On Point blog, page 96 of 262

No IAC prejudice for not telling jury ID of mysterious “Victoria”

State v. John P. Bougneit, 2018AP74, 10/24/18, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A jury convicted Bougneit of fourth-degree sexual assault; he allegedly nonconsensually fondled an 18-year-old woman under a blanket while he, the woman, and his wife were watching a movie together at their house. The wife testified for Bougneit and the state sought to damage her credibility by calling attention to her professed recall–in a statement to police and on the stand–of various seemingly minor details of the evening. 

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Circuit court didn’t have to wait 2 days before moving from default on grounds to terminating parental rights

State v. T.C.G., 2018AP464, 10/23/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This TPR decision doesn’t seem right. The circuit court defaulted T.C.G. for failing to appear at the final pre-trial and trial regarding her fitness to parent J.M.H. It then moved immediately to the dispositional hearing without waiting 2 days as required by §48.23(2)(b)3. The court of appeals held that the 2-day requirement didn’t apply here.

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Driver’s failure to yield on entering roundabout justified traffic stop

State v. Nicholas C. Wegner, 2017AP2236-CR, District 2, 10/23/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A police officer testified he was proceeding through a traffic roundabout when Wegner, ignoring the yield signs posted for vehicles entering the roundabout, entered directly in front of the officer and caused the officer to have to brake to avoid hitting Wegner. (¶4). This conduct justified the officer’s stop of Wegner.

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TPR court correctly applied “substantial relationship” standard in dispo phase

State v. M.G., 2018AP835, 10/23/18, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.G. appeals the termination of his parental rights to his daughter, M.W. He stipulated to unfitness on the ground of failure to assume parental responsibility. See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6). On appeal, he contends the circuit court erroneously imported the required finding for this ground–that he lacked a “substantial parental relationship” with the child–into the third factor of the disposition phase, which concerns only “substantial relationship(s)” between the child and M.G. or others in his family. See Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3)(c).

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Good issues for SCOW: Requests for substitute counsel and self-representation in Chapter 51 cases

Fond du Lac County v. S.R.H., 2018AP1088-FT, 10/17/18, District 2 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity

At the beginning of a Chapter 51 extension hearing, S.R.H. told the court that he wanted to fire his attorney, and he asked for a new one. When that failed, he asked the court “Your honor, could I go pro se?” The court ignored his request. The hearing proceeded, S.R.H. was recommitted, and the court of appeals here affirms in a decision worthy of SCOW’s review.

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Radar was working, so speed reading provided reasonable suspicion for stop

City of Watertown v. Jeffrey Donald Perschke, 2018AP555, District 4, 10/18/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer stopped Perschke after the radar device the officer was using clocked Perschke going 38 in a 25-mile-per-hour zone. Perschke claims the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him because the radar wasn’t working properly, but the circuit court’s finding to the contrary dooms Perschke’s argument.

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Claim of ignition interlock didn’t negate probable cause for PBT

State v. Jesse J. Kain, 2018AP951, 10/17/18, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Kain appeals his drunk driving conviction, arguing the officer that stopped him lacked the probable cause necessary to ask him to take a preliminary breath test. (See Cty. of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 316, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999).)

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Sentencing court assures defendant: “You can ask for expunction later.” Court of appeals says: “No, you can’t”

State v. Kole R. Eichinger, 2017AP1845-1847-CR, 10/16/18, District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This case highlights an expunction issue that SCOW still needs to resolve. Prior to 2014, circuit courts often delayed deciding expunction until they saw how a defendant did on probation. State v. Matasek, 2014 27, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811 changed that practice.  It clarified that courts must decide whether to order expunction at the time of sentencing.  What about all of the defendants who were expressly told at sentencing that they could apply for expunction after they completed probation?

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Court of Appeals upholds TPR

Rock County DHS v. L.H., 2018AP1308, 10/11/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

L.H. challenges the circuit court’s finding that the county department established continuing-CHIPS grounds for termination of her parental rights to her daughter. She says the county can’t have met its burden to show a “substantial likelihood” she wouldn’t meet the conditions of return within nine months, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3. (2015-16) (recently amended), because the court said “I don’t know” whether she’d meet the conditions.

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Counsel not ineffective for failing to object to vouching at trial and impermissible factors at sentencing

State v. Kenneth Alexander Burks, 2018AP208-CR, 9/25/18, District 1, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals held that an officer’s testimony that another witnesses’s testimony was “very believable” did not qualify as “vouching” when considered in context. It also held that the circuit court did not impermissibly rely on its own comments about the opioid epidemic, addiction, and the medical and pharmaceutical industries when it sentenced Burks. Thus, his lawyer was not ineffective when he failed to object to these alleged errors.

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