On Point: B. Chs. 343-346: Traffic offense

State v. Joshua H. Quisling, 2017AP1658-CR, District 4, 4/12/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Quisling was “subject to” a court order to install an ignition interlock device (IID) under § 343.301 (2013-14) even though the requirement for actually installing the device was contingent on DOT issuing him a driver’s license, and that hadn’t happened yet.

State v. Collin M. Gallagher, 2017AP1403, 4/5/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police took Gallagher’s blood by a warrant that the parties agree was supported by probable cause of operating while intoxicated. He argues, though, that the warrant did not, by its terms, authorize the subsequent testing of his blood–or, that if it did authorize testing, its failure to specify what sorts of testing were permitted rendered it an unconstitutional “general warrant.”

City of Chetek v. Daniel John McKee, 2017AP207, District 3, 3/15/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

McKee claimed he was justified in refusing to submit to a breath test under § 343.305(9)(a)5.c. because his chronic gastroesophageal reflux disorder (GERD) and resulting Barrett’s esophagus rendered him physically unable to take the test. (¶¶3-4). McKee sought to admit his medical records as evidence at the refusal hearing, but the circuit court sustained the prosecutor’s objection that they weren’t properly authenticated. (¶5). Further, based on the testimony of the arresting officer, the circuit court found McKee refused out of a concern for his job, not because of his medical condition. (¶¶6-7). The court of appeals rejects McKee’s challenges to the circuit court’s rulings.

State v. Dustin R. Willette, 2017AP888, District 3, 2/6/18 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A police dispatcher informed officer Hughes that a caller saw a man drive into gas station, exit his car, and walk away. Then another officer reported seeing a similarly-dressed man walking down the a road about a mile away. That man was Willette. Officer Hughes picked him up, drove him back to the car at the gas station, performed FSTs, arrested him for OWI, and asked him to submit to a blood test. Willette did not say  “yes” or “no.” He said “I want to speak to a lawyer.” Here’s why the circuit court found probable cause to arrest and improper refusal to submit to a blood test.

State v. Hector Miguel Ortiz Martinez, 2017AP668, District 1, 12/27/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After his arrest for OWI, Martinez refused to submit to a breath test. The arresting officer gave him the standard notice of intent to revoke operating privileges containing the standard written warning that the driver has 10 days to request a refusal hearing. Martinez requested a refusal hearing, but not within the 10-day limit under § 343.305(10)(a), so the circuit court declined to hold a hearing. (¶¶3-5). Martinez argues that a language barrier and incomplete information from the arresting officer mean the standard notice he was given was not legally sufficient to start the 10-day clock running. Yes it was, says the court of appeals.

State v. Bobby Lopez, 2017AP923-CR, District 2, 2/13/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In order to be “within” the 10-year period under § 346.65(2)(am)2., the subsequent offense must occur before the tenth anniversary of the prior offense. Thus, Lopez’s July 9, 2016, OWI offense is not “within [the] 10-year period” that began on July 9, 2006, the date of his prior offense, and he can’t be charged with second-offense OWI.

State v. Scott F. Ufferman, 2016AP1774-CR, District 3, 11/14/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Ufferman complains the trial court’s evidentiary rulings improperly stymied his defense against the charge of operating with a detectable amount of THC. The court of appeals holds the trial court’s rulings were correct.

State v. Gerald Mitchell, 2015AP304-CR; certification granted 9/11/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law, where no exigent circumstances exist or have been argued, violates the Fourth Amendment.

State v. Michel L. Wortman, 2017 WI App 61; case activity (including briefs)

A glitch in the OWI penalty statute appears to suggest that OWI 7th and greater offenses don’t allow for a fine, but only for the imposition of the forfeiture provided for first-offense OWI. The court of appeals concludes otherwise. The court also rejects Wortman’s claim that he was under arrest when a sheriff’s deputy transported him back to the scene of the accident he was in.

On Point is pleased to present a guest post by Attorney Adam Welch of Tracy Wood and Associates. The law firm recently persuaded Dane County Circuit Court Judge William Hanrahan to declare Wis. Stat. § 346.67 facially unconstitutional and to grant their motion to dismiss a felony Hit and Run—Injury complaint. Judge Hanrahan issued an oral ruling. The transcript has not yet been prepared, so we can’t link to the decision. Adam, however, agreed to lay out the issues for On Point. Here’s Adam: