On Point blog, page 26 of 88
Defense win: Neither exigent circumstances nor community caretaker role justified home entry
State v. Michael A. Durham, 2015AP1978-CR, 4/12/2016, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Police were dispatched in response to a 6:30 p.m. phone call from a neighbor about unintelligible yelling and “banging” that shook the walls of Durham’s residence. (¶2). After knocking and ringing the doorbell and receiving no response, police simply entered the house, guns drawn, and proceeded toward the stairs, where they encountered Durham. (¶¶3-5). The officers ordered Durham to show his hands, he didn’t, and they tasered him. (¶6). He was charged with resisting an officer, unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained via the warrantless search of his home, and was convicted at trial. (¶1). The court of appeals here reverses the conviction because the suppression motion should have been granted.
State v. Howes, 2014AP1870-CR, certification granted 4/7/16
On review of a court of appeals certification; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (from certification)
This appeal presents a single recurring issue: whether provisions in Wisconsin’s implied consent law authorizing a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious suspect violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. More specifically, the issue is whether the “implied consent,” deemed to have occurred before a defendant is a suspect, is voluntary consent for purposes of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
Carburetor cleaner is an “intoxicant” under prior version of OWI statute
State v. John Steven Duewell, 2015AP43-44-CR, 3/23/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In a decision that seems to conflict directly with State v. Torbeck, 2012 WI App 106, 344 Wis. 2d 299, 821 N.W.2d 414, see our post here, the court of appeals holds that carburetor cleaner is an intoxicant under Wisconsin’s OWI statute, Wis. Stat. §346.63(1)(a)(2011-2012).
State v. Patrick K. Kozel, 2015AP656-CR, petition for review granted 3/7/16
Review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (composed by On Point)
What is required to show that an evidentiary blood draw was conducted by a “person acting under the direction of a physician” for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(5)(b)?
Accident reporting statute covers injury regardless of monetary cost
City of Rhinelander v. Thomas V. Wakely, 2015Ap302, 3/8/16, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
While the accident reporting requirement under § 346.70(1) requires that property damage reach a certain minimum “apparent [monetary] extent” before the accident is reportable, it does not require a minimum monetary extent for personal injuries before the accident is reportable.
Dying declaration properly admitted
State v. Anthony R. Owens, 2016 WI App 32; case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court properly admitted the victim’s statements about who shot him under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule, and the admission of the victim’s statements didn’t violate the Confrontation Clause.
Multiple counts for single sexual assault were neither “inconsistent” nor multiplicitous
State v. Jama I. Jama, 2014AP2432-CR, District 4, 2/25/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Jama was convicted of both second degree sexual assault of a person too intoxicated to give consent, § 940.225(2)(cm), and third degree sexual assault (sexual intercourse or contact without consent), § 940.225(3), for the same act. The court of appeals rejects Jama’s claim that he can’t be convicted of both counts.
Seventh Circuit rejects challenge to § 948.075
Micah D. Stern v. Michael Meisner, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2558, 2/9/16
Stern’s conviction for using a computer to facilitate a sex crime against a child under § 948.075 is constitutional because the Wisconsin appellate court’s conclusion that the statute allows conviction based on the defendant’s “reason to believe” the victim is a minor was neither unreasonable nor unforeseeable.
Circuit court erred in excluding field sobriety test evidence
State v. Robert A. Schoengarth, 2015AP1834-CR, 2/11/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it ordered that police could not testify about Schoengarth’s performance on field sobriety tests.
Court of Appeals certification asks: Does the implied consent law creates a categorical exception to the warrant requirement?
State v. David W. Howes, 2014AP1870-CR, 1/28/16, District 4; certification granted 4/7/16, reversed, 2017 WI 18; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
This appeal presents a single recurring issue: whether provisions in Wisconsin’s implied consent law authorizing a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious suspect violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. More specifically, the issue is whether the “implied consent,” deemed to have occurred before a defendant is a suspect, is voluntary consent for purposes of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.