On Point blog, page 15 of 87
Challenge to blood test quickly disposed of
State v. Lonnie P. Ayotte, Jr., 2018AP839-CR, 7/25/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Like Jessica Randall, Ayotte consented to a blood draw after his OWI arrest but then asserted his right to privacy in his blood and told authorities they couldn’t test his blood for alcohol without a warrant. As they did with Randall, the authorities tested the blood anyway. And like Randall,
SCOW: Driver can’t revoke consent to test of validly drawn blood sample
State v. Jessica M. Randall, 2019 WI 80, 7/2/19, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
A majority of the supreme court holds that a person who has been arrested for OWI and consented to a blood draw cannot prevent the testing of the blood sample for alcohol or drugs by advising the state she is revoking her consent.
SCOW to address whether solicitation of reckless conduct is a crime
State v. Kelly James Kloss, 2018AP651-CR, petition and cross petition for review of a published court of appeals decision, both granted 6/11/19; case activity (including briefs)
Issues:
Is solicitation of first degree reckless injury a crime under Wisconsin law?
Is solicitation of first degree recklessly endangering safety a lesser included offense of first degree reckless injury, making conviction for both offenses multiplicitous in this case?
SCOW: Burglary locations are modes, not elements
United States v. Dennis Franklin and Shane Sahm, 2019 WI 64, 6/6/19, answering a question certified by the Seventh Circuit; case activity (including briefs)
For state practitioners, the most interesting thing about Franklin is that it happened at all. Certified questions to the Wisconsin Supreme Court are rare, and a certified question presented in a federal criminal case regarding a matter of state criminal law is unheard of.
Admission of other acts evidence and sufficiency of evidence for homicide conviction affirmed
State v. Alberto E. Rivera, 2018AP952-CR, 4/30, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs).
The State charged Rivera with a homicide and an attempted homicide that occurred in 2015. Before trial, it moved to introduce “other acts” evidence–a homicide that Rivera committed in 1997. The trial court tentatively denied the motion. But then Rivera’s counsel made a “strategic” decision to offer the evidence as part of his defense. So, as you might guess, the appellate challenge regarding the admission of this evidence failed.
Driver’s silence constituted refusal; subpoenaed urine test results were admissible
State v. Gerald J. Vanderhoef, 2016AP2052-CR, District 1, 4/30/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Vanderhoef’s silence in response to the “Informing the Accused” form constituted a refusal to consent to a chemical test, so the subsequent blood draw was unlawful. However, the state subpoenaed the results of his urine test, and that evidence was admissible.
SCOW will weigh in on aggregation of retail theft charges
State v. Autumn Marie Love Lopez & Amy J. Rodriguez, 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR, petition for review granted 4/9/19; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Does either Wis. Stat. § 971.36 or inherent prosecutorial charging discretion allow a prosecutor to charge a single felony count of retail theft for multiple separate acts of theft, each involving less than $500 in merchandise, committed over a span of time?
Traffic stop, field sobriety tests lawful
State v. Faith A. Parafiniuk, 2018AP1956, District 2, 3/27/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The stop of Parafiniuk’s car was supported by reasonable suspicion and the officer had sufficient reason to extend the stop to administer field sobriety tests.
Court of Appeals rejects constitutional challenges to detectable amount of controlled substances law
State v. Blake Lee Harrison, 2017AP1811, District 3, 2/26/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Harrison’s due process and void-for-vagueness challenges to § 346.63(1)(am) (prohibiting driving with a detectable amount of restricted controlled substance) go up in smoke.
To prove misdemeanor bail jumping, State must show defendant was arrested, not charged, with a misdemeanor
State v. Melodie Cheree Taylor, 2018AP1953-CR, 2/14/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In a misdemeanor prosecution under §946.49(1)(a) is the State required to prove that, before jumping bail, the defendant had been charged with a misdemeanor? Or may the State simply prove that the defendant had been released from custody under 969 after an arrest for a misdemeanor?