On Point blog, page 1 of 4
COA upholds statute prohibiting possession of a firearm while intoxicated despite State’s failure to adequately litigate matter in circuit court
State v. Bernabe Gonzalez, 2024AP358-CR, 5/6/25, District I (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
In what we believe is COA’s first foray into the vexing world of firearm regulation post-Bruen and Rahimi, COA holds that Wisconsin’s statute prohibiting intoxicated persons from “going armed” passes muster under an originalist legal analysis.
SCOW rejects 2nd Amendment challenge to “going armed while intoxicated” statute
State v. Mitchell L. Christen, 2019AP1767-CR, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; 5/4/21, case activity (including briefs)
Christen was armed while drunk in his apartment when he threatened to shoot his roommates. A jury found that he violated §941.20(1)(b), which makes it a crime to operate or go armed with a firearm while intoxicated. Christen challenged the constitutionality of §941.20(1)(b) as applied to him because it burdened his 2nd Amendment right to armed self-defense under District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In a 5-1-1 opinion, SCOW rejects this challenge. Hagedorn concurs. R.G. Bradley dissents arguing in part that the prevalence of guns and copious alcohol consumption in the colonies show that the Framers guaranteed Americans the right to be armed while drunk.
SCOW rejects 2nd Amendment challenge to felon-in-possession statute
State v. Leevan Roundtree, 2012 WI 1, 1/7/21, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2018AP594-CR; case activity (including briefs)
In 2003, Roundtree was convicted of multiple felony counts of failure to pay child support. Twelve years later, police executed a search warrant at his home and found a firearm and ammunition under his mattress. He pled guilty to one count of felon in possession. On appeal, he argued that §941.29(2)(2013-2014), which barred him from possessing a firearm, is unconstitutional as applied to his case. The statute has no time limit and draws no distinction between serious or violent felonies versus less serious felonies like failure to pay child support. In a 5-2 decision SCOW upheld the statute.
Subsequent mitigating action didn’t extinguish factual basis for reckless endangering conviction
State v. Jonathan N. Reiher, 2019AP2321-CR, District 4, 10/29/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals rejects the defendant’s claim that his pleas to reckless endangerment lacked a factual basis.
“As applied” challenge to guns statute fails, despite State’s tacit concession
State v. Mitchell L. Christen, 2019AP1767-Cr, 3/17/20, District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); review granted 9/16/16; case activity (including briefs)
Interesting case. Section 941.20(1)(b) makes operating or going armed with a firearm while under the influence of an intoxicant a misdemeanor. Christen argued that the statute violates the 2nd Amendment “as applied” to anyone who engages in the prohibited conduct while inside his or her home. The State declined to file a response brief, which means it conceded the point. Still, the court of appeals rejected Christen’s argument and affirmed.
SCOW to address lifetime ban on firearms for felons and guilty plea waiver rule
State v. Leevan Roundtree, 2018AP594-CR, review of per curiam opinion granted, 1/14/20; case activity
Issues:
1. Section 941.29(2) prohibits any person convicted of a felony—even if it doesn’t involve physical violence–from possessing firearms the rest of his life. Is this statute unconstitutional as applied to a person convicted of failure to pay child support?
2. Does a guilty plea waive a claim that the statute of conviction is unconstitutional as applied?
Statute governing transportation of firearms doesn’t preclude CCW conviction
State v. Brian Grandberry, 2016AP173-CR, District 1, 11/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 3/13/17; affirmed 4/10/18; case activity (including briefs)
Grandberry was charged with carrying a concealed weapon after police stopped the car he was driving and found a loaded pistol in the glove compartment. Citing § 167.31, which regulates the transportation of firearms, he argues he was not “carrying” a concealed weapon but was instead “transporting” it under § 167.31(2)(b)(intro.) and 1., which allow handguns to be transported in a car, even when loaded. (¶6). The court of appeals says this argument misses its mark.
Statute prohibiting switchblades doesn’t apply to possession by a person at home
State v. Cory S. Herrmann, 2015 WI App 97; case activity (including briefs)
In light of the Second Amendment decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), Wisconsin’s prohibition on the possession of a switchblade knife, § 941.24(1), is unconstitutional as applied to a person who possesses a switchblade in his or her own home.
Statements on 911 call and to police at the scene admissible under excited utterance exception to hearsay rule
State v. Shironski A. Hunter, 2014AP2521-CR, District 1, 9/15/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The trial court didn’t err in admitting statements witnesses made during a 911 call and to police at the scene of the crime because the statements were excited utterances. Moreover, the statements weren’t testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes, so admitting them didn’t violate the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him.
Notice that juvenile adjudication bars firearm possession isn’t an element of crime under § 941.29
State v. Dijon L. Carter, 2014AP2707-CR, District 1, 7/14/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
While a court adjudicating a juvenile delinquent for a felony is required to warn the juvenile about the prohibition on possessing a firearm under § 941.29, the warning requirement doesn’t add another element to the offenses created by § 941.29. Thus, Carter can be convicted of violating § 941.29(2)(b) even though he wasn’t warned about the ban on firearm possession when he was adjudicated delinquent for possession of THC with intent to deliver.