On Point blog, page 65 of 87
§ 125.075(1), Procuring Alcohol for Minor Resulting in Death – Elements – State Need not Prove Victim’s Level of Intoxication
State v. Ronald L. Wille, 2007 WI App 27, PFR filed 2/28/07
For Wille: Jerome A. Maeder, Benjamin Welch
Issue/Holding:
¶31 … The State was under no obligation to establish the level of alcohol in Meshak’s blood at the time of the accident, or even to prove that he was intoxicated to the degree required for a conviction under Wis. Stat. § 346.63 (“Operating under influence of intoxicant or other drug”).
§ 125.075(1), Procuring Alcohol for Minor Resulting in Death – Jury Instructions: Causation
State v. Ronald L. Wille, 2007 WI App 27, PFR filed 2/28/07
For Wille: Jerome A. Maeder, Benjamin Welch
Issue/Holding:
¶24 Wille claims the trial court erred in instructing jurors that, to find Wille guilty of the charged crime, Meshak’s consumption of alcohol provided by Wille was required to be “a” substantial factor in causing Meshak’s death, instead of “the” substantial factor, as Wille requested.
Double Jeopardy – Multiplicity: Repeated Sexual Assault, § 948.025(1) – Different Counties
State v. Thomas A. Nommensen, 2007 WI App 224
For Nommensen: Anthony L. O’Malley
Issue/Holding: Although charges of repeated sexual assault, § 948.025(1) were the same in law, they were different in fact because they :
¶8 Charged offenses are not multiplicitous if the facts are either separate in time or of a significantly different nature. Id. at 749. “The appropriate question is whether these acts allegedly committed … are so significantly different in fact that they may properly be denominated separate crimes although each would furnish a factual underpinning or a substitute legal element for the violation of the same statute.” Id.
Exposing Minors to Harmful Materials, § 948.11(2) — Sufficiency of Evidence — Failure to Expose Those Alleged Materials to Jury
State v. Tyrone Booker, 2006 WI 79, reversing 2005 WI App 182
For Booker: Jeffrey W. Jensen
Issue: Whether conviction under § 948.11, exposing child to harmful materials, can be sustained where the jury heard the children’s and a detective’s descriptions of the videotape but did not themselves view it.
Holding:
¶25 When we view the evidence in this case most favorably to the State,
§ 941.23, CCW – As-Applied Constitutionality, in Light of Wis. Const. Art. I, § 25 – Tavern Owner, Gun in Car Console
State v. Scott K. Fisher, 2006 WI 44, on certification
For Fisher: Paul B. Millis
Issue: Whether the right to bear arms provision of Wis. Const. Art. I, § 25 countenances prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon in a car’s console by a tavern owner who asserted its necessity for security purposes in that he routinely transported large amounts of cash.
Holding:
¶5 … (W)e conclude that § 941.23 is constitutional as applied to Fisher because his interest in exercising his right to keep and bear arms for purposes of security by carrying a concealed weapon in his vehicle does not substantially outweigh the state’s interest in enforcing § 941.23.…
¶18 … Defendants have the burden of proof.
Hit-and-Run, § 346.67(1) – Element of “Accident”: May Encompass Intentional Conduct
State v. Stephen D. Harmon, 2006 WI App 214, PFR filed 10/26/06
For Harmon: Timothy A. Provis
Issue/Holding:
¶14 The “two clear purposes” of Wisconsin’s hit-and-run statute are:
(1) to ensure that injured persons may have medical or other attention with the least possible delay; and (2) to require the disclosure of information so that responsibility for the accident may be placed.
Hit-and-Run, § 346.67(1) – Reporting Requirement as Related to Self-Incrimination
State v. Stephen D. Harmon, 2006 WI App 214, PFR filed 10/26/06
For Harmon: Timothy A. Provis
Issue/Holding: The § 346.67(1) requirement that a driver provide name, address, vehicle registration number, and driver’s license “to the person struck” does not violate the 5thamendment under controlling authority of California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 426 (1971), notwithstanding that the statute encompasses intentional conduct:
¶29 In short,
Defenses – Issue Preclusion — “Actually Litigated” Requirement: OWI – Prior Judicial Overturn of Administrative Suspension, Not Necessarily Preclusive as to Subsequent Prosecution for Drunk Driving
City of Sheboygan v. Steven Nytsch, 2006 WI App 191, PFR filed 9/11/06
For Nytsch: Chad A. Lanning
Issue: Whether a prior judicial review of a driver’s license suspension, overturning the administrative suspension, had a preclusive effect on the issue of probable cause to arrest for drunk driving in the subsequent prosecution for that offense.
Holding:
¶11 Thus, a threshold prerequisite for application of the doctrine is that,
OWI, § 346.63(1)(am) – “Operating” – Merely Sitting in Parked Car, Engine Running, Not Enough
Village of Cross Plains v. Kristin J. Haanstad, 2006 WI 16, reversing unpublished decision
For Haanstad: John M. Gerlach
Issue: Whether sitting in the driver’s seat of a running, parked car is, without more, “operating” a motor vehicle within § 346.63.
Holding:
¶15 The term “operate” is defined in § 346.63(3)(b), which reads: “‘Operate’” means the physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.”¶16 The court of appeals’
OWI – Enhancer – Collateral Attack on OWI-1st
State v. Joseph J. Hammill, 2006 WI App 128. For Hammill: Patrick J. Stangl
Issue/Holding:
¶15 Hammill argues the circuit court erred by counting a Village of Cameron conviction. Hammill was arrested in that case for OWI-first on January 1, 1991. On January 28, Hammill was arrested for OWI in Eau Claire, which was also charged as a first offense. Hammill pled to both OWI-first cases on the same day,