On Point: 2. Elements

State v. Kelsy R. Wooldridge, 2022AP1927-CR, 5/20/25, District III (not recommended for publication), case activity

In a decision not recommended for publication, the COA reversed Kelsy Wooldridge’s conviction for possessing methamphetamine and found that no reasonable jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that she knew a bloody syringe seized from her purse contained an unmeasurable amount of the drug.

State v. Nakyta V.T. Chentis, 2022 WI App 4; case activity (including briefs)

To convict someone of possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove both that he was in possession of the substance and that he knew or believed he was in possession of it. State v. Christel, 61 Wis. 2d 143, 159, 211 N.W.2d 801 (1973). See also Wis JI-Criminal 6000. In a published opinion, the court of appeals holds Chentis knew he possessed a trace amount of heroin–undetectable until the State Crime Lab applied a special chemical to paraphernalia–based on fresh track marks on his arm.

Stephen McFadden v. United States, USSC No. 14-378, 2015 WL 2473377 (June 18, 2015), reversing and remanding United States v. McFadden, 753 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court holds that in order to convict a defendant of distribution a controlled substance analogue, the government must prove that the defendant knew the substance was controlled under the federal Controlled Substances Act or the Analogue Act, or that the defendant knew the specific features of the substance that make it a controlled substance analogue.

Question presented:

Whether, to convict a defendant of distribution of a controlled substance analogue, the government must prove the defendant knew that the substance constituted a controlled substance analog, as held by the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, but rejected by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.

State v. Henry E. Routon, 2007 WI App 178, PFR filed 
For Routon: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶18   Wisconsin Stat. § 939.31 sets forth the elements of the crime of conspiracy applicable under Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1x).[8] Section 939.31 provides:

…. whoever, with intent that a crime be committed, agrees or combines with another for the purpose of committing that crime may,

State v. Henry E. Routon, 2007 WI App 178, PFR filed 
For Routon: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:  Evidence of conspiracy to manufacture controlled substance is sufficient, notwithstanding that the psilocybe spores that defendant sold were themselves legal, given “abundant evidence from which it is reasonable to infer that Routon marketed the psilocybe spores to persons who wanted to use them for the illegal purpose of growing mushrooms and that this was the predominant part of the business,” ¶30.

State v. Wayne Charles Slagle, 2007 WI App 117
For Slagle: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶2    … Because the State charged Slagle with keeping or maintaining a “vehicle” used for “keeping” cocaine, the State needed to prove the following three elements:

1.         Slagle kept or maintained a vehicle.

2.         Slagle’s vehicle was used for keeping cocaine. “Keeping” requires that the cocaine be kept for the purpose of warehousing or storage for ultimate manufacture or delivery.

State v. Wayne Charles Slagle, 2007 WI App 117
For Slagle: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶7   The interpretation of the statutory term “keeping” as “warehousing or storage for ultimate manufacture or delivery” comes from State v. Brooks, 124 Wis. 2d 349, 354-55, 369 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1985). Neither party challenges this interpretation of the statute. [5] Furthermore, Slagle does not dispute that the evidence shows the cocaine in his truck was “for ultimate manufacture or delivery.” The only dispute here is whether the trial evidence shows the cocaine was being “warehoused” or “stored” in Slagle’s truck.

State v. Alvin M. Moore, 2006 WI App 61, PFR filed 3/21/06
For Moore: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether an effort at dissuading a child witness which was directed at the child’s mother satisfies the elements of attempted intimidation of a witness, § 940.42.

Holding:

¶10      To prove attempted intimidation of Tamika, the State was required to prove that: (1) Tamika was a witness;

State v. Dawn C. Moline, 229 Wis. 2d 38, 598 N.W.2d 929 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Moline: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether prior conviction for possessing drug paraphernalia, § 961.573, qualifies the offender as a repeat drug offender,  § 961.48(3).

Holding:

By this decision, we hold that a prior conviction for possessing drug paraphernalia pursuant to § 961.573, STATS., qualifies as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender statute,