On Point: 9. Crimes

State v. James Lee Eady, Jr., 2016 WI App 12; case activity (including briefs)

Under the forgiving standard for assessing the sufficiency of evidence, the state managed to introduce enough circumstantial evidence to prove that the bank Eady robbed was “chartered” by a state of the federal government, and therefore was a “financial institution” for purposes of § 943.87.

City of Stevens Point v. Todd P. Beck, 2015AP978, District 4, 12/17/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

State law confers automatic admissibility on the results of blood alcohol tests performed in accord with Wis. Stat. § 343.305, but does the plaintiff’s failure to show compliance with that statute render such results inadmissible?

On a bypass petition; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (from the appellant’s brief):

Does a circuit court lack subject matter jurisdiction to enter an OWI 1st offense civil judgment if a defendant has a prior unknown out-of-state OWI conviction?

State v. Cory S. Herrmann, 2015 WI App 97; case activity (including briefs)

In light of the Second Amendment decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), Wisconsin’s prohibition on the possession of a switchblade knife, § 941.24(1), is unconstitutional as applied to a person who possesses a switchblade in his or her own home.

State v. Joseph J. VanMeter, 2014AP1852-CR, 11/24/15, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Following the footsteps of State v. Warren, No. 2012AP1727-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Jan. 16, 2013), the court of appeals holds that an officer’s testimony about how a defendant performed on an HGN test is not subject to the Daubert test for the admissibility of expert testimony.

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

In this case the supreme court will address an important issue about the offense of using a computer to facilitate a child sex crime, § 948.075(1r). The court of appeals granted McKellips a new trial on a charge under that statute, holding the jury was erroneously instructed to decide whether McKellips’s cell phone constituted a “computerized communication system” when it should have been instructed to decide whether McKellips’s uses of the phone constituted communication via a “computerized communication system.” The supreme court might also address another issue that has implications beyond § 948.075: Namely, whether instructional error that isn’t objected to at trial can be a basis for a new trial in the interest of justice.

State v. Patrick K. Kozel, 2015AP656-CR, District 4, 11/12/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 3/7/16, reversed, 2017 WI 3; case activity (including briefs)

The results of a blood draw done by an EMT after Kozel was arrested for OWI were inadmissible because the State failed to prove that the blood draw was conducted by a “person acting under the direction of a physician,” as required by § 343.305(5)(b).

State v. Colton M., 2015 WI App 94; case activity

Colton challenges his delinquency adjudication for repeated acts of sexual contact with a child under the age of 16 under § 948.025(1)(e), arguing that applying the statute to him violates due process because it provides insufficient standards for distinguishing him from D., the victim, as both were 15 years old and both engaged in sexual activity. Colton also argues that prosecuting him rather than D. violates equal protection. The court concludes that, under the facts of this case, the statute is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process and there was a rational basis for prosecuting Colton instead of D.

State v. Christopher J. Oatman, 2015 WI App 76; case activity (including briefs)

The statute prohibiting a registered sex offender from intentionally photographing a minor without parental consent, § 948.14, violates the First Amendment because it “indiscriminately casts a wide net over expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment ….” (¶18, quoting State v. Stevenson, 2000 WI 71, ¶22, 236 Wis. 2d 86, 613 N.W.2d 90).

Little Chute Village Municipal Court v. Dennis M. Falkosky, 2015AP770, District 3, 9/22/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The trial court didn’t err by refusing to modify the standard OWI jury instruction, Wis. J.I.—Criminal 2668, by taking out language giving blood alcohol test results prima facie effect as to the defendant’s BAC at the time of driving and replacing the language with the instruction addressing the blood alcohol curve, Wis. J.I.—Criminal 234.