On Point: B. Chs. 343-346: Traffic offense

State v. Thomas P. Tecza, 2008 WI App 79, PFR filed 5/22/08
For Tecza: Timothy P. Swatek

Issue: Whether a roadway within a gated community entry to which is guarded by a security station is “held out to the public for use of their motor vehicles” so as to support drunk driving conviction within § 346.61.

Holding:

¶18      … We read Phillips as inquiring into whether the premises were available for use to the public or “to a defined limited portion of the citizenry.”Richling,

State v. Daniel J. Machgan, 2007 WI App 263
For Machgan: Patrick M. Donnelly

Issue/Holding: An out-of-state administrative DL suspension, not the result of a refusal, isn’t counted as a “conviction” for purposes of OWI enhancement:

¶12      After examination of these relevant statutes, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 343.307, as the specific statute addressing out-of-state convictions, suspensions or revocations that are to be counted as priors for the purpose of penalty enhancement,

State v. Aprylann Wuteska, 2007 WI App 157, PFR filed 6/14/07
For Wuteska: Mark H. Bennett

Issue/Holding: The plain text of § 346.67(1)(a) requires the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a person or damage to a vehicle to identify him or herself as the operator:

¶13 Applying these principles, we conclude the only reasonable meaning of Wis.

State v. Dawn R. Dartez, 2007 WI App 126, PFR filed 4/23
For Dartez: Bill Ginsberg

Issue/Holding: The definition of “highway” for purposes of the hit-and-run statute, § 346.67(1), is found in § 340.01(22), ¶ n. 3.

State v. Dawn R. Dartez, 2007 WI App 126, PFR filed 4/23
For Dartez: Bill Ginsberg

Issue: Whether hit-and-run liability attaches to an accident occurring on private property.

Holding:

¶13      In this case, as already noted, we are concerned with the meaning of “accident” in Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1) in conjunction with the requirement of “upon the highway” in Wis. Stat.

State v. Darren A. Kliss, 2007 WI App 13
For Kliss: Michael C. Witt

Issue/Holding:

¶7        … Because the implied consent law makes no provision for the right to counsel, an officer is correct to record a refusal if the arrestee insists on speaking to an attorney before answering.…¶8        … County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 276, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct.

State v. Darren A. Kliss, 2007 WI App 13
For Kliss: Michael C. Witt

Issue/Holding: Administering Miranda rights prior to the “Informing the Accused” caution applicable to OWI does not invalidate the latter (at least where the motorist is concurrently under arrest for a separate crime):

¶14      There is no dispute that Thomas read Kliss the Miranda warning prior to reading the Informing the Accused.

State v. Jonathan J. Hubbard, 2007 WI App 240, (AG’s) PFR filed 11/20/07
For Hubbard: Steven Zaleski

Issue/Holding: The construction of “materially impaired” by State v. Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d 18, 27, 386 N.W.2d 47 (1986), clarifies the meaning of that OWI element:

¶9    In Waalen, … (t)he court stated that material impairment “exists when a person is incapable of driving safely,

State v. Gary J. Knapp, 2007 WI App 273
For Knapp: Cory C. Chirafisi

Issue/Holding: The State may not appeal as a matter of right from a successful collateral attack on a prior OWI conviction, reducing the pending charge from OWI-3rd to -2nd; instead, the State’s remedy is to seek leave to appeal a non-final order:

¶2      A defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction to prevent its use as a penalty enhancer when the prior conviction was obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel. 

State v. Stephen D. Harmon, 2006 WI App 214, PFR filed 10/26/06
For Harmon: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding:

¶14      The “two clear purposes” of Wisconsin’s hit-and-run statute are:

    (1) to ensure that injured persons may have medical or other attention with the least possible delay; and (2) to require the disclosure of information so that responsibility for the accident may be placed.