On Point blog, page 132 of 266
Partial TPR summary judgment upheld
Racine County HSD v. R.E., 2016AP2039, 3/15/2017, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The record supported the circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment on grounds of abandonment because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether R.E. had failed to visit or communicate with her child, S.E., for a period of three or more months, § 48.415(1)(a)2.
Nine IAC claims; none succeed
State v. Randy Allen Lapp, 2016AP116-CR, 3/7/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Randy Lapp’s ineffective assistance claims are numerous and diverse, and the court of appeals quickly disposes of them. To wit:
Juvenile waiver decision upheld
State v. T.L.J., 2016AP1395, District 2, 3/8/2017 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in granting the state’s petition to waive T.L.J. into adult court to face charges of armed robbery and operating a motor vehicle without owner’s consent.
Court of Appeals: traffic on East Courtland must yield to traffic on North Hopkins
State v. Randolph Arthur Mantie, 2015AP2443-CR, 3/7/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
As the court notes, the relevant events in this case took place at a “hard-to-describe intersection” so here’s a visual aid.
Plea withdrawal claims rejected
State v. Erika Lisette Gutierrez, 2014AP1983-CR, 3/7/2017 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Gutierrez pleaded guilty to intentional physical abuse of a trial and had a bench trial on her plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. She asserts she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea because the circuit court didn’t give the full § 971.08(1)(c) immigration warning and because her plea was premised on incorrect advice from her lawyer. The court of appeals disagrees.
Convictions for battery, violation of no contact order upheld
State v. Earnest Lee Nicholson, 2015AP2154-CR & 2015AP2155-CR, 3/7/2017, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Nicholson challenges the validity of the no-contact order he was convicted of violating, and also argues his rights to confrontation and to testify were violated. The court of appeals rejects his claims.
Cop had reasonable suspicion to perform FSTs based on time of stop and smell of alcohol
City of Waukesha v. Derek R. Pike, 2016AP1720, 3/1/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A police officer stopped Pike at 1:00 a.m. because his car lacked a front license plate. The officer smelled alcohol, and Pike admitted that he was coming from a nightclub where he had consumed 1 or 2 beers. The officer conducted FSTs, and the results caused him to request blood chemical tests, which Pike refused.
Conduct during ch. 51 exams supported inference person was danger to herself
Marathon County v. R.O., 2016AP1898-FT, 2/27/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In 2016 R.O. was detained under § 51.15 after she was evicted and went to a local shelter but wasn’t able to do the paperwork to stay at the shelter. According to the two doctors who examined her while she was under emergency detention, R.O. was angry, defiant, irritable, displayed some paranoia, refused to cooperate with certain parts of the exams, and ‘lacked insight” into her illness. (¶¶2-6). These observations, in conjunction with information in her records describing past episodes that ended in hospitalization, were sufficient to justify the circuit court’s finding she was dangerous to herself.
Defendant forfeited challenge to improper treatment of second OWI as civil offense
Eau Claire County v. Duane D. Collier, 2016AP366, District 3, 2/22/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Collier’s belated challenge to his 1992 civil forfeiture judgment for OWI 1st offense is foreclosed by City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738.
Lack of recent calibration of radar unit didn’t render stop for speeding unreasonable
State v. Thomas M. Gibson, 2016AP1933-CR, 2/22/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer trained in visually estimating speed observed a car driven by Gibson going what he estimated to be 25 m.p.h. in a 15 m.p.h. speed zone. He trained a radar unit on the car, and that said the car was going 26 m.p.h. The officer stopped the car, and Gibson was ultimately arrested for OWI. It turns out the radar unit hadn’t been calibrated since the early years of the internet—1994. (¶¶3-5). No matter, says the court of appeals. The officer still had reasonable suspicion for the stop.
