On Point blog, page 22 of 53
SCOTUS: Warrantless alcohol breath tests reasonable, blood tests not
Birchfield v. North Dakota, USSC No. 14-1468, 2016 WL 3434398 (June 23, 2016), reversing State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 2015); vacating and remanding State v. Beylund, 861 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 2015); and affirming State v. Bernard, 844 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 2014); Scotusblog pages: Birchfield, Beylund, Bernard (include links to briefs and commentary)
Three years ago, in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the Court rejected a bright-line rule that police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have probable cause to believe is driving drunk, pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception. In these three cases, the Court adopts a bright-line rule that the police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have arrested for driving drunk, pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception. But they can only Conduct a test of the motorist’s breath, and not the motorist’s blood. Make sense?
SCOTUS reaffirms (yet again) that the categorical approach governs ACCA cases
Richard Mathis v. United States, USSC No. 15-6092, 2016 WL 343440, 579 U.S. ___ (June 23, 2016), reversing United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
In this decision the Court, by a 5-to-3 vote, reaffirms its long-standing rule that the “categorical approach,” which focuses on the elements of an offense, is to be used in determining whether a prior conviction enhances a federal offender’s sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. It also rejects the Government’s argument for an exception to that approach when the defendant is convicted under a statute that lists multiple, alternative factual means of satisfying one of the elements of the offense. While the decision obviously affects federal criminal practice, it may also affect a recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Defense win: State failed to meet burden at Kastigar hearing
State v. Karl L. Quigley, 2016 WI App 53; case activity (including briefs)
Karl Quigley confessed to sex offenses during an interrogation by a police detective, and later confessed to additional offenses while being questioned by his probation officer. The court of appeals rejects his Miranda challenge to his initial confession, but agrees that the state failed to show that evidence obtained after the statement to the P.O. was “derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of” that statement, as required by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Because Quigley’s plea bargain incorporated charges from both sets of offenses, the court remands for plea withdrawal.
Marijuana smell alone not exigency for warrantless home search
State v. Julie C. Phillips, 2015AP927-CR, 6/14/16, District III (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals rejects the state’s attempt to parlay a single fact–a strong smell of unburned marijuana emanating from a house–into exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search.
SCOTUS: Due process required recusal of justice who helped prosecute habeas petitioner
Williams v. Pennsylvania, USSC No. 15-5040, 2016 WL 3189529 (June 9, 2016), vacating and remanding Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
When he was district attorney of Philadelphia, Ronald Castille authorized a subordinate to seek a death sentence in Terrance Williams’s murder trial. Thirty years later, as Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Castille refused to recuse himself from the commonwealth’s appeal of Williams’ successful habeas petition, which alleged that the DA’s office had withheld exculpatory information contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled against Williams; SCOTUS now holds that Castille’s participation in that decision deprived Williams of due process.
SCOTUS finds Batson violation in fact-intensive ruling
Foster v. Chatman, USSC No. 14-8349, 2016 WL 2945233 (May 23, 2016); reversing an unpublished order of the Supreme Court of Georgia; Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Timothy Foster, who is black, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an all-white jury. Long after his conviction, his attorneys obtained documents from the prosecutors’ files showing their heavy reliance on race in deciding which jurors to strike. Seven of the eight justices now side with Foster and reverse the state courts’ rejection of his habeas claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Instructing jury on wrong law requires new trial
State v. Michael W. Bryzek, 2016 WI App 48; case activity (including briefs)
Bryzek had already completed most of his alleged acts when a 2010 statute broadened the definition of theft by a bailee; the court of appeals agrees with the circuit court that the jury should have been instructed on the narrower element.
Openly carrying firearms didn’t violate loitering ordinance
Village of Somerset v. Mark J. Hoffman, 2015AP140, District 3, 5/17/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Viewed through the interpretive prism mandated by § 66.0409(6), a local ordinance prohibiting “wander[ing] or stroll[ing] in an aimless manner” that is “not usual for law abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons” isn’t violated by a person walking around with a loaded semi-automatic rifle slung over his shoulder and a loaded handgun in a holster on his hip.
Traffic stop unreasonable; officer had no reason to conclude driver violated parking statute
State v. Justin Carl Herman Hembel, 2015AP1220-CR, 5/10/16, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Police lacked probable cause to believe Hembel violated § 346.54, governing “How to park and stop on streets,” so the stop of Hembel was unlawful.
Potential of juror coercion during deliberations requires new trial
United States v. Lemurel E. Williams, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1194, 4/26/16
Williams is entitled to a new trial because under the totality of the circumstances, the jury’s continued deliberations after an aborted delivery of the initial verdict were impermissibly coercive.