On Point blog, page 75 of 88
Battery to, and Intimidation of, a Witness § 940.201(2)(a) and (b) — Elements
State v. Anthony M. Cotton, 2003 WI App 154
For Cotton: Timothy T. Kay
Issue/Holding:
¶19. Following the preliminary hearing and bindover, the State filed an information containing new charges pertaining to Cotton’s encounter with Paikowski-one count of battery or threat of battery to Paikowski and a further similar count regarding Paikowski’s family pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 940.201(2)(a) and (b). These charges require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant caused or threatened to cause bodily harm to the victim or victim’s family,
§ 941.23, CCW – As-Applied Constitutionality, in Light of Wis. Const. Art. I, § 25
State v. Munir A. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, on bypass
For Hamdan: Chris J. Trebatoski
Issue/Holding:
¶46. Under its broad police power, Wisconsin may regulate firearms. It may regulate the time, place, and manner in which firearms are possessed and used. The concealed weapons statute is a restriction on the manner in which firearms are possessed and used. See State v.
§ 941.23, CCW – Elements – “Go Armed”
State v. Munir A. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, on bypass
For Hamdan: Chris J. Trebatoski
Issue/Holding:
¶20. To convict a person of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.23, the State must prove three elements. First, the State must show that a person who is not a peace officer went armed with a dangerous weapon. State v.
Identity Theft, § 943.201 – Obtaining Lower Bail, as Something of “Value”
State v. Pamela L. Peters, 2003 WI 88, on certification
For Peters: Terry W. Rose
Issue/Holding:
¶1. This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals on a question of first-impression regarding the scope of Wisconsin’s identity theft statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.201(1999-2000). Specifically, the question is whether a defendant who misappropriates another’s identity and uses it during an arrest and in subsequent bail proceedings to obtain lower bail has done so “to obtain credit,
Escape, § 946.42 – “Actual Custody” – Dismissal of Charge but Parole Violation “Apprehension Request”
Meriter Hospital v. Dane County, 2003 WI App 248, affirmed, 2004 WI 145
Issue: Whether issuance of an “apprehension request” for alleged parole violation, following dismissal of pending charges upon jail inmate’s transfer to a hospital for treatment, leaves the person in “custody.”
Holding:
… We recently decided that a person did not have criminal status while hospitalized once a trial court stays confinement.
Escape, § 946.42 – “Actual Custody” – Effect of Stay of Probation Confinement Order
State v. Rick L. Edwards, 2003 WI App 221, PFR filed 10/24/03
For Edwards: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: A probationer whose order of jail confinement has been stayed during a period of hospitalization is not in custody for § 946.42 purposes and therefore may not be charged with escape for leaving the hospital and failing to return to jail. ¶21, and distinguishing,
Sexual Contact, § 948.02(2) — Definition of “Chest,” § 939.22(19) — Applicability to Male Victim
State v. Michael J. Forster, 2003 WI App 29, PFR filed 1/31/03
For Forster: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether designation of “breast,” in § 939.22(19), applies to males as well females, so that touching of a male breast may constitute sexual assault.
Holding: The statute plainly applies to the “intimate parts,” including “chest,” “of a human being,” and therefore applies to both genders.
Sexual Assault, § 948.02(2) — Sufficiency of Evidence
State v. Michael J. Forster, 2003 WI App 29, PFR filed 1/31/03
For Forster: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: The male victim’s testimony that the defendant “rubbed his nipple in a circular motion, while kissing [his] neck, for approximately twenty-five minutes,” established that the defendant touched an intimate part (chest) with illicit intent. ¶¶19-20.
§ 948.025, Repeated Sexual Assault — Remedy for Violation of Multiple Charging Proscription
State v. John S. Cooper, 2003 WI App 227, PFR filed 11/14/03
For Cooper: John A. Birdsall
Issue: Whether the trial court properly remedied violation of § 948.025(3) (impermissible to charge in same action both repeated-acts and individual acts of sexual assault involving same victim in same time period) by dismissing the repeated-acts charge instead of the individual-act charges.
Holding:
¶15. We hold that a court may reverse a conviction on the repeated acts charge under Wis.
§ 948.02(2), 2nd-Degree Sexual Assault (by Contact) — Elements – “Intentional” (Vs. “Knowing”) Contact
State v. John A. Jipson, 2003 WI App 222
For Jipson: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: The specifically prohibited “purpose” of sexual contact (i.e., sexual degradation, humiliation, arousal, or gratification) is not listed in § 948.02(2), but is nonetheless defined in § 948.01(5) as an element. ¶9 and id., n. 4, following State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶50, 232 Wis.