On Point blog, page 128 of 261
Defendant forfeited challenge to improper treatment of second OWI as civil offense
Eau Claire County v. Duane D. Collier, 2016AP366, District 3, 2/22/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Collier’s belated challenge to his 1992 civil forfeiture judgment for OWI 1st offense is foreclosed by City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738.
Lack of recent calibration of radar unit didn’t render stop for speeding unreasonable
State v. Thomas M. Gibson, 2016AP1933-CR, 2/22/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer trained in visually estimating speed observed a car driven by Gibson going what he estimated to be 25 m.p.h. in a 15 m.p.h. speed zone. He trained a radar unit on the car, and that said the car was going 26 m.p.h. The officer stopped the car, and Gibson was ultimately arrested for OWI. It turns out the radar unit hadn’t been calibrated since the early years of the internet—1994. (¶¶3-5). No matter, says the court of appeals. The officer still had reasonable suspicion for the stop.
Order waiving juvenile into adult court affirmed
State v. T.T.H., 2016AP1553-1554-CR, District 1, 2/21/17 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
T.T.H., aged 16, challenged a circuit court decision waiving his case into adult court on the grounds that: (1) the record did not show that the circuit court gave “paramount consideration” to the juvenile’s best interests, and (2) the circuit court failed to give sufficient consideration to T.T.H.’s suitability for the Serious Juvenile Offender program. Both challenges failed.
Stipulation to grounds for TPR was entered freely, voluntarily, intelligently
State v. D.T., 2016AP1488, 2/21/17, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
D.T. sought to withdraw her stipulation that the court had grounds to terminate her parental rights. She said the court made conflicting statements during its colloquy with her, such as “it’s never too late to meet the conditions of return.” The court of appeals noted that the circuit court later clarified this remark by stressing that the focus of the subsequent dispositional hearing would be on the child’s best interests.
Officer had reasonable basis to believe defendant committed traffic violations
Oneida County v. Joseph A. Ravens, 2015AP2612, 2/22/17, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Raven was driving a pickup and towing a trailer when he entered an intersection as the light was changing. Unfortunately for him, Officer Young was watching and claimed the light turned red before Raven entered the intersection. He stopped Raven, smelled intoxicants, and observed slurred speech. After being charged with OWI, Raven moved for suppression and testified that the traffic light was yellow and turned red only after he was actually in the intersection. You can guess whom the trial court believed.
No error where judge reached verdict in bench trial while jury out on remaining count
State v. Robert Mario Wheeler, 2016AP55-CR, 2/21/2017, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Robert Wheeler was tried for reckless injury and being a felon in possession of a gun arising out of a single shooting incident. To keep the jury from hearing about his status as a felon, the parties stipulated that he was and agreed that the gun possession charge would be decided by the court. Wheeler’s counsel specifically noted the possibility that the two counts could be decided differently, given the different factfinders. (¶5).
Evidence sufficient to show driver’s intoxication
Waukesha County v. Kimberly A. Ridl, 2016AP554, 2/15/17, District 2 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals rejects an OWI defendant’s claim that the circuit court could did not have sufficient evidence of her impairment because the judge (it was a bench trial) was unqualified to conclude that her “medication caused her to be affected by alcohol in an atypical way.”
Disorderly conduct in the use of a drone and the hazards of going pro se
Village of DeForest v. Alexei Strelchenko, 2016AP1814, 2/16/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
Just how did Strelchenko misuse his drone? Unfortunately, we do not know. He proceeded pro se and neglected to include a copy of the trial transcript in the appellate record. It is the appellant’s job to ensure that the record is sufficient for the court of appeals to review the issues.
Erroneous admission of social worker’s expert testimony on ultimate issue was harmless
Dane County D.H.S. v. J.B., 2016AP2422, District 4, 2/16/17 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
To terminate parental rights based on the “continuing CHIPS” ground, the jury had find that there was a substantial likelihood that JB would not meet the conditions for the safe return of her child within 9 months of the hearing. §48.415(2)(a). The circuit court admitted a social worker’s expert testimony on this issue, apparently without following §907.02 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmacueticals. The court of appeals assumed error but declared it harmless.
Moving driver 8 miles to conduct field sobriety tests didn’t transform stop into arrest
State v. Dane C. McKeel, 2016AP884-CR, District 4, 2/16/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
“Due to the extremely cold, windy, icy, and snowy conditions” police moved McKeel approximately 8 miles from where he was stopped to a local police department so that McKeel had the “best opportunity” to complete field sobriety tests. (¶¶4-5). Moving McKeel this far did not transform the stop into an arrest.