On Point blog, page 136 of 266
State presented sufficient evidence to corroborate juvenile’s confession
State v. J.F.K., 2016AP941, District 3, 12/28/16 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
Fifteen-year-old J.F.K. confessed to having sex twice with his 17-year-old ex-girlfriend. At the delinquency hearing, the State (1) played his video confession, (2) offered the testimony of a detective who said that police had referred the girlfriend to be charged for having sex with J.F.K., and (3) a JOC showing that the ex-girlfriend had pled guilty to 4th degree sexual assault but, of course, did not name the victim.
Counsel’s failure to object to hearsay and opinion evidence was not ineffective
State v. B.H., 2016AP892-893, District 1, 12/28/16 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication)
B.H.’s twins were taken from her due to a report of violence between her and their father. The trial court found that she had failed to meet the conditions for their return and to assume parental responsibility. B.H. argues that those findings rest upon inadmissible hearsay in the form of testimony from the foster mother and from a social worker and in the form of a letter from the Bureau. B.H. asserts that trial counsel’s failure to object to this evidence amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Wide turn into left-hand lane, slow speed among factors justifying stop
City of Eau Claire v. David Eugene Phelps, 2016AP248, District 3, 12/28/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Contrary to the circuit court’s conclusion, a police officer’s observations about Phelps’s driving provided more than a “hunch” and justified the stop of his car.
Defense win: TPR order reversed because it was based on circuit court’s mistake about its authority
T.M.H. v. A.N.W., 2016AP1981, District 4, 12/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The biological father of J.H. petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother, A.W. The circuit court granted the petition, but only after concluding it could order continued visitation between J.H. and his maternal great-grandmother, with whom J.H. had an important relationship. It turns out the circuit court did not have that authority. Because the circuit court said it “absolutely, positively” would not terminate A.W.’s rights unless it could order continued visitation by the great-grandmother, the termination order is reversed.
Community caretaking justified contact with man sleeping or passed out in car
State v. John D. Myer, 2016AP490-CR, District 4, 12/22/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Assuming a police officer’s contact with Myer constituted a seizure, it was justified under the community caretaker doctrine.
Summary judgment in TPR case affirmed
Jefferson County DHS v. C.C., 2016AP1983, District 4, 12/21/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly granted summary judgment on the petition terminating C.C.’s parental rights despite C.C.’s claims that the circuit court violated the mandatory notice provision under § 802.08(2) and that a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of grounds for termination.
Court rejects claim that revocation hearing lawyer was ineffective
State ex rel. Vincent Martinez v. Brian Hayes, 2014AP2095, District 2, 12/21/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Martinez claimed the lawyer who represented him at his ES revocation hearing should have objected to certain hearsay evidence and to the ALJ’s failure to find good cause for the lack of appearance of certain witnesses. The court of appeals rejects the claim because even if counsel was deficient, Martinez wasn’t prejudiced.
Objective facts justified officer’s contact with driver
State v. Marie A. Martin, 2016AP913-CR, District 1, 12/20/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A police officer’s contact with the driver of a car idling in a parking lot at 2:00 a.m. was lawful because the objective facts justified a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Time, place, quick turn, hanging out in parking lot = reasonable suspicion of OWI
State v. Gregory J. McMillan, 2016AP127-CR, 12/16/2016, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
12:30 a.m., Saturday, Dodge Charger, driving away from tavern-rich area of McFarland. No bad driving, but a “relatively sudden” right turn with a squad two car lengths behind. The turn is onto a dead-end street with only “large industrial-type buildings.” Officer drives around a back way and sees McMillan standing at the back of his car talking on his phone. From where he’s standing, McMillan could have snuck into the shadows had he seen the squad following him, instead of coming around a back way. Officer stops McMillan. Reasonable suspicion?
Defendant pleading to “sexual contact” enticement need not understand “sexual contact”
State v. Shannon Olance Hendricks, 2015AP2429-CR, 12/15/2016, District 1/4 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 5/15/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 15 ; case activity (including briefs)
A defendant pleading to a sexual assault involving sexual contact (as opposed to sexual intercourse) is required to understand the meaning of “sexual contact.” If he or she does not, he or she is entitled to plea withdrawal. State v. Jipson, 2003 WI App 222, ¶9, 267 Wis. 2d 467, 671 N.W.2d 18. Here, the court of appeals holds that a defendant pleading to child enticement with a purpose to engage in a sexual assault by “sexual contact” need not understand the meaning of this phrase.