On Point blog, page 58 of 266
COA: dismissal with prejudice not unreasonable remedy for county’s repeated failure to produce key witness
Fond du Lac County v. John Anthony Hettwer, 2020AP 1422, 7/21/21, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The county charged Hettwer with OWI- and PAC-first. At the first attempted trial, the jury was sworn, but before opening statements could begin, the county told the court that the phlebotomist it intended to call as a witness was home with a sick child, and asked that she be allowed to testify by telephone. Hettwer objected and ultimately the court declared a mistrial. (No double-jeopardy problem here because an OWI-1 is non-criminal.)
COA upholds stop on community-caretaker grounds
State v. Keith J. Dresser, 2020AP2017, 7/22/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A sheriff’s deputy saw Dresser apparently unconscious in his vehicle in a Taco Bell parking lot at 5:00 a.m. The deputy pulled behind Dresser’s vehicle, turned on his emergency lights apparently based on departmental “procedures,” and knocked on the window. Dresser woke up, he and/or the deputy opened a car door, and ultimately Dresser was arrested for OWI.
COA rejects ineffective-assistance claims; rejects state’s broad guilty-plea waiver rule
State v. Skylard R. Grant, 2020AP404, 7/20/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Grant pleaded to reduced charges on the second day of his trial for homicide, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possessing THC with intent to deliver. He claims his trial lawyer was inadequate in various ways during the trial. The court rejects Grant’s specific claims, but it also rejects the state’s expansive reading of State v. Villegas, 2018 WI App 9, 380 Wis. 2d 246, 908 N.W.2d 198. The state had argued that counsel’s alleged failings were waived by the guilty plea because they did not occur during the actual process of procuring the plea. The court of appeals says Villegas‘s waiver rule is not quite this unforgiving; it clarifies (in accord with Supreme Court case law) that claims of ineffective assistance survive a guilty plea where, “but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty.”
IAC claim based on failure to ask for theory of defense jury instruction rejected due to absence of proposed instruction
State v. Michael J. Foster, 2020AP2149-CR, District 4, 7/29/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A defendant claiming that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask for a theory of defense jury instruction must propose the language the instruction should have included and establish it is a correct statement of the law. Absent such a proposed instruction, the ineffective claim will fail.
Rookie cop’s mistake in reading results of registration check didn’t invalidate stop given other facts showing reasonable suspicion
State v. Anthony Francen Harris, 2019AP1908-CR, District 3, 7/30/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Police stopped the car Harris was driving in part because Skenandore, an officer-in-training, misread the data on his in-squad computer screen and wrongly concluded that the car’s owner didn’t have a valid license. (¶¶2-3, 5-7). His mistake doesn’t matter because the officer’s other observations justified the stop.
Conspiracy and solicitation charges weren’t multiplicitous, sentencing judge didn’t erroneously exercise sentencing discretion
State v. Lisa Rena Lantz, 2020AP742-CR, District 3, 7/27/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Lantz was convicted of conspiring to deliver methamphetamine between September 2015 and March 2016 and of soliciting the delivery of methamphetamine in February and March 2016. The court of appeals rejects Lantz’s argument that the charges are multiplicitous. It also rejects her challenge to her sentences.
Ch. 51 respondent had sufficient notice of standard of dangerousness; and the evidence was sufficient to dangerousness
Trempealeau County v. B.K., 2020AP1166, District 3, 7/27/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
B.K. (“Brian”) argues he was denied procedural due process because he was not given particularized notice of which standard of dangerousness the County intended to prove at the final commitment hearing. He also contends the evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient to prove he was dangerous. The court of appeals rejects with both claims.
Defense win: Evidence at recommitment hearings was insufficient to prove dangerousness
Rusk County v. A.A., 2019AP839 & 2020AP1580, District 3, 7/20/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (2019AP839; 2020AP1580)
A.A. appeals two recommitment orders, raising multiple constitutional issues as to both and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of dangerousness as to one of the cases and the admission of hearsay evidence regarding the other. The court of appeals acknowledges that A.A.’s constitutional claims raise “important” and “thorny” issues about recommitment petition pleading requirements and the constitutionality of recommitment proceedings, but it it resolves both cases on the evidentiary issues. (¶¶15, 31-32).
Consent to voluntary TPR was valid
C.W. v. M.M., 2021AP330 & 2021AP331, District 3, 7/21/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
M.M.’s consent to voluntary termination of parental rights was valid and can’t be withdrawn.
Defense win: Disorderly conduct charges precluded by First Amendment
State v. Aaron Matthew Oleston, 2020AP952-CR, District 4, 7/15/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Olseston was charged with five counts of disorderly conduct for “hurling profanities and personal insults” (¶14) at Janesville police officers as they came and left the police station, as well as filming some of the encounters. Three of the five counts can’t be prosecuted because Oleston’s conduct was protected by the First Amendment; the other two can be, because they went beyond protected speech.