On Point blog, page 67 of 266
COA decides appeal from expired commitment order due to recurring issue on sufficiency of evidence
Fond Du Lac County v. R.O.V., 2019AP1228, 2020AP853, 12/16/20, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
In these consolidated cases, the court of appeals reviewed both Ray’s initial commitment and his 2nd recommitment (not his 1st recommitment), which has not yet ended. Although the initial commitment order expired long ago, the court held that it was not moot due to a recurring, “sufficiency of the evidence” regarding dangerousness that might affect the outcome of his appeal from the 2nd recommitment.
The doctors who examined Ray for his initial commitment and for his 2nd recommitment agreed that he is mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment. They diagnosed him with either bipolar disorder with psychotic features, schizoaffective disorder bipolar type, or schizophrenia. The main dispute was over his alleged dangerousness.
Sentencing court’s failure to consider presumptive mandatory release date isn’t a new factor
State v. Gerald D. Taylor, 2019AP1244-CR, District 1, 12/15/20, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In 1999, a court imposed two, consecutive, 30-year indeterminate sentences on Taylor for child sexual assault. Accounting for the parole system in place, the court told Taylor he would be eligible for parole after serving one-quarter (15 years) of his sentence, and he could end up serving two-thirds (40 years), which is when he would reach his mandatory release date. Taylor moved for a sentence modification because the court didn’t realize his sentence had a presumptive release date (not a mandatory release) which results in a lengthier confinement.
Driver can’t refuse chemical test based on right to counsel
Washington County v. James Michael Conigliaro, 2020AP888, District 2, 12/9/20 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Conigliaro appealed an order finding that he refused to submit to an evidentiary chemical test. He argued that the arresting officer, Joseph Lagash, led him to believe that he had the right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to the test and/or that Lagash failed to dispel his belief that he had the right to counsel. The court of appeals rejects both arguments.
Weaving at bar time justified traffic stop
City of Oshkosh v. Brian D. Hamill, 2020AP867, District 2, 12/2/20 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The facts are just that simple. At 2:38 a.m. (bar closing time) an officer observed Hamill’s Jeep drifting to the right line of its lane, then to the center for 30-40 feet, then to the left centerline, and then to the right line of its lane. It was undisputed that Hamlin’s Jeep never crossed over either lane marker. And yet the circuit held that these facts gave the officer reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigator traffic stop.
State presented sufficient evidence to support adjudication for making terrorist threats
State v. D.A.M., 2020AP821, District 2, 11/25/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence at D.A.M.’s trial was sufficient to show his conduct constituted a terrorist threat under § 947.019.
Reasonable suspicion for traffic stop amply demonstrated
City of New Berlin v. Eric John Dreher, 2020AP850, District 2, 11/25/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer testified he observed Dreher cut across lanes while turning, deviate from his lane, and travel at a high rate of speed. This led the officer to believe the driver was impaired, as “it was some of the worst driving that [he] observed in over 250 drink driv[ing] arrests.”
Defense win: Police didn’t have reasonable suspicion to detain driver to do field sobriety tests
State v. Michael Anthony Dotson, 2019AP1082-CR, District 3, 11/24/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Though this is a “close case” (¶28), the objectively reasonable inferences from the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer who stopped Dotson’s car did not provide reasonable suspicion to believe that Dotson’s blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limits or that his ability to operate his vehicle was impaired. Thus, the officer’s detention of Dotson to conduct field sobriety tests was unlawful.
COA finds another exception to the Haseltine rule
State v. Richard L. Pringle, 2020AP6-CR, 11/17/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
No witness, expert or otherwise, may give an opinion that a mentally competent witness is telling the truth. State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984). This case, which the court of appeals calls “close,” holds that an expert may give an opinion that a category of individuals generally lacks the sophistication to concoct a sexual assault claim.
Evidence sufficient to satisfy Chapter 51’s 4th standard of dangerousness
Vilas County DHS v. N.J.P., 2019AP1567, 12/15/20, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
In this appeal from an initial commitment, the county conceded that it had not offered clear and convincing evidence to mee the 4th standard of dangerousness. It asked the court of appeals to affirm the commitment based on the 5th standard of dangerousness. The court of appeals rejected the county’s concession and affirmed on the 4th standard because N.J.P., who is mentally ill, had been expelled from a homeless shelter and was found dressed in tattered clothes on a bitterly cold day.
COA says hospital’s BAC data was independent source after cop’s draw suppressed
State v. Daniel J. Van Linn, 2019AP1317, 11/17/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 4/27/21, affirmed, 3/22/22; case activity (including briefs)
Police found Van Linn injured and intoxicated near the scene of an accident, and an ambulance took him to the hospital for treatment. At the hospital Van Linn refused an officer’s request that consent to a blood draw; the officer, claiming exigency, ordered blood taken anyway. Van Linn moved to suppress and the court held there was no exigency, and accordingly suppressed the BAC results. Shortly thereafter, the district attorney asked the court to approve a subpoena of Van Linn’s treatment records from the hospital; the court issued the subpoena and the hospital turned over the records, which included the results of the hospital’s own blood test. Van Linn asked the court to suppress those as well, but it declined. He was convicted and appealed.