On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Sarah J. Katula-Talle, 2019AP1622-CR, District 3, 10/6/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A police officer had contact with Katula-Talle while responding to a domestic disturbance call. The department’s standard procedure in those situations is to run a driver’s license and warrant check on everyone the officers have contact with. The check on Katula-Talle showed she was revoked for an OWI-related offense. Two weeks later the officer saw her driving and stopped her on suspicion she was operating after revocation. (¶¶3-5). Was the two-week-old check enough to justify the stop, or was it only enough to give the officer a hunch?

Portage County v. E.R.R., 2020AP870-FT, District 4, 10/1/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

As the supreme court recently emphasized, at a proceeding to extend a ch. 51 commitment, proving dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(am) requires evidence establishing that the person is likely to be dangerous under one of the specific standards in § 51.20(1)(a)2. if treatment is withdrawn. Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶40, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. There was not enough evidence in this case to prove E.R.R. was dangerous under one of those standards.

State v. Synika Antonio Kirk, 2019AP175, 9/22/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

You know, those semis that carry like 6 or 10 cars. Kirk owned a 1989 Jaguar that was riding on such a vehicle along with several other cars. A Kansas trooper pulled the truck over and asked to inspect the driver’s paperwork. The trooper would testify that the driver’s logbook had an entry he found strange: a two-day stay in Reno, Nevada after the truck was loaded–a stop the trooper called “not normal.” He also didn’t buy the driver’s explanation that he had spent those two days trying to find tires for his truck.

State v. Raymond R. Barton, 2019AP1990, 9/24/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Barton was convicted at trial of three counts involving battery of his adult stepson. He argues the trial court should have granted the mistrial he asked for when his daughter testified she was afraid that something had happened because “things had happened before.” He also asserts the court should have instructed the jury on self-defense. The court of appeals rejects both arguments.

State v. Jerry A. Leister, 2020AP365-CR, District 4, 9/24/20 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Leister, charged with intentional mistreatment of animals,  wanted a lawyer but had trouble retaining one.  After repeated adjournments, he wound up trying his case pro se in the absence of a colloquy to determine whether he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. After his conviction, he retained lawyer, who raised the issue in a postconviction motion. 

Brown County Human Services v. T.F., 2020AP793, 9/22/20, District 3 (1-judge opinion, illegible for publication); case activity

To establish grounds for terminating T.F.’s parental rights, the Department sought to prove that she had abandoned her daughter, Allie, for period of 6 months or longer. It filed a successful motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of T.F.’s communications and visits with her daughter occurring after it filed its TPR petition. The court of appeals held that the circuit court erred in excluding this evidence. It reversed and remanded the case for a new jury trial on grounds for the TPR.

N.M. v. State, 2020AP964, case activity; and State v. J.M.W., 2020AP1057, 9/22/20, case activity, District 1 (i-judge opinions, ineligible for publication)

Anyone who loves an alcoholic parent will find this decision heart-wrenching. J.M.W. has a close relationship with her 11 year old daughter, N.M. Unfortunately, J.M.W. also struggles with alcoholism and unstable housing, so the circuit court terminated her parental rights. Both mother and daughter appealed and challenged the circuit court’s “best interests of the child” analysis. In two overlapping decisions, the court of appeals called this a “difficult” case, but nevertheless affirmed.

State v. Decarlos K. Chambers, 2019AP411-CR, petition for review of per curiam opinion granted 9/16/20; case activity (including briefs)

Issue presented (derived from Cambers’ petition for review):

The State charged Chambers with 1st degree reckless homicide. He maintained that he had not committed the crimes and that was absolutely innocent. He refused all plea offers. Nevertheless, during closing arguments his lawyer told the jury they should consider convicting him of 2nd degree recklessly homicide, and they did.  The issues is whether trial counsel violated Chambers’ 6th Amendment right to determine his own defense under  McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S Ct. 1500 (2018).

Jackson County v. C.A.D, 2020AP69, District 4, 9/17/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is the second time in a week District 4 has dismissed a recommitment appeal as moot despite the claim of collateral effects: a firearm restriction, stigma, possible liability for costs of care. D4 says: “prove they exist!” A fundamental principle of appellate procedure is that the parties to an appeal cannot cite to evidence outside the record. So query how District 4 thinks appellants should prove these effects? This is why appellate courts around the country presume that committiments have collateral effects and decide them. Click here. Meanwhile, District 3 just took the opposite approach in denying a motion to dismiss a recommitment appeal for mootness. Click here.

Waukesha County v. H.M.B., 202AP570, District 2, 9/16/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is not your typical Chapter 51 mootness decision.  The county petitioned for the initial commitment of “Heather,” who was suffering from anorexia nervousa. She stipulated to a commitment but not to confinement at a mental hospital or to involuntary treatment. The court of appeals dismissed her appeal as moot despite the collateral consequences of a firearm restriction and stigma.