition hearing in A.S.’s termination of parental rights proceeding after A.S. failed to appear, and the subsequent termination order didn’t violate A.S.’s rights to be present and to participate in the hearing.
“Mixed bag” of facts still enough for probable cause to arrest
State v. Terry Sanders, 2017AP636-CR, District 3, 1/9/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Sanders challenges his arrest for OWI, saying the officer lacked probable cause based on a “mixed bag” of facts that included inconclusive field sobriety tests and things an officer “would likely see [being done] by day by sober folks.” (¶9). The court of appeals does not agree.
TPR default judgment upheld
Kenosha County DHS v. V.J.G., 2017AP1150 & 2017AP1151, District 2, 12/27/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
V.J.G.’s failed to appear at the pretrial and grounds trial in the TPR proceedings regarding his children. The circuit court then discharged V.J.G.’s lawyer, set a new evidentiary and dispostional hearing, and terminated V.J.G.’s parental rights. The court of appeals rejects V.J.G.’s challenges to § 48.23(2)(b)3., the statute on which the court based its actions.
Court rejects challenge to strict application of 10-day deadline for requesting refusal hearing
State v. Hector Miguel Ortiz Martinez, 2017AP668, District 1, 12/27/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
After his arrest for OWI, Martinez refused to submit to a breath test. The arresting officer gave him the standard notice of intent to revoke operating privileges containing the standard written warning that the driver has 10 days to request a refusal hearing. Martinez requested a refusal hearing, but not within the 10-day limit under § 343.305(10)(a), so the circuit court declined to hold a hearing. (¶¶3-5). Martinez argues that a language barrier and incomplete information from the arresting officer mean the standard notice he was given was not legally sufficient to start the 10-day clock running. Yes it was, says the court of appeals.
OWI driver owes restitution even if “victim” ran into him
State v. David M. Larson, 2017AP1610-CR, 12/27/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
David Larson was driving drunk when another driver, who was cited for failing to yield the right of way, collided with him in a roundabout. Larson drove away while police were investigating. After a contested hearing, the court awarded the other driver restitution for injuries to himself and damage to his car.