On Point blog, page 83 of 87

§ 943.30(1), Extortion – Threatening Interference with Education

State v. Richard L. Kittilstad, 231 Wis.2d 245, 603 N.W.2d 732 (1999), affirming State v. Kittilstad, 222 Wis.2d 204, 585 N.W.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Kittilstad: Richard L. Wachowski

Issue: Whether threats to interfere with educational opportunity may amount to extortion under § 943.30(1).

Holding: A threat to interfere with education is tantamount to a threat to a “calling or trade,”

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§ 944.21, Obscenity – constitutionality – jury instructions – selective prosecution – prevailing community standards

County of Kenosha v. C & S Management, 223 Wis.2d 373, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999), on certification
For C & S: Robert R. Henak, and Shellow, Shellow & Glynn

Holdings:

  • Obscenity statute, Wis. Stat. § 944.21 (1995-96), survives freedom-of-speech and void-for-vagueness challenges.
  • Expert testimony on community standards isn’t constitutionally required; telephone survey wasn’t relevant, largely because it didn’t convey the explicitness of a video,
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§ 944.32, Prostitution – Soliciting Voyeuristic Acts

State v. Richard L. Kittilstad, 231 Wis.2d 245, 603 N.W.2d 732 (1999), affirming State v. Kittilstad, 222 Wis.2d 204, 585 N.W.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Kittilstad: Richard L. Wachowski

Issue: Whether offering money in exchange for the opportunity to watch sex acts may amount to soliciting prostitution under § 944.32.

Holding: The statute requires that the defendant “solicit” someone “to practice prostitution.”

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§ 948.05, Sexual exploitation of child – constitutionality

State v. Joel R. Zarnke, 224 Wis.2d 116, 589 N.W.2d 370 (1999), reversing and remanding, 215 Wis.2d 71, 572 N.W.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1997)
For Zarnke: Michael R. Cohen, Wachowski, Johnson & Cohen

Issue/Holding:

¶ The issue before the court is whether Wis. Stat. § 948.05 prohibiting the sexual exploitation of a child violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,

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Hit-and-run – public premises

State v. Lisa A. Carter, 229 Wis. 2d 200, 598 N.W.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Carter: Paul G. LaZotte

Holding: Hit-and-run, § 346.67, applies to “premises held out to the public for use of their motor vehicles.” The event occurred at a closed gas station; the court holds the element satisfied: ” … The premises is bordered by two city streets and abuts an alley in the rear.

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OWI – implied consent law, application where driver not under arrest

State v. Jack E. Thurk, 224 Wis.2d 662, 592 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Thurk: Christopher A. Mutschler

Holding: Following a vehicular homicide the culpable driver voluntarily accompanied an officer to the station and submitted to a chemical blood test. He seeks suppression, on the ground that he was denied a request for a breathalyzer as an alternate test. The COA rejects the argument, holding that he had no right to the alternate test because he wasn’t under arrest.

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OWI – Implied Consent Law – Right to Counsel

State v. Dennis J. Reitter, 227 Wis.2d 213, 595 N.W.2d 646 (1999), on certification
For Reitter: Michael C. Witt, Monogue & Witt, S.C.

¶3 … where a defendant expresses no confusion about his or her understanding of the statute, a defendant constructively refuses to take a breathalyzer test when he or she repeatedly requests to speak with an attorney in lieu of submitting to the test. We also hold that because the implied consent law creates statutory privileges,

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Attempt, § 939.32 — intended victim’s refusal to submit

State v. Gabriel DeRango, 229 Wis.2d 1, 599 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1999), affirmed on other grounds, State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 83
For DeRango: Robert G. LeBell

Holding: The evidence was sufficient, largely because the complainant’s refusal to go along with DeRango’s scheme constituted intervention of another person, so as to satisfy the attempt statute.

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§ 940.01, Intentional Homicide — definitions – “human being” – fetus

State v. Deborah J.Z., 228 Wis.2d 468, 596 N.W.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1999), affirmed by equally divided vote, 225 Wis.2d 33, 590 N.W.2d 711 (1999)
For Deborah J.Z.: Sally Hoelzel

Holding: An unborn child is not a “human being” under the controlling definition in § 939.22(16), and the defendant therefore can’t be charged with attempting to kill and injure her fetus by excessive drinking during her pregnancy.

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§ 940.02, First-degree reckless homicide — utter disregard for human life — sufficiency of evidence

State v. Audrey A. Edmunds, 229 Wis. 2d 67, 598 N.W.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Edmunds: Dean A. Strang

Holding: “Utter disregard for human life,” an element of first-degree recklessness, derives from the old second-degree (depraved murder) statute. It imposes an objective test. Therefore, in this shaken baby death, it’s irrelevant whether Edmunds had “personal knowledge that vigorously shaking a twenty-two pound infant could subject her to the risk of serious injury”: a reasonable person would have known of the risk.

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