On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

Nathan Y. v. Tarik T., 2010AP992, District IV, 10/7/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Tarik T.: Philip J. Brehm

The court rejects the argument that under Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶36, summary judgment is inappropriate when the ground alleged is abandonment.

¶7        …  First, Steven V. explained that its discussion of the use of summary judgment procedure on grounds proven by documentary evidence versus those proven by non-documentary evidence was not “mean[t] to imply that the general categorization of statutory grounds in this and the preceding paragraph represent a definitive statement about the propriety of summary judgment in any particular case.”  Id.

Grant Co. DSS v. Stacy K. S., 2010AP1678, District IV, 10/7/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Stacy K.: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

The circuit court may take the parent’s admission telephonically at the grounds phase of a TPR; neither § 48.422(7)(a) nor § 807.13 requires physical presence.

¶16      Addressing first the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 48.422(7)(a),  the plain import of the requirement that the court “[a]ddress the parties present” is that the court engage in an on-the-record discussion,

City of Kenosha v. Elizabeth R. Tower, 2009AP1957, District 2, 10/6/10  

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Tower: Michael F. Torphy; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Because the police knew Tower was merely stopped temporarily for the purpose of dropping of a passenger – an explicit statutory exception to illegal parking – they didn’t have reasonable suspicion to temporarily seize her for illegal parking:

¶10 The City argues that like the officers in Renz,

State v. Javier Galvin, 2010AP863-CR, District 2, 10/6/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Galvin: John S. Schiro, Keith Llanas; BiC; Resp.

Galvan, who had minimal ability to understand English, didn’t understand the implied consent warnings given to him in English. Because the arresting officer knew of Galvan’s limitation, and had indeed obtained the translation services of another officer at the time of arrest,

State v. Jason L. Sedahl, 2010AP1097-CR, District 3, 10/5/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Sedahl: William A. Schembera; BiC; Resp.

The trial court erred in dismissing a pending charge on the theory that the charge (OWI) resulted from police failure to perform their community caretaker function (preventing him from driving):

¶12      …  No Wisconsin case holds that the doctrine places an affirmative duty on police to intercede and take a person into preventative detention prior to the commission of a crime. 

State v. Precious M. Ward, 2009AP2085-CR, District 1, 10/5/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Ward: Lew A. Wasserman; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Hearing-Impaired Juror

Juror who was hearing impaired, but not completely so; who could lip read; and for whom the trial judge took precautions to make sure he could hear everything, was qualified to sit.

State v. David J. Bucknell, 2010AP833-CR, District 3, 9/30/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Bucknell: Rebecca M. Coffee; BiC; Resp.; Reply

A prior conviction, used to enhance a pending charge, may be collaterally attacked on the basis of denial of the 6th amendment right to counsel. Because “it is clear from Bucknell’s testimony at the hearings on his motion that he was aware of his right to be represented by an attorney at the prior proceeding and that he knowingly and intelligently relinquished that right,”

Village of Marathon City v. Jenny L. Nowak, 2010AP462, District 3, 9/30/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); Resp. Br.

¶11      The five-factor Hanson/Kramer test is used to determine the accuracy of moving radar.[4] See Washington Cnty. v. Luedtke, 135 Wis. 2d 131, 133 n.2, 399 N.W.2d 906 (1987).  “If there is compliance with the Hanson/Kramer criteria,

Jeffrey J. v. David D., 2010AP1717, District 3, 9/28/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for David D.: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate

Parent’s right to confrontation was satisfied by in-chambers discussion between judge and children during which they spoke in favor of termination, where their father killed their mother and grandparents, and the judge reasonably determined that they would suffer emotional harm if required to submit to face to face confrontation.

Door County v. Andrew M. LaFond, 2010AP976, District 3, 9/28/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for LaFond: Robert C. Raymond; BiC; Resp.; Reply

The court rejects an argument that a driver has a due process right to be informed that a blood sample can be taken forcibly upon refusal to consent to a blood draw.

¶8        Our supreme court has held that the information required by what is now WIS.