On Point: 9. Crimes

State v. Scott H. Wenger, 2017AP2305, 6/14/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wenger got arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting at Art in the Park in Stevens point. The circuit court dismissed the DC but found him guilty, after a bench trial, of resisting. He claims insufficient evidence as to all three elements of resisting an officer:

State v. James E. Gray, 2017AP452-CR, 6/6/18, District 2, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals here affirms several trial court evidentiary decisions and holds that the State presented sufficient evidence to support convictions for 5 counts  of identity theft.  As you might guess, the decision hinges on the harmless error doctrine and facts specific to this case.

County of Door v. Donald L. McPhail, 2017AP1079, 5/30/18, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

When McPhail was arrested for first-offense OWI, he refused a blood test. The arresting officer gave him the notice of intent to withdraw his operating privilege, which told McPhail he had 10 days to request a hearing, and that he should send his request to 1201 S. Duluth Ave in Sturgeon Bay. But that’s the Sheriff’s department, not the clerk of courts, which is at 1205 (though the two are part of the same complex).

City of Eau Claire v. Debora Ann West, 2017AP1527, District 3, 5/22/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Section 346.675 provides that the owner of a vehicle is liable for a hit-and-run violation that his or her vehicle is involved in, regardless of whether the owner is operating the vehicle at the time of the violation, but also subject to certain defenses. One of the defenses, § 346.675(4)(b)2., allows the owner to avoid liability by providing the name and address of the person operating the vehicle at the time of the violation along with other information sufficient to provide probable cause that the owner wasn’t operating at the time of the violation. Contrary to the circuit court’s conclusion, the evidence in this case wasn’t sufficient to conclude that West established that defense.

State v. Joshua H. Quisling, 2017AP1658-CR, District 4, 4/12/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Quisling was “subject to” a court order to install an ignition interlock device (IID) under § 343.301 (2013-14) even though the requirement for actually installing the device was contingent on DOT issuing him a driver’s license, and that hadn’t happened yet.

State v. Collin M. Gallagher, 2017AP1403, 4/5/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police took Gallagher’s blood by a warrant that the parties agree was supported by probable cause of operating while intoxicated. He argues, though, that the warrant did not, by its terms, authorize the subsequent testing of his blood–or, that if it did authorize testing, its failure to specify what sorts of testing were permitted rendered it an unconstitutional “general warrant.”

State v. Daniel Wilson, 2017AP813-CR, 3/27/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This appeal raises, among others things, a novel issue specific to child sexual assault cases. Is the State actually required to prove the 2nd element of repeated child sexual assault–that at least 3 assaults took place “within a specified period of time” as §948.025(1)(b) plainly states? Or is it relieved of that burden by virtue of various opinions holding that the State does not have to prove the “specifics” of a child sexual assault?

City of Chetek v. Daniel John McKee, 2017AP207, District 3, 3/15/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

McKee claimed he was justified in refusing to submit to a breath test under § 343.305(9)(a)5.c. because his chronic gastroesophageal reflux disorder (GERD) and resulting Barrett’s esophagus rendered him physically unable to take the test. (¶¶3-4). McKee sought to admit his medical records as evidence at the refusal hearing, but the circuit court sustained the prosecutor’s objection that they weren’t properly authenticated. (¶5). Further, based on the testimony of the arresting officer, the circuit court found McKee refused out of a concern for his job, not because of his medical condition. (¶¶6-7). The court of appeals rejects McKee’s challenges to the circuit court’s rulings.

State v. Korry L. Ardell, 2017AP381-CR, District 1, 3/6/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Ardell was convicted of stalking in violation of § 940.32(2) for sending emails about N., a woman he had dated, to a former employer of N. (¶¶3-20). The court of appeals rejects his arguments that, under the plain language of the statute: 1) conduct or statements regarding N. but directed at a third party were irrelevant absent proof Ardell either intended such information to be passed on to the alleged victim or intended the third party to harass the alleged victim based on the information; and 2) the jury instructions failed to apprise the jury that the state had to prove that intent before they could convict him.

State v. James C. Faustmann, 2017AP1932-CR, District 2, 3/7/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Under the test for lesser included offenses under § 939.66(1), disorderly conduct in violation of § 947.01(1) isn’t a lesser-included offense of unlawful use of a computerized communication system in violation of § 947.0125(2)(a).