On Point blog, page 1 of 2
Boyfriend can’t assert defense based on girlfriend’s privilege to “reasonably discipline” her child
State v. Glen Artheus Beal, 2014AP2534-CR, 9/22/15, District 1 not recommended for publication); case activity
A jury convicted Beal of child abuse as a party to a crime because multiple witnesses testified that he punched his girlfriend’s daughter and also restrained the daughter so that her mother (his girlfriend) could hit her. See §939.05(2)(a) and §939.45(5). Beal argued that although he was not entitled to assert the parental discipline privilege himself, he should have been able to present a defense based on his girlfriends’ right to assert that privilege.
Defendant’s rights to free speech and religious freedom were not violated by prosecution for conspiracy to commit child abuse based on his preaching the use of the rod for child discipline
State v. Philip B. Caminiti, 2013AP730-CR, District 4, 3/20/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The prosecution of Caminiti for conspiracy to commit child abuse, §§ 939.31 and 948.03(2)(b), based on his instructions to his congregants to use a rod to discipline their children did not violate his First Amendment rights to advocacy or freedom of religion.
§ 948.02(2) – Elements, in Relation to Defense of Rape By the Child
State v. Monika S. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, reversing 2005 WI App 265
For Lackershire: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶29 Lackershire’s second argument centers on the somewhat unique posture of this case. A violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) is generally viewed as a strict liability offense. Unlike other sexual assault offenses, where consent of the victim may be a central issue,
§ 948.03(3)(b), Physical Abuse of Child by Recklessly Causing Bodily Harm – Element of Recklessness
State v. Quentrell E. Williams, 2006 WI App 212
For Williams: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Because “recklessly” causing harm to a child, § 948.03(b), is determined solely from an objective point of view, evidence related to whether the actor “subjectively thought his [disciplinary action] was reasonable parental discipline” is irrelevant, including evidence of how the actor was him or herself disciplined as a child,
Common Law Defenses – Collateral Attack on Custody Order, § 948.31
State v. John W. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, on certification
For Campbell: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: To attack a custody order as void, in defense against interference with child custody, § 948.31, “the family court would have had to lack subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, or Campbell would have had to receive inadequate notice of the divorce proceedings,” ¶46.
Campbell argued that the custody order was procured by fraud,
Common Law defenses – Collateral Attack on Element of Custody Order, § 948.31, as Procured by Fraud
State v. John W. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, on certification
For Campbell: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether a § 948.31 defendant is entitled to raise a common-law privilege defense against the element of “legal custody” by collaterally attacking the court’s custody order as having been procured by fraud.
Holding:
¶56 There are good reasons not to recognize a common law affirmative defense of fraud to interference with child custody.¶57 One species of affirmative defense——exemplified by self-defense and the now-abrogated privilege to resist unlawful arrest——that courts recognize arises where a person is faced with the difficult decision whether to commit a crime or suffer an injury not otherwise susceptible to effective redress.
Defenses – § 948.03(2)(b) (2001-02), Harm to Child – Defense of Parental Privilege, § 939.45(5)
State v. Kimberly B., 2005 WI App 115
For Kimberly B.: Anthony G. Milisauskas
Issue/Holding:
¶30 While Wis. Stat. § 939.45(5) recognizes the right of a parent to inflict corporal punishment to correct or discipline a child, that right of parental discipline has its limits. Kimberly seems to suggest that the statute prohibits only force that is “intended to cause great bodily harm or death” or that “create[s] an unreasonable risk of great bodily harm or death.” However,
Sexual Assault, § 948.02(2) — Defense of Deceitfully Misleading Defendant as to Minor’s Age
State v. Todd M. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68, on certification
For Jadowski: Richard Hahn
Issue: Whether a minor sexual assault complainant’s intentional misrepresentation of his or her age supports an affirmative defense to § 948.02(2) sexual assault.
Holding:
¶19. The defendant acknowledges that Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(2), 939.23, and 939.43(2) prohibit an actor from raising mistake about the age of the minor as a defense to the charge of sexual assault.
Non-Support, § 948.22 – Statute of Limitations — Support Arrearages, § 893.40 – Accrual upon Entry of Support Judgment
State v. Walter Junior Benjamin, 2003 WI 50, affirming 2002 WI App 89
For Hamilton: Robert A. Ramsdell
Issue/Holding:
¶3. Walter’s case raises questions about the application of statutes of limitations to child support collection actions. The issue presented is whether the State, as an assignee of Walter’s deceased former wife, filed a timely action to collect child support arrearages in 2000.
§ 948.22(2), Nonsupport — statute of limitations, unit of prosecution
State v. David J. Lenz, 230 Wis.2d 529, 602 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Lenz: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether a charge of § 948.22(2) nonsupport based on arrearages accrued more than six years prior to the charge is barred by the statute of limitations.
Holding: The crime of nonsupport is complete after each 120-day period of intentional failure to pay, including arrearages as well as current obligations,