On Point: B. Chs. 343-346: Traffic offense

State v. Thomas P. Sterzinger, 2002 WI App 171
For Sterzinger: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue1: Whether fleeing, § 346.04(3) requires proof that the defendant knowingly “interfere(d) with or endanger(ed)” another.

Holding1: Scienter is required, but is limited to a single element — knowingly flee or attempt to elude — and doesn’t extend to “interfere with or endanger.” ¶¶7-11.

Issue2: Whether fleeing,

Village of Little Chute v. Todd A. Walitalo, 2002 WI App 211, PFR filed 8/1/02
For Walitalo: Ralph A. Kalal

Issue/Holding:

¶11. However, the arresting officer, by reading the informing the accused form, simply stated the truth: If Walitalo refused to submit to a chemical test, his driving privileges would be revoked. This statement did not involve any deceit or trickery, but instead accurately informed Walitalo of his precise legal situation. 

State v. Donald Marshall, 2002 WI App 73, PFR filed 2/28/02
For Marshall: Richard L. Zaffiro

Issue: Whether, after the OWI arrestee refused consent for a blood draw, the police could then obtain “consent” for the draw by threatening to use physical force.

Holding: Marshall’s argument that § 343.305(9)(a), by providing the exclusive police option for refusal, bans such a threat has been rejected by State v.

State v. Michael J. Carlson, 2002 WI App 44, PFR filed 1/17/02
For Carlson: Christopher A. Mutschler

Issue: Whether Carlson was entitled to have his refusal charge dismissed with prejudice because his driver’s license was improperly revoked for nineteen days before he was granted a hearing.

Holding: Due process protections — with respect to a hearing before loss of particular interests — are afforded under Mathews v.

State v. Darin W. Baratka, 2002 WI App 288, PFR filed 10/20/02
For Baratka: Michael C. Witt

Issue/Holding:

¶12      Baratka claims that he was not properly informed of his choices and was therefore unable to understand his rights regarding chemical testing.  In order for Baratka to prove he was not adequately informed, he must show:

1.      Has the law enforcement officer not met,

State v. Roland Smart, 2002 WI App 240
For Smart: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether sentencing-guideline disparity for driving while intoxicated under guidelines adopted by local counties pursuant to § 346.65(2m) violates equal protection or due process.

Holding: Sentencing guideline disparities need be supported only by rational basis for equal protection purposes, as “(i)t is not a fundamental right to be free from deprivations of liberty as a result of arbitrary distinctions.”

State v. Michael S. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528, affirming State v. Piddington, 2000 WI App 44, 233 Wis.2d 257, 607 N.W.2d 303
For Piddington: Michelle Ann Tjader

Issue: Whether BAC results were suppressible because the profoundly deaf defendant could not have heard the implied-consent law recitation of rights.

Holding:

¶1 … We hold that § 343.305(4) requires the arresting officer under the circumstances facing him or her at the time of the arrest,

State v. Jeremy J. Hanson, 2001 WI 70, 628 N.W.2d 759
For Hanson: James B. Connell

Issue: Whether DOT rescission of a defendant’s HTO status under § 351.09 “relates back” to the date of the charged offense so as to nullify that HTO classification and render him or her ineligible for enhanced sentencing.

Holding:

¶32. Given the accepted meaning of the language of § 351.09 and the legal effect attributable to ‘rescind’ and ‘rescission,’ we conclude that the effect of the Department’s recalculation of Hanson’s HTO status was an annulment and abrogation of that status from the outset of its existence.

State v. Paul J. VanLaarhoven, 2001 WI App 275
For VanLaarhoven: Michele Anne Tjader

Issue: Whether a blood sample, properly obtained under the Implied Consent law, may be analyzed without a warrant.

Holding: The Implied Consent law requires that all who apply for a driver’s license consent not only to provide a sample, but also a chemical analysis of the sample, ¶¶7-8. More broadly: “the examination of evidence seized pursuant to the warrant requirement or an exception to the warrant requirement is an essential part of the seizure and does not require a judicially authorized warrant.”

State v. Robert W. Wodenjak, 2001 WI App 216, PFR filed 8/31/01
For Wodenjak: Rex Anderegg

Issue: Whether administration of a blood test, following OWI arrest, was reasonable under the fourth amendment, where the police first rejected the driver’s request for a (less invasive) breath test.

Holding: As long as the standard for warrantless blood draw established by State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993),