On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Donald L. White, 2017AP188-CR, 8/23/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

White argued that his plea colloquy was defective because the circuit court did not (1) sufficiently describe the nature of the charge against him, (2) ascertain his education or level of comprehension, especially of the constitutional rights that he was waiving, (3) advise him that he was not bound by the plea agreement and could impose the maximum penalty. He relied primarily on State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906. The court of appeals distinguished White from Brown and affirmed the decision to deny the motion for plea withdrawal without a hearing.

State v. Michael A. Johnson, 2017AP331-CR, District 2, 8/23/17 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Officer Baldwin stopped Johnson for failing to dim his headlights, then cited him for that and failing to provide proof of insurance for the car he was driving (his mom’s). Baldwin told Johnson that he was free to go, so Johnson started to walk away. Baldwin asked “do you have drugs, weapons or alcohol in the car?” Johnson replied “no.” Baldwin asked if he could search the car.  Johnson replied that the car did not belong to him. 

State v. A.O., 2016AP2186, District 1, 8/22/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In deciding whether to waive a juvenile into adult court a judge must consider the criteria set out in § 938.18(5). The judge has the discretion to determine how much weight to give to each criterion. J.A.L. v. State, 162 Wis. 2d 940, 960, 471 N.W.2d 493 (1991). According to A.O., the juvenile court in his case didn’t properly apply § 938.18(5)(c), which obliges the court to consider the adequacy and suitability of facilities and services available in the juvenile justice system to treat the juvenile and protect the public. According to the court of appeals, the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion.

State v. Denton Ricardo Ewers, 2016AP1671-CR, 8/22/2017, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An employee at Family Dollar called the police to report that man who appeared “dazed and confused” and whose breath smelled of intoxicants had come into the store before leaving in a gold Ford Focus and heading west. An officer looked for the Focus but could not find it. Two hours later, the employee called back to say the same man, still “dazed and confused,” had once again been in the store, and once again had departed to the west in his gold Ford Focus. This time, the officer located the car and stopped it. The driver, Ewers, seemed intoxicated, which he eventually proved to be.

Dodge County v. L.A.S., 2017AP302, District 4, 8/17/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Under § 51.20(9)(a) the circuit court must appoint two licensed physicians or psychologists to examine and write reports on an individual subject to involuntary commitment proceedings. This requirement applies only to the initial commitment proceeding, not to the proceeding to extend a commitment.

Monroe County DHS v. T.M., 2017AP875 & 2017AP876, District 4, 8/17/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

T.M.’s parental rights were terminated on abandonment grounds under § 48.415(1). (¶¶2-10). She argues this violated her substantive due process rights under Kenosha Cty. DHS v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845, because the period of alleged abandonment included time during which the County suspended her visitation rights based on her failure to satisfy conditions it was impossible for her to meet. (¶14). The court of appeals disagrees.

Winnebago County v. C.S., 2016AP1955, 8/16/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

C.S. argues that §51.61(1)(g) is unconstitutional because it allows the government to administer involuntary medication to a prisoner without a finding of dangerousness. The court of appeals elected not to decide the issue due to mootness, but that seems like a mistake.

State v. K.J. & State v. A.W., 2016AP1501/1502 and 2017AP720/721, District 1, 8/8/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2016AP1501; 2016AP1502; 2017AP720; 2017AP721

The circuit court didn’t lose competency to terminate the parental rights of K.J. and A.W. after an initial TPR petition failed, nor did the doctrine of issue preclusion apply to the second TPR trial.

State v. J.L.B., 2016AP2358, District 4, 8/3/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court erred in finding that a six-year-old child’s videotaped interview was admissible under § 908.08 because nothing in the interview showed the child understood the importance of telling the truth and that there are negative consequences to untruthfulness. See § 908.08(3)(c); State v.

State v. D.J.A.R., 2017AP52, District 4, 8/3/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

After D.J.A.R. was adjudicated delinquent for second degree child sexual assault under § 948.02(2), the circuit court ordered him to register as a sex offender. (¶¶4-6). It relied on § 938.34(15m)(am)1., which requires finding that the juvenile’s conduct was sexually motivated and that registration is in the interest of public protection. That was a mistake, because D.J.A.R.’s offense is governed by § 938.34(15m)(bm), which mandates registration unless the requirements of § 301.45(1m) are met. (¶¶11-14). The mistake was harmless, however. (¶15).