On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

Waukesha County v. E.B.V., 2021Ap1910, District 2, 4/20/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court granted the County’s motion to dismiss the truancy petition filed against E.B.V. because E.B.V. was no longer truant and, after initially contesting the facts of the petition, he entered into a consent decree. J.C.V., one of E.B.V.’s parents,  had also filed motions to dismiss the petition, alleging it was untimely,

State v. S.J., 2022AP160, 4/19/22, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Sharon” pled “no contest” to being an unfit parent, and then the circuit court held that it was in “Danielle’s” best interests to terminate Sharon’s parental rights so that Danielle’s paternal aunt could adopt her. Sharon appealed that decision arguing that the circuit court failed to give sufficient consideration to 1 of the 6 “best interests of the child” factors in §48.426(3).

State v. Michael T. Dewey, 2021AP174-CR, District 4, 4/14/22 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Dewey was charged with three dozen counts of child sexual assault related crimes alleged to have occurred during various times between 2005 and 2013. He argues the charging periods for most of the counts were “too long and disjointed” to allow him to prepare an adequate defense and that his trial lawyer was ineffective for not objecting to jury instructions for five of the counts on the ground that the three non-continuous time periods charged for those counts failed to protect his right to a unanimous verdict. The court of appeals rejects his arguments.

Walworth County v. P.S., 2021AP2090-FT, 4/13/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court entered an initial commitment order against P.C. without specifying a standard of dangerousness. The court of appeals shrugged. It did not matter because the circuit court’s findings “were specific, tracked the statutory criteria, and are supported by the record.” Opinion, ¶10 n.2.

Waupaca County v. H.I.B., 2021AP2026, 4/7/22, District 4 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

It is uncontested that “Hazel” has done well for three commitments in a row. Yet the court of appeals has affirmed her 4th Chapter 51 recommitment  because the jury could have inferred a “substantial probability” of death or serious injury from evidence that was “only suggestive” and that “lacked details such as dates and clear descriptions of conduct.”

Dane County DHS v. A.D., 2022AP76 & 2022AP77, District 4, 3/31/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Another case showing that in TPR proceedings, “egregious” conduct is coming to mean “missing one hearing.”

City of Rhinelander v. Zachary Tyler LaFave-LaCrosse, 2020AP1466-1467, 4/5/22, District 3 (1-judge appeal, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This case needs a motion for reconsideration. LaFave-LaCrosse, an unemployed student, appealed convictions for OWI 1st and refusal to take a breath test and moved the circuit court for waiver of transcript fees due to his indigency. The circuit court denied his motion, so he appealed that decision. The court of appeals held that the circuit court made an error of law. But then the court of appeals applied the wrong legal standard to affirm.

State v. E.L.C., 2021AP1624, 4/5/22, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In 2016, 13-year-old E.L.C. pled to 4th-degree sexual assault of his 7-year-old sister. The juvenile court deferred the issue of sex offender reporting until E.L.C. had a chance to participate in counseling. Five years later, it ordered him to register as a sex offender based on his conduct during supervision and his failure to fully engage with treatment. The court of appeals affirmed.

State v. Michael Lee Muehl, 2021AP1755-CR & 2021AP1758-CR, District 4, 3/31/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court sentenced Muehl to prison and made him eligible for the earned release programs. Turns out Muehl was ineligible for those programs, so he filed a motion to modify his sentence on the grounds that his ineligibility was a “new factor”—that is, a fact highly relevant to the imposition of sentence that was not known to the judge at the time of sentencing because it wasn’t in existence or was unknowingly overlooked. State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, ¶35, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828. (¶¶2-10). Although a defendant’s ineligibility for earned release programming   might be a new factor in some cases, it isn’t here because Muehl hasn’t established his ineligibility was “highly relevant” to the sentencing decision.

State v. Eric Allen Erickson, 2021AP1826-CR, District 4, 3/31/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The state appealed a circuit court order granting Erickson’s collateral attack of a prior OWI conviction. Erickson’s response brief argued that the state ignored the relevant facts and relied on irrelevant facts. Erickson also cited authorities that “squarely rebut” authorities relied on by the state. Despite Erickson’s onslaught against its argument,