On Point blog, page 17 of 87
Identity theft doesn’t require some extra act of “representing” in addition to “use” of identifying documents
State v. Christopher A. Mason, 2018 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs)
Applying its newly minted decision in State v. Stewart, 2018 WI App 41, the court of appeals holds that the “representing” element of identity theft under § 943.201 can be proven with the same evidence that proves the defendant “used” the identifying information or documents.
SCOW finds no problem with problematic jury instructions on self-defense, accident
State v. Joseph T. Langlois, 2018 WI 73, 6/20/18, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017 WI App 44; case activity (including briefs)
A majority of the supreme court concludes that the jury instructions given in this case, when viewed in their entirety, accurately stated the law the jury needed to decide the case. Two dissenting justices disagree, concluding that when considered in their entirety, the instructions could have led the jury astray.
Identity theft statute applied to defendant’s forgery of documents he submitted at sentencing hearing
State v. Theoris Raphel Stewart, 2018 WI App 41; case activity (including briefs)
Facing sentencing for failure to pay child support, Stewart forged some documents to support his argument for probation rather than a prison sentence. For his trouble he was charged with and convicted of identity theft under § 943.203(2). The court of appeals rejects his argument that his use of the forged documents did not violate that statute.
SCOW to consider whether expunged OWI counts as prior
State v. Justin A. Braunschweig, 2017AP1261-CR, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals decision granted 6/11/18; case activity (including briefs)
Braunschweig was convicted of first-offense OWI causing injury, but that conviction was expunged. So, when he picked up another OWI, was it a first or a second?
COA finds sufficient evidence for all elements of resisting an officer
State v. Scott H. Wenger, 2017AP2305, 6/14/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Wenger got arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting at Art in the Park in Stevens point. The circuit court dismissed the DC but found him guilty, after a bench trial, of resisting. He claims insufficient evidence as to all three elements of resisting an officer:
Court of appeals rejects challenges to admission and sufficiency of evidence
State v. James E. Gray, 2017AP452-CR, 6/6/18, District 2, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals here affirms several trial court evidentiary decisions and holds that the State presented sufficient evidence to support convictions for 5 counts of identity theft. As you might guess, the decision hinges on the harmless error doctrine and facts specific to this case.
Wrong return address on notice of intent to revoke license doesn’t undo refusal revocation
County of Door v. Donald L. McPhail, 2017AP1079, 5/30/18, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
When McPhail was arrested for first-offense OWI, he refused a blood test. The arresting officer gave him the notice of intent to withdraw his operating privilege, which told McPhail he had 10 days to request a hearing, and that he should send his request to 1201 S. Duluth Ave in Sturgeon Bay. But that’s the Sheriff’s department, not the clerk of courts, which is at 1205 (though the two are part of the same complex).
Court of appeals construes owner’s defense to hit and run liability under § 346.675(4)(b)2.
City of Eau Claire v. Debora Ann West, 2017AP1527, District 3, 5/22/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Section 346.675 provides that the owner of a vehicle is liable for a hit-and-run violation that his or her vehicle is involved in, regardless of whether the owner is operating the vehicle at the time of the violation, but also subject to certain defenses. One of the defenses, § 346.675(4)(b)2., allows the owner to avoid liability by providing the name and address of the person operating the vehicle at the time of the violation along with other information sufficient to provide probable cause that the owner wasn’t operating at the time of the violation. Contrary to the circuit court’s conclusion, the evidence in this case wasn’t sufficient to conclude that West established that defense.
Entry of order to install ignition interlock device triggered 0.02 BAC limit
State v. Joshua H. Quisling, 2017AP1658-CR, District 4, 4/12/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Quisling was “subject to” a court order to install an ignition interlock device (IID) under § 343.301 (2013-14) even though the requirement for actually installing the device was contingent on DOT issuing him a driver’s license, and that hadn’t happened yet.
COA: Warrant to take blood authorized testing blood
State v. Collin M. Gallagher, 2017AP1403, 4/5/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Police took Gallagher’s blood by a warrant that the parties agree was supported by probable cause of operating while intoxicated. He argues, though, that the warrant did not, by its terms, authorize the subsequent testing of his blood–or, that if it did authorize testing, its failure to specify what sorts of testing were permitted rendered it an unconstitutional “general warrant.”