On Point: 9. Crimes

State v. Benjamin J. Strohman, 2014AP1265-CR, District 3, 2/3/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for prosecution); case activity (including briefs)

Rejecting the state’s arguments that the statute of limitation had been tolled, the court of appeals holds the state could not re-charge Strohman for an OWI offense that was improperly treated as a first offense because the time limit for charging the offense had expired.

State v. Kyle R. Christoffersen, 2014AP1282, District 2, 1/28/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The judge at Christoffersen’s refusal hearing didn’t violate Christoffersen’s due process rights when it limited cross-examination about the arresting officer’s training on, and administration of, field sobriety tests and refused to allow Christoffersen to make an offer of proof by questioning the officer. (¶¶5-7, 14).

Question presented:

Whether, to convict a defendant of distribution of a controlled substance analogue, the government must prove the defendant knew that the substance constituted a controlled substance analog, as held by the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, but rejected by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.

State v. Jonathan Thomas, 2014AP543-CR, District 1, 1/5/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity

At his trial on a charge of second degree reckless homicide for causing the death of Michael Brown, Thomas claimed Brown accidentally shot himself while handling a gun. The jury found Thomas guilty of the lesser included offense of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, § 940.08(1). The court of appeals rejects Thomas’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for that verdict.

State v. Bobbie Tanta Bowen, 2015 WI App 12; case activity

Bowen was found guilty of bail jumping for violating the provision of his bail that he have no contact with F.B., the victim of an earlier battery charge, or F.B.’s residence. The court of appeals holds that the trial evidence—which showed Bowen went into F.B.’s residence but had no direct contact with F.B. while he was inside—was sufficient to support the verdict because the bond condition “that [Bowen] not have contact with F.B.” did not require proof that Bowen directly communicated with F.B.

State v. Cassius A. Foster, 2014 WI 131, 12/26/14, affirming a court of appeals summary disposition; majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity

State v. Alvernest Floyd Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, 12/26/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

State v. Michael R. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, 12/26/14, affirming a per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity

In these three cases, the supreme court addresses two issues arising from Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013): If a blood draw was conducted before McNeely in reliance on State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), does the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule mean the test results should not be suppressed? And, if the dissipation of alcohol by itself doesn’t constitute exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw, what circumstances do establish such an exigency? Foster and Kennedy hold that the good-faith exception applies to pre-McNeely searches. Tullberg addresses the second question.

City of Portage v. Kenneth D. Cogdill, 2014AP1492, District 4, 11/20/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had probable cause to believe Cogdill had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant based on the statements of witnesses, the officers’ own observations, and Cogdill’s statements.

State v. Fernando Moreno-Acosta, 2014 WI App 122; case activity

While § 943.201(2) requires the state to prove the defendant used personal identifying information belonging to an actual person, it need not prove that the defendant knew the information belonged to another “real, actual person.”

State v. Michael C. Hess, 2014AP268-CR, District 3, 11/11/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

While the trial evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Hess possessed methamphetamine, Hess is entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice because the verdict may have been influenced by evidence offered to proved drugged-driving charges that were dismissed during trial.

Consolidated review of two published court of appeals decisions: State v. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73 (case activity); and State v. Luedtke, 2014 WI App 79 (case activity)

Issues (composed by On Point)

In light of State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, does the Wisconsin Constitution provide greater due process protection than the federal constitution, such that defendants charged with operating with a detectable amount of a controlled substance in their blood are denied due process under the Wisconsin Constitution when their blood samples are destroyed before the defendants had notice of the charges or test results and thus had no chance to get the blood independently tested?

Does the offense of operating with a detectable amount of controlled substances in the blood violate due process by failing to require the state to prove that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance?