On Point blog, page 84 of 87
§ 940.10, Negligent Homicide by Operation of Vehicle — elements — objective standard for negligent conduct
State v. Derrick D. Johannes, 229 Wis. 2d 215, 598 N.W.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Johannes: Gregory A. Petit
Holding: Johannes was convicted of several counts related to criminally negligent operation of a vehicle. The state’s theory was that Johannes crossed a centerline when he either fell asleep or played with a stereo. He now argues that the state had to prove that he knew that such conduct would cause him to cross the centerline.
§ 940.19(1), Battery – causing bodily harm, splashed with urine.
State v. Charles Dante Higgs, 230 Wis.2d 1, 601 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Higgs: Joseph E. Redding
Issue: Whether splashing the victim’s face with urine satisfies the battery element of bodily harm.
Holding: The mere fact that urine struck the victim’s face isn’t enough to establish bodily harm, but the victim’s testimony that he felt stinging and burning satisfied the element.
§ 943.23(1r), Carjacking: Operating Vehicle Without Owner’s Consent Resulting in Death — Sufficiency of Evidence, Causation
State v. Earl L. Miller, 231 Wis.2d 447, 605 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Miller: Eduardo M. Borda
Issue: Whether an act may satisfy the “substantial factor” test for causation element if it merely plays a prominent rather than lone role in the proscribed result.
Holding: Causation is satisfied by any significant, not necessarily the sole, factor resulting in death.
Miller was convicted of operating a vehicle without owner’s consent resulting in death (carjacking),
§ 943.32, Armed Robbery – sufficiency of evidence
State v. Keith Jones, 228 Wis.2d 593, 598 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Jones: Edward J. Hunt
Holding: In the course of making their get-away, Jones’s shoplifting codefendant allegedly threatened Shogren, a pursuing guard. Notwithstanding the codefendant’s acquittal, Jones’s conviction for armed robbery is sustained against a sufficiency of evidence challenge.
Here, there was sufficient evidence to convict Jones. That the jury acquitted Patterson does not necessarily mean that it discounted Shogren’s testimony.
§ 943.10(2), Burglary While Armed – nexus of weapon to underlying crime
State v. David J. Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32, 601 N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Gardner: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate
Holding: Gardner was convicted of burglary while armed, § 943.10(2), and argues that the crime requires a nexus of weapon to burglary. The argument fails, largely on authority of State v. Norris, 214 Wis. 2d 25, 571 N.W.2d 857 (Ct. App. 1997).
Gardner next challenges his conviction claiming that “due process of law and fundamental fairness demand” that there be some nexus between the commission of the underlying crime and the fact that the accused was carrying a weapon.
Bail jumping – sufficiency of evidence – no drug consumption, positive urine test.
State v. Louis Taylor, 226 Wis.2d 490, 595 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Taylor: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether a positive urine test, while the subject is under is on bail with a no drug consumption bond condition, is sufficient to support a felony bail jumping conviction.
Holding:/Analysis:
“Where the State prosecutes an individual under Wis. Stat. § 946.49 for bail jumping,
§ 948.02, Child Abuse — failing to protect child from sexual assault — elements — person responsible for child’s welfare.
State v. Suzette M. Ward, 228 Wis.2d 301, 596 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Ward: Patricia L. Arreazola
Holding: The § 948.02(3) element, “person responsible for the welfare of a child,” was properly defined in jury instructions as “person employed or used by one legally responsible for the child’s welfare.” Payment, that is, isn’t required. Evidence of this element is therefore held sufficient, though the child care arrangement wasn’t fiscal.
§ 948.22(2), Nonsupport — “involuntary” payment via intercepts of tax refunds
State v. David J. Lenz, 230 Wis.2d 529, 602 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Lenz: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate.
Issue: Whether intercepts of tax refunds can be considered payments toward support obligations.
Holding: The nonsupport statute doesn’t require that payments be made “voluntarily,” and tax refund intercepts therefore count.
“The intercepts are payments from Lenz’s assets. Although he did not directly make them,
§ 948.22, Nonsupport — inability to pay
State v. Christopher M. Clutter, 230 Wis.2d 472, 602 N.W.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Clutter: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate.
Issue: Whether the nonsupport defense of inability to pay is viable by showing “lack of financial resources alone.”
Holding: “(L)ack of financial resources alone is insufficient to demonstrate inability to pay.”
Inability to pay is a defense to nonsupport. Clutter, on postconviction motion,
§ 948.22(2), Nonsupport — statute of limitations, unit of prosecution
State v. David J. Lenz, 230 Wis.2d 529, 602 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Lenz: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether a charge of § 948.22(2) nonsupport based on arrearages accrued more than six years prior to the charge is barred by the statute of limitations.
Holding: The crime of nonsupport is complete after each 120-day period of intentional failure to pay, including arrearages as well as current obligations,