On Point: B. Chs. 343-346: Traffic offense

State v. Darin W. Baratka, 2002 WI App 288, PFR filed 10/20/02
For Baratka: Michael C. Witt

Issue/Holding:

¶12      Baratka claims that he was not properly informed of his choices and was therefore unable to understand his rights regarding chemical testing.  In order for Baratka to prove he was not adequately informed, he must show:

1.      Has the law enforcement officer not met,

State v. Roland Smart, 2002 WI App 240
For Smart: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether sentencing-guideline disparity for driving while intoxicated under guidelines adopted by local counties pursuant to § 346.65(2m) violates equal protection or due process.

Holding: Sentencing guideline disparities need be supported only by rational basis for equal protection purposes, as “(i)t is not a fundamental right to be free from deprivations of liberty as a result of arbitrary distinctions.”

State v. Michael S. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528, affirming State v. Piddington, 2000 WI App 44, 233 Wis.2d 257, 607 N.W.2d 303
For Piddington: Michelle Ann Tjader

Issue: Whether BAC results were suppressible because the profoundly deaf defendant could not have heard the implied-consent law recitation of rights.

Holding:

¶1 … We hold that § 343.305(4) requires the arresting officer under the circumstances facing him or her at the time of the arrest,

State v. Jeremy J. Hanson, 2001 WI 70, 628 N.W.2d 759
For Hanson: James B. Connell

Issue: Whether DOT rescission of a defendant’s HTO status under § 351.09 “relates back” to the date of the charged offense so as to nullify that HTO classification and render him or her ineligible for enhanced sentencing.

Holding:

¶32. Given the accepted meaning of the language of § 351.09 and the legal effect attributable to ‘rescind’ and ‘rescission,’ we conclude that the effect of the Department’s recalculation of Hanson’s HTO status was an annulment and abrogation of that status from the outset of its existence.

State v. Paul J. VanLaarhoven, 2001 WI App 275
For VanLaarhoven: Michele Anne Tjader

Issue: Whether a blood sample, properly obtained under the Implied Consent law, may be analyzed without a warrant.

Holding: The Implied Consent law requires that all who apply for a driver’s license consent not only to provide a sample, but also a chemical analysis of the sample, ¶¶7-8. More broadly: “the examination of evidence seized pursuant to the warrant requirement or an exception to the warrant requirement is an essential part of the seizure and does not require a judicially authorized warrant.”

State v. Robert W. Wodenjak, 2001 WI App 216, PFR filed 8/31/01
For Wodenjak: Rex Anderegg

Issue: Whether administration of a blood test, following OWI arrest, was reasonable under the fourth amendment, where the police first rejected the driver’s request for a (less invasive) breath test.

Holding: As long as the standard for warrantless blood draw established by State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), 

State v. William K. Nord, 2001 WI App 48, 241 Wis. 2d 387, 625 N.W.2d 302
For Nord: Timothy J. O’Brien

Issue: Whether the implied consent statute, § 343.305(4) violates due process by providing misleading information regarding the consequences for taking or refusing the test.

Holding: The warning that the motorist “will be subject to other penalties” beyond revocation doesn’t overstate the consequences for refusal, because refusal can result in substance assessment,

State v. Henry T. Skibinski, 2001 WI App 109, 244 Wis. 2d 229, 629 N.W.2d 12
For Skibinski: Karma S. Rodgers

Issue: Whether a trial court can, after findings of guilt on second and third offense OWI, apply the increased penalties of OWI-3rd to both offenses at sentencing.

Holding: For several reasons, the sentence for OWI-2nd was limited to the applicable penalty for that discrete offense, even though the defendant was simultaneously being sentenced for OWI-3rd: a prior conviction is an element of OWI,

State v. William P. Eckola, 2001 WI App 295
For Eckola: Gregory A. Parker

Issue: Whether the trial court erroneously exercised discretion by placing Eckola on probation for OWI-6th without requiring confinement for at least the presumptive minimum mandated by § 346.65(2)(e).

Holding:

¶15. When the circuit court, in its discretion, determines that a defendant will be placed on probation, Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(d) requires that the person be confined for at least the mandatory minimum period.

State v. Lisa A. Carter, 229 Wis. 2d 200, 598 N.W.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Carter: Paul G. LaZotte

Holding: Hit-and-run, § 346.67, applies to “premises held out to the public for use of their motor vehicles.” The event occurred at a closed gas station; the court holds the element satisfied: ” … The premises is bordered by two city streets and abuts an alley in the rear.